The Quality of Political Representation in Plural Societies

An Analysis of the Causes and Consequences of Policy Responsiveness towards Ethnic Minorities

Thesis (cumulative thesis)
presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
of the University of Zurich
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Accepted in the fall semester 2015
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee
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Zurich, 2017

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Abstract

This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities in democracies worldwide. I argue that the literature overlooks still existing limits of political equality in democracies, because the assessment of the quality of representation largely relies on the degree of policy responsiveness towards the median voter. The primacy of the median voter in policy making is not only normatively problematic, but also empirically relevant as it may put the sustainability of democracy at risk. A lack of responsiveness towards certain segments in society may lead to dissatisfaction among excluded groups, the questioning of a democracy's legitimacy, and intergroup tensions (e.g. conflict). For these reasons, a good democracy should aim at an equal consideration, formulation and inclusion of the preferences of all its citizens.

In sum, this dissertation shows that policy responsiveness differs significantly between minority and majority groups and that governments are often less responsive to members of minority than majority groups. The fact that governments are less responsive towards minorities in many democracies is normatively problematic because one of the main pillars of democracy seems to be only partially fulfilled. But it also has important empirical consequences: a lack of policy responsiveness negatively affects political support, and increases the likelihood of violent or non-violent protest against the state.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Dissertation untersucht die Ursachen und Folgen von Policy Responsiveness gegenüber ethnischen Minderheiten in Demokratien weltweit. Es wird argumentiert, dass die bisherige Literatur bestehende Grenzen von politischer Gleichheit in Demokratien übersieht, weil die Beurteilung von Policy Responsiveness den Medianwähler zum Referenzpunkt nimmt. Dies ist nicht nur aus normativer Sicht problematisch, sondern hat auch empirische Konsequenzen, weil fehlende Responsivität gegenüber Minderheiten die demokratische Stabilität gefährdet. Mangelnde Responsivität kann zu Unzufriedenheit von ausgeschlossenen Gruppen, zur Hinterfragung der demokratischen Legitimität, oder sogar zu inter-ethnischen Spannungen führen. Deshalb sollte eine gute Demokratie die Präferenzen all ihrer Bürger berücksichtigen und einbeziehen.

Zusammengefasst zeigt diese Dissertation, dass sich Policy Responsiveness tatsächlich zwischen Minderheiten und Mehrheiten unterscheidet. Regierungen sind eher gegenüber der ethnischen Mehrheit responsiv. Die Tatsache, dass Regierungen in vielen Demokratien die Präferenzen von Minderheiten weniger berücksichtigen als diejenigen von Mehrheiten ist in normativer Hinsicht problematisch, da eine der wichtigsten Säulen der Demokratie nur teilweise erfüllt wir. Sie hat jedoch auch empirische Konsequenzen: mangelnde Responsivität gegenüber Minderheiten schwächt die politische Unterstützung und erhöht die Gefahr von gewaltlosen und gewalttätigen Protesten gegen den Staat.

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Preface

This dissertation is the result of four years of research in the context of the NCCR Democracy Project "Democracy Barometer" at the University of Zurich and the Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau. Over the last four years, I was lucky to receive the support of many people who contributed tremendously to development of this thesis.

First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my defence committee. I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Daniel Bochsler who has been very supportive over the last four years. He encouraged me to pursue the challenges of studying the representation of minorities across a wide range of groups and countries from the very beginning despite – or maybe because of – a lack of any ready available data for this purpose. His critical and constructive comments on my papers and many early drafts were always very helpful in further developing my research. Innovative ideas about the framing of certain parts opened new avenues that I would not have pursued otherwise. I am also indebted to Erin Jenne from the Central European University who warmly welcomed me in her research group during my stay in Budapest. Her critical comments and the discussions in her research group CONSEC were crucial in further developing my thesis and opened my eyes to new and different aspects of the topic. The stimulating and lively environment at CEU was very valuable for developing and finalizing my dissertation. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Daniele Caramani who immediately agreed to participate in my committee and take part in my defence.

During my PhD I met many other people whose support and contribution to this thesis cannot be overestimated. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at the University of Zurich for their repeated comments on early drafts and the emotional support during our regular coffee breaks. In particular, I would like to thank Nino Abzianidze and Karima Bousbah who accompanied me from my very first days of my PhD; together we faced many steps of our PhDs; Christian Rubba and Kushtrim Veseli for their methodological support; Lea Heyne for helpful comments on various team events, and Saskia Ruth and Rebecca Welge for patiently

commenting on late versions of my dissertation and facilitating the final phase by sharing their experiences with me. Furthermore, I would like to thank all the people I have met during my research stay in Budapest and who made my time there a unique experience, both academically and socially (in particular Lisa Wewerka, Stefan Roch, Eva Zemandl, Artak Galyan, Natalia Peral, and Renira S.Angeles).

During my PhD I benefitted a lot from the opportunity to participate in multiple academic conferences and would like to thank the NCCR Democracy for the generous financial support over the last four years. The number and diversity of conferences that I was able to attend thanks to this is highly appreciated.

Beyond academia, my friends and family were always supportive and I would like to warmly thank all of them. The writing of this thesis would not have been possible without them. In particular, I would like to thank Goms who was always there for me and supported me through all the difficulties of a PhD without ever questioning my ability to finish my dissertation successfully. I would also like to thank my parents who have supported me through more than 20 years of school and university, and my brother who shared the experience as a PhD-student for some years with me and should continue to enjoy it while it still lasts.

1 Chapter

Synopsis

> *"A key characteristic of a democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals"* (Dahl 1971, 1)

According to Robert Dahl political equality, and in particular inclusion and representation are among the central aspects of democracy (Dahl 1998, 75). While earlier studies on democratization and democracy focused heavily on the (formal) aspect of inclusion (e.g. Dahl 1971; Vanhanen 2000), many seem to believe that inclusion no longer matters, especially when it is defined as universal suffrage (for citizens). Since this criteria is fulfilled in all current democracies, and even in some non-democracies, the dimension of inclusion is sometimes even dismissed as irrelevant for the evaluation of a democratic system (Beckman 2012). Because the level of inclusion no longer varies among democracies, the literature on democracy and democratization has increasingly shifted from inclusion to another aspect of democracy – (the quality of) representation (Caramani and Strijbis 2012, 2; Powell 2000; Roberts 2010). At the heart of representation lies the aspect of responsiveness, which Pitkin (1967, 142–143) judges as its most important dimension. May (1978, 1) even sees policy responsiveness as *the* defining criteria of democracy. Consequently, the aspect of responsiveness has gained increasing attention over the last few decades, with most studies concluding that today's democracies perform reasonably well in this regard (e.g. Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Kang & Powell, 2010; Powell, 2004; Roberts, 2010).

As inclusion appears to be universal, and policy responsiveness sufficiently high, we might be tempted to celebrate the fulfilment of political equality as one of the defining (if not

the defining (c.f. May, 1978, p. 1)) aspects of democracy. But is political equality indeed perfectly guaranteed in all democracies? My dissertation begs to differ.

I argue that the literature overlooks still existing limits of political equality in democracies. Inclusion and representation are severely restricted in most (if not all) democracies in at least two respects. On the one hand, they tend to exclude individuals without voting rights such as non-naturalized immigrants or prisoners (Paxton et al. 2003). Since parties adjust their policy position towards the median voter in order to maximise votes (Downs 1957), they have less reason to be responsive to individuals without voting rights. Consequently, the phenomenon of exclusion from the electorate is likely to affect the level of responsiveness of governments (Gilens 2011). On the other hand, the definition of inclusion as universal suffrage is very restrictive. Inclusion does not only refer to the formal inclusion into the electorate, but also to the incorporation of citizens in the decision-making process and their opportunity to influence policy outcomes – i.e. to citizens' inclusion into decision-making (Young 2000, 5–6). When inclusion is understood in this way, in most democracies even individuals with citizen status are excluded, namely minority groups within the (national) population. Although, some countries have introduced special rules for the representation of minorities, responsiveness towards them remains low (see Chapter 2). In particular when policy preferences vary systematically across social or political groups, the primacy of the median voter (Downs 1957) might mean that the preferences of certain groups in the population are ignored and their equal rights and treatment neglected (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 29; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 156). In this sense I argue that most democracies do not fulfil one of the main quality criteria when it comes to minorities, namely the continued responsiveness of political authorities to the preferences of its citizens, treated as political equals (Dahl 1971, 1).

The political exclusion and underrepresentation of minorities is not only normatively problematic, but also empirically relevant as it might lead to dissatisfaction among excluded

groups, the questioning of a democracy's legitimacy, and intergroup tensions (Dalton 2004; Norris 2011; Roberts 2010). In this regard, the question of how a regime treats its minorities and to what extent it responds to their preferences may influence the trajectory of the entire political system. Anecdotal case evidence supports these concerns. Disagreements over cultural, economic and language policies has led to protests and violence between minority and majority groups (for instance) in the Ukraine, Tîrgu Mureș (Romania), Bulgaria, or Bolivia. More specifically, in the Ukraine MPs clashed violently over disagreements regarding the language rights of the Russian minority (BBC News Europe 2012; Roudik 2012); in Tîrgu Mureș (Romania) protests by the Hungarian minority against the language policy of the government turned violent when minority protestors clashed with nationalist Romanians (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); in Bolivia indigenous groups engaged repeatedly in protests against government reforms concerning indigenous land and access to subsoil resources (see also chapter 4); and in Bulgaria the economic and cultural discrimination of the Turkish minority under communism brought the country to the fringe of ethnic conflict in the early 1990s. It was probably only avoided due to a more accommodative policy stance (Koinova 2009). These examples underline the importance of ensuring responsiveness not only towards the majority, but also towards structural and political minorities (e.g. ethnic minorities). A good democracy should, thus, aim at an equal consideration, formulation and inclusion of the preferences of all its citizens (Bühlmann et al. 2011). Motivated by this tension between responsiveness towards the median citizen and minority groups in the population, this dissertation aims at better understanding responsiveness towards minorities. In particular, I focus on the causes and consequences of (a lack of) responsiveness towards minorities in democratic states.

While the problem of low responsiveness towards minorities potentially applies to a wider range of minority groups in a country, empirically I study responsiveness towards ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities are a feasible level of analysis, because in contrast to

other minority groups in society – e.g. class, immigrants – divisions between a country's majority population and its national minorities present a persistent, identity-based cleavage (in contrast to class). In addition, most members of national minorities have full citizenship rights (in contrast to immigrants). Ethnic minorities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-national identity groups, based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18).

The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses existing studies that deal with policy responsiveness in general and policy responsiveness towards minorities in particular. Section 2 examines the quality of minority representation from a comparative perspective and shows that representation and responsiveness towards minorities is insufficiently guaranteed in most democracies. Section 3 discusses the contributions of this dissertation and outlines my own arguments. Section 4 presents the case selection, while section 5 gives an overview of the three papers that build the core of the dissertation.

State of the Art

Responsiveness is approached in different ways in the literature. In my dissertation it is understood as policy responsiveness and defined as the responsiveness of political institutions (namely government and legislature) to the preferences and opinions of their citizens and the introduction of policies and issues that are in line with citizens' preferences. As many studies on policy responsiveness towards minorities are based on Pitkin (1967, 209), I use the term substantive representation and (policy) responsiveness interchangeably. In line with the definition of policy responsiveness used here, Pitkin (1967, 209) defines substantive representation as "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them."

Current research on policy responsiveness towards the general population is often based on the idea of ideological (or issue) congruence between citizens and the government or the

legislature. These studies depart from the premise that congruence between what citizens want and what governments and legislatures do is one of the central features of democracy and should be sufficiently high (e.g. Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000; Wlezien & Soroka, 2007). Comparing ideological or policy positions of voters and legislatures (or governments), policy responsiveness appears satisfactory (e.g. Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2007; Kang & Powell, 2010; Mattila & Raunio, 2006). Mainstream parties seem to change their policy positions in response to the preferences of the median voter (Ezrow et al. 2010), legislatures' and governments' position appear to be mostly in line with the preferences of the median voter (Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000), and responsiveness seems even to improve over time (Powell, 2009). However, all these studies judge the quality of representation exclusively through the representation of the median voter. That preferences of minorities might not be equally represented is not seen as a flaw of democracy, because "the position of *the median voter* is the only policy that would be preferred to all others by a majority of voters" (Powell, 2000, p. 163).

By contrast, research on policy responsiveness towards minority groups explicitly challenges this view of representation and argues that minority groups must be protected against a "tyranny of the majority". Influenced by Hannah Pitkin's (1967) theory on representation, an overwhelming majority of studies focus either on the relationship between descriptive representation – i.e. representation of minorities by MPs of their group – and policy responsiveness, or simply on the level of policy responsiveness towards specific minority groups. In this tradition, policy responsiveness towards minorities has mainly been studied with respect to three groups: socio-economic minorities, women, and ethnic minorities (or immigrants).

Studies on socio-economic minorities repeatedly showed that governments are less responsive to poor citizens than to the median citizen or more affluent citizens (e.g. Bartels,

2008; Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012; Gilens, 2011, 2012). However, most of these studies did not place much emphasis on the reasons for low levels of policy responsiveness towards socio-economically less well-off citizens. The main exception is a recent study by Bernauer, Giger and Rosset (2015) who show that the bias against less affluent citizens is smaller in more proportional electoral systems.

Studies on policy responsiveness towards women, by contrast, have extensively studied the causes of policy responsiveness, in particular the link between descriptive and substantive representation (e.g. Kittilson, 2008; Phillips, 1994; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Wängnerud, 2009). They tend to agree that the presence of female MPs is a central prerequisite for policy responsiveness towards women.

Research on ethnic minorities' substantive representation is most developed in the United States. Since the 1970s, a vast body of literature has built up that focuses on the effect of ethnic minority representation (mostly of Afro-Americans and Hispanics) in parliament on policy responsiveness towards these groups (e.g. Gamble, 2007; Hero & Tolbert, 1995; Minta & Sinclair-Chapman, 2013; Minta, 2009; Owens, 2005). Only few scholars have dealt with policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities in other countries (e.g. Bird 2011b; Hodžić and Mraović 2015; Pande 2003; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011). To the best of my knowledge, the only comparative evaluation of ethnic minorities' substantive representation was conducted by Andrew Reynolds who briefly addresses the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation across countries (Reynolds 2011, 99–100).

I build on this literature in order to study how well democracies fulfil one of their central pillars when it comes to ethnic minorities, and what its causes and consequences are. In my dissertation I widen the scope of previous studies, both theoretically, by addressing the causes *and* consequences of policy responsiveness towards minorities, and geographically, by covering more than 40 democracies worldwide. This enables us to understand if the pattern found in previous studies is a phenomenon of certain heavily divided societies or

generalizable to democracies worldwide. In order to better understand this, the next section gives an empirical overview of the quality of minority representation in today's democracies. Thereafter, I introduce the argument of this dissertation and outline its main contributions.

The Quality of Minority Representation

As discussed above, representation is a central aspect of democracy. While most citizens enjoy the right to vote in today's democracies and have, therefore, the formal possibility to be represented in the political system, the actual representation of minorities and responsiveness towards their demands is often criticised. In this section, I present a descriptive overview of the novel data on descriptive and substantive representation used in this dissertation by discussing how well ethnic minorities are represented in today's democracies, and how responsive governments are towards their demands. In this context I also address the argument that responsiveness towards minorities only matters as long as minorities and majorities have different policy preferences.

While disputed in the literature, many members of minority groups seem to think that only members of their own ethnic group can represent them properly. Hence, they see a direct link between representation in parliament and the representation of their interests (Phillips 1998; Ruedin 2009; Young 2000). Even in the absence of a proven effect of descriptive representation on substantive representation, most democracies seek some degree of minority representation "in the name of justice and legitimacy" (Ruedin 2009, 335). Nevertheless, minorities remain underrepresented in most democracies (see figure 1). Based on the data used in this dissertation, figure 1 presents the average level of descriptive representation across a country's democratic period. While there is quite a lot of variance across time and between countries, which will be investigated further in chapters 2 and 3, it is evident even at this stage that many minority groups are severely underrepresented or entirely excluded from the legislature (values<1 in figure 1), while only few achieve representation that is

proportional to their size or overrepresentation (values≥1 in figure 1). Despite the fact that all these countries are democratic they seem to violate one of the main requirements of liberal democracy when it comes to minorities – namely the equality of representation. It is striking how many groups have been completely excluded from parliament throughout the entire democratic period of their country. While complete exclusion is predominantly the fate of very small minorities, there are a number of large groups with astonishingly low levels of representation (e.g. Russians in Estonia and Lithuania, indigenous groups in Bolivia and Peru). Representation in Boliva, for instance, only increased in recent years when Evo Morales managed to fully mobilize the indigenous population and won the presidential elections of 2005.

What does the exclusion of minorities from parliament imply for other aspects of representation? While some expect a direct link between descriptive representation of groups in parliament and the responsiveness to their preferences (e.g. Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Mansbridge 1999; Preuhs 2007; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), others question the benefit of descriptive representation (e.g. Cameron, Epstein, and Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999; Pitkin 1967), and point out that governments may enact minority friendly policies in the absence of descriptive representation in order to improve democratic legitimacy and ensure the accommodation of ethnic groups (e.g. Preuhs 2007, 279; Zuber 2015, 5). Hence, policy responsiveness towards minorities might be achieved even in the absence of descriptive representation. Given that research on policy responsiveness towards the general population evaluates the quality of representation as rather good (e.g. Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000) the question arises whether they are equally responsive to minority groups.

Figure 1: The descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in democratic parliaments



Notes: Figure 1 depicts the average level of descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups across the democratic period of a particular country. Values of 1 refer to proportional representation – i.e. a group's share in parliament corresponds to its share in the population.

From a normative point of view, responsiveness towards minorities is crucial for a democracy in order to fulfil the democratic requirement to represent citizens as political equals (Bühlmann et al. 2011, 522; Dahl 1971, 1). Empirically, however, a lack of responsiveness towards minorities *only* matters if minorities have distinct preferences that differ from the majority (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 166). If preferences among the minority and majority population are equal it is (empirically) irrelevant if governments are more likely to respond to the demands of one group or the other, since the link between policy preferences and policy outcome would be the same across all groups (Gilens 2012, 78). Research on policy responsiveness towards special groups, therefore, relies on the implicit or explicit assumption that distinct minority interests exist, and that preferences on these differ between minorities and majorities (e.g. Zuber, 2015, p. 4). The link between group identity and political preferences has been discussed most extensively in social psychology. According to this literature, group membership influences not only how we view ourselves and others, but also the values and attitudes we hold (Conover 1984; Hogg 2003; Huber and Powell 1994; Lieberman and McClendon 2012). Apart from social psychological processes associated with group membership, the actual life experiences of members of a social group contribute to the formation of preferences that are similar across members of the same group. For instance, many ethnic groups share not only a distinct culture, but also a distinct economic position that differentiates them (on average) from other groups. Such group based cultural and economic differences might well affect group needs and preferences with regard to cultural, economic and social-welfare policies (Baldwin and Huber 2010).

When policy preferences indeed differ between the minority and majority population, studying the responsiveness towards the median voter is insufficient to judge the quality of representation. Therefore, figures 2-4 compare the preferences of minorities and majorities over different issues for selective (mostly European) countries, for which survey data was available. I distinguish between policy issues which are directly associated with minorities –

e.g. cultural and minority rights – and issues that have more indirect implications – i.e. economic issues. In each figure the coefficients represent the (predicted) difference between minority and majority groups, sorted by the difference between the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval and the zero line (see also Lieberman and McClendon 2012).[1]

Figure 2: Difference between the majority and minority groups regarding the perceived importance of cultural autonomy for minority groups, 95% CIs



Notes: Estimates are based on the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2003 on National Identity (II) (ISSP Research Group 2012). Specifically, the following question was used in order to analyse differences between minorities and majorities: "Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions" (Q8b). Coefficients represent predicted difference between minorities and majorities, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figures 2 and 3 clearly reveal preference differences between members of minority and majority groups when it comes to cultural issues. Figure 2 presents preferences for cultural autonomy in eight democracies.[2] In line with what one would expect, minority groups are more supportive of cultural rights than the respective majority group in their country.[3] We find the largest differences in countries with strong ethno-national cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe and the smallest differences in Western countries with comparatively less

[1] Where the bars do not cross the zero line these differences are statistically significant on the 95% level.
[2] Specifically, individuals were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their cultural autonomy (ISSP Research Group, 2012).
[3] On the 90% level, differences are significant in all countries except Spain.

salient ethnic divisions. The fact that the differences are not significant in Spain is surprising, given the increased salience of autonomy demands in recent years. A closer look at the preferences of Spain's ethnic groups reveals that the non-finding is partly due to differences across groups. While Basques are more supportive of cultural autonomy than the Spanish majority, all other groups are not significantly distinguishable from the majority population.

Along the same lines, figure 3 displays differences regarding the evaluation of the importance of minority rights (European Social Survey 2013). Supporting the pattern described above, members of ethnic minority groups differ significantly from the respective majority group in about half of the cases. Kosovo is the only case, where the minority is significantly less supportive of minority rights than the respective majority population. On the one hand, the fact that the Serb minority in Kosovo is less in favour of minority rights than the Albanian majority might be related to the Serbs' strong orientation towards Serbia. If Serbs perceive themselves as citizens of Serbia rather than of Kosovo, they might not be concerned with the guarantee of minority rights. On the other hand, Serbs might not perceive themselves as a national minority, because the term "nationalities" was used for non-constituent people in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (e.g. Albanians, Roma, Greeks etc.) rather than for the Slavic constituent people of the six republics. In line with the pattern in Figure 2, preferences differ more strongly in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western European countries, where minority rights are less salient. Intuitively this makes sense, as rights for *national* minorities receive broad support in most Western European countries.[4]

[4] It is more surprising that the preferences for minority rights do not differ significantly between majorities and minorities in the Ukraine and Israel. The case of the Russians in the Ukraine might be similar to the Serbs in Kosovo. Russians might not perceive themselves as a true minority, because they used to control the government before the Ukraine became independent from the USSR. Furthermore, the survey was conducted in 2013 – i.e. before the ousting of Yanukovych – when the Russian minority was politically more powerful. While for The case of Israel, the difference between the Jewish and Islamic population almost reaches significance, the relatively small effect might be explained by the ESS' sampling strategy. They have exclusively interviewed Arab (Islamic) people who hold Israeli citizenship and, therefore excluded Palestinians in East Jerusalem (or the occupied territories). The exclusion of an important part of the Islamic population from the survey might potentially bias the results.

Figure 3: Perceived importance of minority rights among minorities, 95% CIs



Notes: Estimates are based on the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS6) (European Social Survey 2013). Specifically, responses to the following question were analysed: "How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the rights of minority groups are protected?" Coefficients represent predicted difference between minorities and majorities, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

In sum, as expected by Kymlicka (1995) and others (e.g. Evans & Need, 2002; Rovny, 2014) preferences on cultural issues seem to differ considerably between members of the majority and the minority population. When governments follow the median voter[5] on these issues, minority preferences are likely to be neglected. However, members of ethnic minority groups are obviously not only concerned with cultural policies. On the contrary, for many, economic questions might be much more important. Therefore, I also looked at differences in policy preferences on more general policy issues. Based on data from the second and third round of the comparative study of electoral systems (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013) I evaluated differences between minority and majority groups regarding their perception of a country's most important policy problem. I was particularly interested in whether members of minorities and majorities prioritize economic questions differently. If we

[5] Following the median voter theorem (Downs 1957) we can expect governments to be responsive to the majority more often than to the minority population.

also find preference variations in purely economic areas, this lends further support to the claim that policy responsiveness towards minorities matters empirically.[6]

Figure 4: Probability of prioritizing unemployment relative to (majority) group, 95% CIs



Notes: Estimates are based on the second and third round of the comparative survey of electoral systems (CSES) (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013). Specifically responses to the following question were analysed: "What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election?"

Figure 4 presents the differences between a country's minority groups and the majority population in the predicted probability of mentioning unemployment as the most important policy problem. With 15 out of 53 (28%) differences being significantly distinguishable from the majority group, the gap between majorities' and minorities' priorities is quite substantial. Given that unemployment is generally a very salient political topic, the size of this gap is surprising. It implies that governments might face difficulties when attempting to be equally responsive to minorities and majorities when it comes to economic issues. Comparable

[6] As I am more interested in whether preferences differ between majority and minority groups than in the direction of the effect, I present absolute values to facilitate the graphical interpretation (c.f. Lieberman & McClendon, 2012).

differences also exist with regard to other non-cultural policy issues in democracies (see figure A1 & A2 in the Appendix).

Considering the differences between preferences of minorities and majorities, policy responsiveness towards minority groups is not only normatively desirable, but also empirically relevant, as polities that are primarily responsive towards the median voter are likely to neglect the preferences of minority groups. How do democratic governments deal with this challenge? Are they ready to defend the interests of minorities against intrusion by the majority population (Van Cott 2005) and risk contradicting the preferences of the median voter? Or do they accord electoral concerns greater importance, and respond only to the preferences of the pivotal (median) voter (Downs 1957)?

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate policy responsiveness in the two policy areas discussed above – cultural and economic rights – by analysing the level of minority language rights and the existence of policies against economic discrimination. Given the substantial preference differences in cultural and economic areas these two policies are likely to be important for most members of minority groups. According to figures 5 and 6 there are only few countries which fully guarantee minority language rights and where economic discrimination against minorities is completely absent. In about half of the countries, minority language rights are relatively well guaranteed and governments implement policies to improve the economic position of minorities. This leaves roughly half of all analysed minority groups, which do not benefit from minority language rights and are severely economically discriminated against. Since minorities often have higher preferences for minority rights than majorities, this implies that policy responsiveness towards minorities suffers in these countries. How policy responsiveness towards minorities may be increased, and what consequences a failure to respond to minorities' preferences has, is the topic of the three chapters that comprise this dissertation. Based on this discussion, I now outline the main theoretical and empirical contributions and the overall findings of my dissertation.

Figure 5: The level of language rights for minorities in democratic states



Notes: Figure 5 shows the average level of minority language rights (scale of 0-6) over a country's democratic period. Higher values refer to higher levels of language rights.

Figure 6: The level of economic discrimination of minorities in democratic states



Notes: Figure 6 shows the average level of economic discrimination (scale of 0-4) over a country's democratic period. Higher values refer to higher levels of discrimination.

Main contributions of the dissertation

This dissertation combines the literature on the quality of democracy – in particular on policy responsiveness and representation - with studies on ethnic conflict and power-sharing.

More specifically, it contributes to the literature on political representation in general and policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities in particular in two ways. First, I challenge the still dominant view in the literature that policy responsiveness towards the median voter (or citizen) is sufficient or even normatively superior (Powell 2000, 164; Roberts 2010, 40). While there is indeed no other policy position that is supported by more voters (Powell 2000, 163), I argue that strict responsiveness to the preferences of the median voter is nevertheless problematic – in particular in heterogeneous societies. When preferences differ significantly between minority and majority groups, responsiveness towards the median voter might easily result in a "tyranny of the majority" (Toqueville 1987). By focusing explicitly on policy responsiveness towards minorities, I test to what extent democracies fulfil their liberal requirement to "guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1987). Second, I develop a new theoretical framework to explain diverging levels of policy responsiveness towards minorities. One part of the literature discusses the problem of low policy responsiveness towards minorities as a critique of the median voter perspective, and compares responsiveness towards minorities and majorities (e.g. Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012; Gilens, 2011). However, this literature does usually not consider the causes or consequences of low levels of policy responsiveness among minorities (but see Bernauer et al., 2015). Other studies depart from the assumption that minorities are underrepresented without actually testing it, and focus on explanations for the (allegedly) low policy responsiveness towards minorities. These studies (e.g. Bird 2011a; Mansbridge 1999; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wängnerud 2009) tend to associate low policy responsiveness towards minorities with their low political representation in parliament – that is, minorities' low descriptive representation. However, already Pitkin (1967, 142) on whose

work most of these studies rely, questioned whether the representation of groups through MPs of their own group really increases policy responsiveness. Minority MPs might be too small in number to influence policy outputs even if all MPs of minority groups are fully committed to representing their own groups (probably a very unrealistic assumption). Consequently, I argue in my dissertation that mere descriptive representation of minorities in parliament is insufficient to guarantee government responsiveness towards their demands. Minority MPs need to be in a special position of power, and possess additional leverage to ensure that their demands are heard and translated into minority-friendly policy outcomes.

Contributing to the literature on democratic support, ethnic conflict and power-sharing, I analyse the consequences of low policy responsiveness towards minorities. While the potential consequences of low levels of policy responsiveness are vividly discussed in the literature and many are aware of the fact that responsiveness towards minorities is not fully guaranteed, very few, if any, studies have explicitly analysed the consequences of low policy responsiveness on the behaviour and attitudes of minorities. I argue that a lack of policy responsiveness reduces the legitimacy of a political system and the political support among the minority population, and is likely to lead to protest and conflict. While especially the latter has become a central claim in the literature on ethnic conflict (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Theuerkauf 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), it has so far not directly been tested, as most studies approximate policy responsiveness with descriptive representation in the government. Combining insights from the conflict and representation literature, I argue that these are two different mechanisms which need to be disentangled in order to fully understand the role of representation for conflict.

Apart from developing a new theoretical framework to explain why responsiveness towards minorities is important, how it may be achieved, and what consequences it has, I contribute empirically to the literature on policy responsiveness by presenting a novel approach to studying policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities from a comparative

perspective. Policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities has so far mainly been studied in qualitative studies with few cases (e.g. Bird, 2011a; Hodžić & Mraović, 2015; Pande, 2003), or in quantitative single case studies in the United States (e.g. Owens, 2005; Preuhs, 2006, 2007; Reingold & Smith, 2012). Studying policy responsiveness towards minority groups comparatively across *different* countries is notoriously difficult, as neither the approaches from qualitative nor quantitative case studies are easily applicable. (Qualitative) Case studies focus mostly on roll call votes, speeches of parliamentarians or MPs' expressed commitment to represent their ethnic group (e.g. Bird, 2011b; Hodžić & Mraović, 2015). Quantitative studies from the United States, by contrast, measure policy responsiveness by looking at issues that are important to minorities in the United States (e.g. social welfare benefits). Both approaches pose unresolved challenges to an application to comparative large-N studies. Analysing roll-call votes or parliamentary speeches across multiple countries is impractical and suffers from problems of data availability; issues that are important to minorities in the United States are certainly not a sufficient proxy for substantive representation in other countries. In this dissertation, I therefore present an approach that allows policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities to be studied across a wider range of groups and countries by applying a strategy that proved successful in studies on policy responsiveness towards women (e.g. Caiazza, 2004; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005): I consider policies that are likely to be important for most members of minority groups across many countries, and concentrate on policy areas where minorities tend to have different preferences than the majority – i.e. on areas where responsiveness towards minorities matters. I relied on academic research and international treaties to identify two policy areas which directly affect members of ethnic minority groups: language rights and economic discrimination.

In sum, through studying policy responsiveness towards minorities from a comparative perspective, this dissertation shows that policy responsiveness differs significantly between

minority and majority groups and that governments are often less responsive to members of minority groups. Normatively, this is problematic as, when it comes to ethnic minorities, one of the main pillars of democracy seems to be only partially fulfilled. This has important consequences, as minorities who receive lower levels of policy responsiveness are less supportive of their political system (see chapter 2), and more likely to engage in conflict (see chapter 4). While descriptive representation is important to increase policy responsiveness, in particular if minorities benefit from additional leverage (see chapter 3), it is insufficient to guarantee the legitimacy of a democratic system on its own, i.e. in the absence of policy responsiveness. The inclusion of token representatives in parliament is not sufficient to ensure the support for democracy (see chapter 2). What matters are governments that consider the preferences of minority groups, and respond adequately to their demands. In light of increasing discussions about quotas for women and minorities, this has important implications. In order to fulfil the liberal requirement of representing as many citizens as possible, democratic governments need to consider minorities' as well as majorities' preferences, rather than just granting certain groups some additional seats in parliament. This requires political systems with incentives for politicians to act against the will of the majority if it is necessary to protect the fundamental interests of the minority. While this is unlikely in purely majoritarian systems, it might be achieved through political systems which encourage compromises among different factions of society – be it through political institutions that require coalition governments or electoral rules that make politicians dependent on the preferences of majorities and minorities alike (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1969; Reilly 2001).

While this dissertation focuses on the representation of ethnic minorities, these findings are likely to be valid for other minority groups in society as well. The challenge of low policy responsiveness applies not only to ethnic minorities, but also to poorer socio-economic groups or sexual minorities. For instance, in light of the findings of this dissertation, the growing

economic inequality in democracies and the underrepresentation of lower classes in parliament (Schäfer 2015, chap. 8) should raise concerns. Similar to underrepresented ethnic groups, they might become dissatisfied with democracy and/or engage in protest against the state. Conversely, when democracies succeed in including and representing these groups, support for the political system they live in might prosper. To what extent the findings of this dissertation are indeed transferable to other social minority groups might be a promising avenue for future research.

Case selection

This thesis builds on the assumption that political representation, institutional characteristics and political processes influence the level of policy responsiveness towards minority demands. It aims at understanding how well democracies fulfil one of their central pillars when it comes to ethnic minorities and what its consequences are. While it would certainly be enlightening to compare responsiveness towards minorities in democracies and autocracies, causes and consequences of policy responsiveness are inherently different in democratic and non-democratic regimes. For instance, one argument for the level of policy responsiveness put forward in the literature refers to descriptive representation in parliament (see chapter 3). In non-democratic regimes, parliaments are often less important and MPs have less influence over the legislative process. Studying the effect of representational processes in democracies and autocracies simultaneously might, therefore, not be very useful. Similarly, the consequences of lacking policy responsiveness might be different. For instance, analysing the support for democracy in non-democratic countries (see chapter 2) is quite counterintuitive.

Consequently, this dissertation is based on a worldwide sample of ethnically heterogeneous democracies. Ethnicity is understood as a socially constructed identity, based on factors such as perceived common origin, language, or religious beliefs (Cederman,

Wimmer, and Min 2010; Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985). Countries that reach a minimum level of democracy according to Freedom House (≤4) and Polity IV (≥6) and exceed a population of 500'000 were included in the initial selection.[7] In order to ensure the comparability of cases 17 Asian and African countries were then excluded from further analyses. In particular, the countries were excluded for the following reasons:

1) It is more difficult to reliably identify relevant ethnic groups in African and Asian countries. In contrast to other world regions, identity-based cleavages tend to cut across each other more often (i.e. India, Kenya, Zambia) which makes the identification of ethnic groups empirically much more problematic. The basis for ethnic identification may even change completely in a short period of time, as illustrated by regime transitions in Kenya and Zambia, where democratization led to a shift from local (clan-based) identity to regional (language- or religion-based) identity (Posner 2007).

2) Studying policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities requires that minority and majority groups are clearly distinguishable and identifiable. In most democracies political and demographic majorities are identical, i.e. majorities are usually better represented than minorities and constitute the political elite. However, this is not necessarily true in former colonies, where some minority groups are historically advantaged and control the most important political positions. The history of ethnic dictatorship and colonialism makes the division into majority and minority groups particularly problematic in Asia and Africa. In depth case knowledge of each country would be necessary to pick the appropriate (political) minority group for the analysis. While the political majority might

[7] In cases where the two ratings differed, the country was only included if it was rated at most one scale-point below the democracy threshold (on the measure where it was not rated as democratic). If countries were democratic for different periods with authoritarian interruptions, only the most recent democratic period was considered. If a country's democracy broke down recently (e.g. Venezuela), it was excluded.

reside with the minority in Latin America as well, the privileged minority group is at least consistent across countries – i.e. the descendants of the Spanish settlers.

3) In many African countries ethnic parties are banned and representation based on ethnicity is prohibited. Information on the representation of ethnic groups is, therefore, scarce. This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to study the effect of descriptive representation in these countries (e.g. Bogaards, Basedau, & Hartmann, 2010; and further contributions in Democratization 17(4)).

Overall, these criteria allow for the consideration of over 90 ethnic minority groups from more than 40 countries.[8] In order to study policy responsiveness towards minorities empirically across time and space, I compiled the original dataset "Ethnic minorities in democracies" that covers all pluri-ethnic democracies in Europe, North and South America, and Oceania since 1945. Datasets on ethnic groups notoriously suffer from selection bias, as researchers need to determine which of over 5000 ethnic groups to include into the analyses (Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce the problem of selection bias, the two most commonly used datasets on ethnic groups were combined in order to select ethnic groups. Groups were selected on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority at Risk Project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).[9] The dataset includes novel measures on minority language rights and descriptive representation in parliament and government since 1945 and combines them with recoded and extended measures of MAR and EPR.[10]

[8] However, the number of countries that are included in the different chapters differs slightly due to data availability (see the respective appendices of each chapter for a list of countries and ethnic groups that are included).

[9] EPR-ETH defines a group as politically relevant if "at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Hunziker 2013). A group is defined as relevant (or politically significant) by MAR if "the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and [if] the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests" (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).

[10] A more detailed description of the dataset is provided in the data appendix at the end of this dissertation.

Overview

This dissertation consists of three papers each highlighting different aspects of the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities (see figure 7). The first article (chapter 2) is concerned with a normative critique of the primacy of the median voter in studies on policy responsiveness. It challenges the view that responsiveness towards the median voter is sufficient or even normatively superior, and highlights the empirical consequences of a lack of responsiveness for the quality of democracy. The second article (chapter 3) focuses explicitly on the causes of policy responsiveness by analysing the conditions under which descriptive representation contributes to policy responsiveness. The third and final article (chapter 4) of this dissertation is concerned with the question of whether policy responsiveness indeed has an accommodating effect on inter-ethnic relations by reducing the risk of violent and non-violent ethnic protest.

In the following paragraphs the main argument and the most important findings of each paper are briefly summarized.

Figure 7: Overview of dissertation



Chapter 2: Responsiveness – to whom? Why the primacy of the median voter alienates minorities

Chapter 2 (1st Paper) constitutes the normative basis of this dissertation and discusses why policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities matters. Many see responsiveness towards the median voter as sufficient or even normatively superior, because no other policy position will receive more support (Powell 2000, 164; Roberts 2010, 40). However, in heterogeneous societies pure responsiveness to the median voter bears the risk of creating a "tyranny of the majority" (Toqueville 1987), as policy positions which divert from the median's position are not considered in policy making. I argue that a lack of policy responsiveness towards minorities is not only normatively problematic, but endangers the stability of democratic systems, because policy outputs which meet the demands of a society are one of the most important guarantors for the public support of a political system (Easton 1957). Accordingly, if citizens feel unrepresented by the political authorities, they are likely to lose trust in the political institutions and to withdraw their support from the political system (Ishiyama 2001; Ruiz-Rufino 2013).

Chapter 3: Presence, representation and impact: how minority MPs affect policy outcomes

After having established the importance of policy responsiveness towards minorities in chapter 2, chapter 3 (2nd Paper) focuses on the potential causes of policy responsiveness. Why are policy outcomes in some democracies consistent with minority preferences while in others minority rights are severely contested? Some scholars of representation argue that there is a direct link between representation in parliament and the representation of interests – i.e. between descriptive and substantive representation. They claim that descriptive representatives share experiences with members of their own social group and are, therefore,

more likely to share their group's political perspectives and to act in favour of minority voters than MPs of other social groups (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 2000).

While this argument seems appealing at first, I argue in the third chapter that the actual effect of minority representation in parliament on policy outcomes is not self-evident. Even if a minority group is proportionally represented in parliament, its number of MPs is usually rather small. Minority MPs can, therefore, easily be outvoted and politically marginalised (Bieber 2008, 114). Conversely, governments may enact minority-friendly policies even in the absence of descriptive representation in order to enhance democratic legitimacy and stability (Preuhs 2007, 279).

Hence, while many expect a link between the descriptive representation of minorities and policy responsiveness, the mechanism of how minority MPs affect policy outcomes has so far remained largely unclear. In this paper I focus on the conditions under which descriptive representation has an effect on policy outcomes. I argue that it is not primarily the level of descriptive representation that matters, but its combination with three moderating factors that increase the leverage of minority MPs: government inclusion (Preuhs 2006, 2007), a powerful legislature (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007), and the size of the included minority group (Ghanem 2012).

Chapter 4: Inclusion and responsiveness: Disentangling political representation and its effect on ethnic protests in electoral democracies

The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation (3rd Paper) analyses the consequences of a lack of policy responsiveness on democratic stability and inter-ethnic peace. According to grievance-based explanations of conflict, ethnic unrest is more likely when minority groups are insufficiently included into the political process. When certain groups do not feel represented, they are more likely to feel excluded and to develop feelings of anger and resentment that might translate into ethnic confrontations (Theuerkauf 2010). In this regard,

political representation has two potential benefits: symbolic inclusion and policy responsiveness. While most studies on the link between representation and ethnic conflict acknowledge the importance of policy responsiveness, they restrict their analysis to the effect of descriptive representation (in the government). In the fourth chapter of my dissertation, I disentangle the effect of symbolic inclusion from policy responsiveness and argue that actual policy consequences are more important than descriptive representation for the avoidance of ethnic confrontations. The quantitative analysis of the argument is combined with a qualitative case study of Bolivia to better illustrate the causal mechanism at hand.

Synthesis of the chapters

In sum, this dissertation combines and extends the literature on representation, conflict, and power-sharing in order to study the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness towards minorities in democracies. The overarching theoretical framework of this thesis heavily relies on Pitkin's (1967) seminal contribution, which emphasises the multi-dimensionality of representation. Whereas her contribution remains entirely theoretical, many have taken up her argument and studied some dimensions of representation empirically. In line with Pitkin (1967) and May's (1978) conviction that policy responsiveness is *the* crucial aspect of democracy, most scholars have particularly focused on this aspect of representation. The general literature on policy responsiveness tends to overlook, however, that minorities are not necessarily well represented by the median voter, in particular if their preferences differ from those of the majority population. The goal of the present thesis was to address this gap in the literature by focusing explicitly on policy responsiveness towards *minorities*.

In contrast to the literature on policy responsiveness, the literature on conflict and power-sharing has long recognized the importance of representing minorities and considering their preferences in politics. Most prominently, Lijphart (1969) argues in favour of power-sharing systems that include minorities and majorities into the most important political institutions.

The underlying assumption of such propositions is that political inclusion – i.e. descriptive representation – automatically translates into political influence (see also Birnir 2007; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). With this dissertation, I challenge this simplification and argue that the effects of descriptive and substantive representation need to be distinguished. It is not evident that descriptive representation directly relates to increased levels of policy responsiveness (chapter 3), or that different types of representation affect the stability and legitimacy of a political system in the same way (chapter 2 and 4). Therefore, by distinguishing between different aspects of representation, and studying the role of policy responsiveness beyond the median voter, this thesis adds to the literature on representation, power-sharing and conflict.

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Appendix

Preference differences between minorities and majorities across various issues

In order to test if minority and majority groups only prioritize unemployment differently or if once can observe a more general trend of policy priority differences, I further analysed if minorities and majorities differ with regard to the evaluation of a country's three most important problems. Figure A1 below presents the results of country-wise multinomial logistic regressions with ethnic group dummies. It plots the difference between a country's majority group and the respective minority groups in the predicted probability of selecting one of a country's three most popular issues. In total figure A1 shows 181 predicted differences in 31 countries. 47 of these differences (26%) are statistically significant. In other words, the probably that members of minority groups have different policy priorities than members of the majority group is about one fourth. This is comparable to the differences found with regard to unemployment. It is difficult to judge whether this is a lot or not. I would argue that the fact that preferences of minorities and majorities differ even on general issues in one fourth of the cases is a strong indication that policy responsiveness towards minorities matters. If governments are only responsive to the majority population responsiveness towards minorities is likely to suffer. From the data at hand, it seems evident that minorities sometimes have quite distinct policy priorities that are not well represented by responding solely to the median voter. These differences remain robust to the inclusion of control variables such as gender, age, education and employment status (see figure A2 below).

Figure A1: Probability of prioritizing one of the top three issues relative to the majority group, 95% confidence intervals



Notes: Estimates are based on the second and third round of the comparative survey of electoral systems (CSES) (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013). Specifically responses to the following question were analysed: "What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election?"

Figure A2: Probability of prioritizing one of the top three issues relative to the majority group, 95% confidence intervals, incl. control variables



Notes: Estimates are based on the second and third round of the comparative survey of electoral systems (CSES) (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013). Specifically responses to the following question were analysed: "What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election?" It was controlled for gender, age, education, and employment status.

2 Chapter

(a revised version of this chapter is forthcoming with *Political Studies*)

Responsiveness – to whom? Why the primacy of the median voter alienates minorities

Abstract

Policy responsiveness – i.e. responsiveness of governments to the preferences of its citizens – is a crucial characteristic of every democracy. Many see responsiveness towards the median voter as sufficient for democracy, because no policy position will receive more support. In this paper, I argue that the primacy of the median voter is normatively and empirically problematic. From a normative point of view a good democracy does not (only) need to maximise the influence of the majority, but must also protect minorities against oppression by the majority population. Beyond normative arguments, ignoring the preferences of social minorities has real empirical consequences as it endangers the legitimacy and stability of a democracy through decreasing the political support of minority groups. Based on ESS6 data, the empirical analysis confirms the risks of a lack of policy responsiveness. It indicates that minorities are generally less supportive of the political system than majorities, but that their support increases if policy responsiveness towards them rises.

Keywords: policy responsiveness, descriptive representation, political support, minorities, median voter

Introduction

Policy responsiveness is one of the central pillars of democracy (Dahl 1971, 2) and directly related to the democratic ideal of the 'rule by the people'. If people truly rule, public policies should follow their preferences closely (Roberts 2010, 39). In this sense, good democracies require politicians who heed the policy preferences of the people and respond to them when deciding on issues.

The question of policy responsiveness is particularly complex in heterogeneous societies, where policy preferences might differ strongly between different groups in society. Nevertheless, most research analyses policy responsiveness from a majoritarian perspective of democracy, and focuses heavily on the median voter (e.g. Cohen, Jeffrey, 1997; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2007; Kang & Powell, 2010; Roberts, 2010). This paper challenges this primacy of the median voter. While responsiveness towards the median voter ensures that a majority supports public policies, it also carries the risk of creating a "tyranny of the majority" (Toqueville 1987), as preferences which divert from the median's position are not considered in policy making. Responsiveness towards the preferences of the median voter might, therefore, mean that important concerns are ignored or that minorities' equal rights and treatment are neglected (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 29). While this problem is empirically most relevant in heterogeneous societies with strong group identities, normatively, it also applies to homogenous societies, as the preferences of some citizens are always more influential than those of others. The focus on the preferences of the median voter, thus, violates a key normative principle of democracy that demands that governments are responsive to as many people as possible and treat them as political equals (Dahl 1971, 1). The consideration of the preferences of minority groups should, therefore, be a key element of all democracies, even and particularly if they contradict the position of the median voter (Kymlicka 1995; Van Cott 2005). This type of democracy requires systems with incentives for politicians to act against the will of the majority if it is necessary to protect fundamental interests of the minority. This might be achieved

through political systems which encourage compromises among different factions of society – be it through political institutions that require coalition governments or electoral rules that make politicians dependent on the preferences of majorities and minorities alike (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1969; Reilly 2001). In a similar vein, some political theorists demand that decision-making power is distributed proportionally to people's stakes in a particular decision (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010, 137). This would ensure that majorities cannot overrule minorities on issues that are of particular importance to minorities (but not to majorities).

However, as argued in this paper, the primacy of the median is not only problematic from a normative point of view, but also empirically relevant as it may put the sustainability of democracy at risk. Citizens who feel that the government is unresponsive towards their preferences tend to lose confidence in the political system and to express less support for political institutions (Roberts 2010, 8). A loss of confidence may lead to political alienation and apathy as citizens fear that their voice is not heard and their vote has no effect (Ishiyama 2001; Ruiz-Rufino 2013). Decreasing involvement in politics as a consequence of political apathy is highly problematic and delegitimizes the political process, which is based on the participation of its citizens. If voters lose attachment to political parties, electoral volatility and the development of new (anti-system) parties may increase (Dalton 2004, 11), or anti-elite protests, participation in riots, and even political violence may be encouraged (Dalton 2004; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Roberts 2010).

Following these arguments, the present paper investigates policy responsiveness towards minorities and its effect on their support for the political system they live in - henceforth referred to as "political support of minorities" or "minorities' political support". The problem of governments being responsive to majorities, and not minorities, potentially applies to a wide variety of groups, such as ethnic, religious or socio-economic groups. In the present paper minorities are operationalised as ethno-national minority groups, because ethnicity is a relatively persis-

tent identity that only changes slowly over time (Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985). Politically mobilized ethnic identity groups are understood as a subset of all possible identity groups which might be affected by low government responsiveness. For this purpose, ethnic groups are defined as national or autochthonous groups who self-identify with their group based on a shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18).

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, I review previous research on policy responsiveness and establish the argument that a focus on the median voter is normatively problematic. In the light of this, I examine the empirical consequences of a lack of policy responsiveness in today's heterogeneous societies by focusing on the question of political support. The third and fourth sections discuss the data and the results, which indicate that minorities are indeed more supportive of the political system if the system is responsive to their preferences. The final section discusses the implications of these results for democracy in heterogeneous societies.

Policy responsiveness towards minorities

Why policy responsiveness towards the median voter alienates minorities

Policy responsiveness is a central aspect of liberal democracy (e.g. Dahl, 1971; Pitkin, 1967). Democratic rule implies not only a certain procedural process – i.e. elections – but also that the preferences of the people influence the policies that are implemented (Powell 2000, 160). While the importance of responsiveness towards citizens' preferences is uncontested it remains an open question towards whom policy makers ought to be responsive.

For those who favour a majoritarian model of democracy, responsiveness towards a majority of the people is sufficient. For others, governments should be responsive to "as many people as possible"; they favour a proportional model of democracy (Lijphart 1984, 4; Powell 2000, 21).

Independent of the majoritarian or proportional perspective of democracy, however, when judging a system's responsiveness, responsiveness towards the *median* voter or median citizen is usually taken as the reference point (e.g. Kang & Powell, 2010; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000; Roberts, 2010). Many even see responsiveness towards the median citizen as normatively superior, because there is no other policy position available on which more people would agree (Powell 2000, 164; Roberts 2010, 40).

However, the primacy of the median citizen overlooks the fact that most democracies are heterogeneous in some way or another, which has severe implications. Most democracies are characterised by the presence of socio-economic subgroups and/or identity-based ethnic or racial groups (even if they are not, or only to a small degree, voters have heterogeneous interests in all societies). Indeed, previous research indicates that the level of responsiveness differs between different groups in society, and that governments are more responsive to affluent citizens (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2011, 2012; Rigby and Wright 2011; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2013)[1] and ethnic majority groups (Abrajano and Poole 2011). Particularly in this context, majority rule easily transforms into a "tyranny of the majority" (Lijphart 2004; Toqueville 1987, chap. 15). Majority rule as it is practised today bears the risk of producing situations where a majority that has little stakes in an issue overrules a minority with great interest in a decision. When people have different stakes in collective matters the interests of the minority will not be sufficiently considered by majority rule, even if all voters enjoy equal procedural influence (namely, equal voting rights) (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). Thus, democracy requires more than the maximisation of the influence of the majority (the procedural aspect of democracy). It also needs to fulfil the liberal requirement of democracy which demands the equal protection of the rights of all citizens in society independent of their resources and other forms of power (in)equalities – including of those who belong to the minority (Diamond and Morlino 2004;

[1] While there is also contradictory evidence which suggests that responsiveness towards different socio-economic groups is substantially similar (e.g. Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Ura & Ellis, 2008), generally when there are differences the preferences of less affluent citizens are worse represented (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015).

Rigby and Wright 2011, 189). In this regard, a (democratic) republic needs to guard "one part of the society against the injustice of the other part" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1987), and to be responsive to as many citizens as possible and not only to the median voter (Dahl 1971, 2).

While a lack of responsiveness towards parts of the population is always normatively questionable, empirically, the primacy of the median voter is only problematic if policy preferences vary systematically across groups (Gilens 2011, 250; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 166). When preferences do not differ between groups the political preferences of minorities are represented even if the government only responds to the median citizen (Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer 2012, 52; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 161). However, there is good reason to expect differences between minority and majority preferences. Group membership influences not only how we view ourselves and others, but also the values and attitudes we hold (Hogg 2003). This implies that policy preferences might vary with group membership. The link between group identity and political preferences has been discussed most extensively in the literature on social psychology and social identity. This literature argues that individuals who take their group identity into account when making decisions are likely to develop policy preferences distinct from those of the median voter (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Conover 1984; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Lieberman and McClendon 2012). When policy preferences vary between different social groups – i.e. between minority and majority groups – governments which are responsive to the median citizen are not necessarily responsive to minority groups in society. If democracies in heterogeneous societies are to avoid the so-called 'tyranny of the majority' (Toqueville 1987, chap. 15) and to fulfil their liberal requirement of protecting minority and majority rights alike (Diamond and Morlino 2004; Kymlicka 1995), they need to be responsive not only to the majority, but also to the minority population. By solely focusing on responsiveness towards the median citizen we potentially overlook important and consequential deficits of today's democracies.

Empirical consequences of median responsiveness

A lack of responsiveness towards minority preferences is not only normatively problematic, but is also likely to create empirical challenges as political systems in which the policy preferences of (parts of) the population are ignored are likely to suffer from a loss of confidence on the part of their population (Roberts 2010, 8). According to Easton (1957, pp. 395–397) one of the main mechanisms that generates support for the political system is through policy outputs that meet the demands of society – i.e. through output legitimacy. All citizens have certain expectations towards the government and the political institutions. When these expectations are met, this translates into political support for the government, and the entire political system (Hetherington 1998; Liu and Baird 2012; Norris 1999a; Ruiz-Rufino 2013). Certainly, the political authorities cannot and do not need to meet every demand of their citizens and most governments can rely on a reservoir of trust (or 'diffuse support' in Easton's terminology) that protects them against immediate reactions to the introduction of unpopular policies. If a government is persistently unable to meet the demands of its citizens – or parts of its citizens – however, this reservoir of trust may erode, leading to demands for a regime change or even a dissolution of the political community (Easton 1957, 397). More specifically, in countries where parts of the society perceive the political system as illegitimate and the government as unresponsive, the stability of democracy is endangered (Hänni 2014). A lack of political support among parts of the population might foster cleavages within society, alienation from the political system, and fuel conflict if minority groups feel that their preferences cannot be satisfied within the existing polity (Cho 2010; Dalton 2004; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Norris 1999c). By contrast, we can expect that higher levels of responsiveness towards minorities reduce the risk of alienation and dissatisfaction among these groups, and in turn, increase their political support. This leads to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The better policy responsiveness towards minorities is, the higher their level of political support will be.

However, some argue that the legitimacy of a system depends not on the system's output, but also on its perceived input. In heterogeneous societies a key conflict evolves around the question of whether every group has the opportunity to elect its own representatives into parliament (Cho 2010, 1652) – i.e. around whether a group is descriptively represented. Descriptive representation is a special category of representation and refers to representation through members of one's own social group (Norris and Franklin 1997; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 409). Especially in heterogeneous societies, descriptive representation may serve as a basis for evaluating the legitimacy of a polity (Mansbridge 1999, 628). It is argued that members of marginalised groups are more likely to identify with the legislature and the political institutions if they see representatives "like themselves" in the parliament (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 414). Descriptive representation by group members may influence attitudes towards the polity by giving members of minority groups the feeling of being included and having participated in the decision-making process (Madrid 2008, 172; Mansbridge 1999, 651; Sanchez and Morin 2011, 486–487). This in turn is expected to influence individuals' subjective perception of democratic legitimacy – i.e. political support (Welge 2015). Hence, the legitimacy of the political system might not (only) depend on what it does, but also on how it looks (Scherer and Curry 2010, 91). In light of these arguments the following hypothesis is postulated.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Higher levels of descriptive representation of minorities are positively related to support for the political system.

Case Selection and measurement

This paper studies the effect of policy responsiveness on the support of minorities for the political system. The theoretical arguments apply to different types of politically salient groups. In the empirical part of this paper, I test the hypotheses for politically relevant[2] ethno-national minority groups as a subset of salient minority groups in the society. The aim is to empirically test the influence of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation on political support. Ethnic minorities are a feasible operationalization of societal minorities, because ethnicity is a relatively persistent identity that only changes slowly over time (Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985) and group membership of politically relevant groups is politically salient.

In the empirical analysis this paper establishes whether the normative problem of the primacy of the median voter has empirical consequences. In particular, it analyses how policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities is related to their political support. In order to study the effect of policy responsiveness among the minority group, I first discuss how ethnic minority groups are identified. Then, policy responsiveness is operationalised in areas that are important for these minority groups. The empirical analysis mostly focuses on ethnic minorities, but also includes the majority for some parts of the analysis.

Selection and measurement of ethnic groups

The empirical analysis combines group- and individual-level data. For the individual level data, I rely on the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS6) (European Social Survey 2013).[3] To analyse the effect of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation on political support, members of ethnic minority groups need to be identified from survey data. The selection of ethnic groups is based on the EPR-ETH dataset on ethnic power relations

[2] EPR-ETH's definition of politically relevant is applied. In this sense groups are defined as politically relevant if at least one political organisation claims to represent a group in national politics, or if the group is subjected to state-led discrimination (Bormann et al. 2015)

[3] While many public opinion surveys allow for an assessment of political support, only the ESS6 includes questions that enable us to measure the policy responsiveness towards minorities with individual level data.

(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Ethnic groups are defined as autochthonous or ethno-national communities based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). The ESS6 covers 14 countries for which EPR counts ethnic groups. I only include groups into the analysis which are covered by the EPR dataset (and therefore by EPR's definition "politically relevant"). In Europe – and in particular in the countries covered by the ESS6 - these ethnic groups can mostly be identified through their language. I relied on a subjective definition of ethnicity given by the survey respondents by coding answers to the questions on an individual's language spoken at home or an individual's religion (for Israel). This approach also allowed me to take the fluid character of ethnicity into account (Fearon 2003, 197).

In order to test the validity of the coding, the share of an ethnic group in the population as measured with ESS6 data is correlated with the aggregate measure of ethnic group size – based on EPR-ETH (Cederman et al., 2010). The correlation between the two measures of ethnic group size is very high and lends confidence in the measure of ethnicity used here (correlation of 0.98, see figure A1 in the supplementary material). A list of included minority groups is included in table A1 in the supplementary material.[4]

Dependent variables[5]

The present paper focuses on ethnic minorities' political support as a function of policy responsiveness. Political support is usually disaggregated into support for the political community, support for the political regime[6] and support for the political authorities (Dalton 2004; Easton 1965; Norris 1999c). The operationalization of the concept is based on previous research which has identified widely available indicators to measure the different objects of political

[4] The ESS6 includes 14 multi-ethnic countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Kosovo, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and Ukraine. These 14 countries contain individuals from 25 minority groups for which all information is available.
[5] Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table A2 in the supplementary material.
[6] Support for the political regime is sometimes broken down into support for regime principles, support for regime performance, and support for regime institutions (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999c).

support (c.f. Norris, 2011, p. 44). In this paper, I rely on support for regime performance as an indicator that lies between the extreme points on a continuum from diffuse to specific support (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999b). Judgments of *regime performance* are based on evaluations of how the political system functions in practice. Although criticized for measuring multiple dimensions of political support and for being differently understood across individuals and nations (Linde and Ekman 2003; Oskarsson 2010, 428), the survey item most appropriate for measuring subjective evaluations of regime performance remains the question regarding an individual's satisfaction with the way democracy works in his/her country (scale 0-10) (Dalton 2004, 24; Norris 2011, 44). The respective survey question reads as follows.

And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?

While not ideal, the item is less problematic for measuring regime performance than regime principles (Linde & Ekman, 2003). In particular, the indicator still varies across individuals and countries as it does not ask about the general support for democracy (a value quite unanimously supported in Europe and beyond), but specifically about support for the way democracy works in a particular country.

Independent variables

The main independent variable is policy responsiveness on the individual and group level. All group-level variables are based on a novel dataset "Ethnic minorities in democracies" which includes measures of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation.[7] In the present paper policy responsiveness refers to responsiveness towards the preferences of ethnic minorities and the representation of minority issues. Using an appropriate measurement for responsiveness towards ethnic minorities is challenging as most previous studies solely rely on responsiveness towards the median voter. Generally, one can distinguish two approaches. On the one hand, we may assess policy responsiveness by examining the existence of policies which are usually

[7] More information on the dataset is available from the dataset appendix at the end of the dissertation.

considered ‘minority issues’. This approach has been applied in research on policy responsiveness towards women or (racial) minority groups in the United States (e.g. Caiazza, 2004; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; Preuhs & Hero, 2009; Preuhs, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). On the other hand, one can assess policy responsiveness on an individual level by comparing individuals’ expectations with individuals’ evaluation of government performance on particular issues. Individual level data allows the potential heterogeneity of policy preferences among minorities to be taken into account. In this paper, both approaches are used, thereby providing a more complete picture of the relationship between policy responsiveness and political support.

First, the assessment of policy responsiveness on an individual level is operationalised as the difference between individuals’ expectations and their evaluation of government performance. This view of policy responsiveness relates citizens’ expectations with (perceived) policy outcomes. The sixth wave of the European Social Survey provides (for the first time) indicators which allow policy responsiveness to be analysed in a comparative perspective with individual level data. In order to measure the congruence between expectations and perceptions of policy outcomes, I use the questions on government responsiveness (E37 and E38), and minority rights (E7 and E23), respectively (see table 1). All variables are scaled from 0-10 and are used to build two indices of policy responsiveness – general responsiveness and minority rights responsiveness. For both indices, policy responsiveness is measured as the inverted difference between citizens’ expectations and the perceived performance of policy makers; values that exceed maximal congruence are constrained at ten – i.e. policy responsiveness is not considered to be higher if an individual benefits more than (s)he expects. Accordingly, the index of policy responsiveness ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating full policy responsiveness. Formally, policy responsiveness is defined as follows:

$$\text{Policy responsiveness} = \min [10, 10 - (\text{importance} - \text{perceived performance})]$$

Table 1: Operationalisation of policy responsiveness

General Responsiveness	[…] please tell me how often you think the government in [country] today changes its planned policies in response to what most people think? How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the government changes policies in response to what most people think?
Minority Rights Responsiveness	[…] please tell me to what extent you think each of these statements applies in [country]. The rights of minority groups in [country] are protected. How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the rights of minority groups are protected?

Second, policy responsiveness is examined based on what are usually considered 'minority issues'. For this purpose, two policies which are of particular importance for many minority groups are taken into account: cultural rights and the extent of economic discrimination (c.f. Hänni 2015). Cultural rights are measured as language rights. Language is often seen as an important group characteristic which bonds group members together (Liu 2011, 125), and is the most important marker for many ethnic groups (Micheal E. Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3).[8] The second issue area taken into account is economic discrimination. Economic discrimination is one of the most obvious obstacles which ethnic minority groups face in many countries, and accordingly an issue of substantive importance for most members of an ethnic community.

To assess the level of minority language rights, an additive index is developed which ranges from 0 to 6 and consists of three variables where each element can be guaranteed (2), partly guaranteed (1), or not guaranteed (0). The three variables are 1) the possibility of using the minority language when interacting with authorities and the courts; 2) the possibility of education of the minority language (as a subject); 3) the possibility of education in the minority language (as the language of instruction for all subjects). Data is collected on the group level by

[8] Even if not all members of minorities support minority group rights to the same extent, ethnic minorities are significantly more in favour of minority rights than members of the majority population (Evans and Need 2002; Rovny 2014).

coding laws provided by Leclerc's database on language policies around the world (Leclerc 2015). This information is complemented with data from Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Liu (2011). Economic discrimination is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 with MAR data, where (0) refers to no discrimination and (4) refers to the presence of exclusionary and repressive policies which severely restrict the economic opportunities of an ethnic group (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The use of MAR data is associated with problems of selection bias (Hug 2013). The problem is minor for the present study as only three groups are missing from the MAR sample. Missing groups (French and German speakers in Belgium, Serbs in Kosovo) were recoded with secondary sources, based on qualitative country reports by the Council of Europe (2014) and the Minority Rights Group International (2014). The consideration of actual policies in addition to individual perceptions of policy responsiveness also allows me to account for the potential problem that perceptions of democracy and responsiveness might empirically be closely related: when minorities are dissatisfied with democratic rule in general they might rate all aspects of democracy (e.g. performance) more critically, regardless of the actual level of policy responsiveness. In other words, minorities might judge governments to be unresponsive, because they dislike democratic rule, without considering the actual policy performance of the government. By including objective factors in addition to subjective evaluations it can be tested if the results hold beyond subjective evaluations of policy responsiveness.

The second independent variable of interest is descriptive representation of ethnic minorities. *Descriptive representation* is defined as representation of an individual by a co-ethnic in parliament, and is thus measured on the group-level. Data for descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is based on the annual Human Rights Reports of the United States Department of State (U.S. Departement of State) and parliamentary websites.[9] Descriptive representation is calculated as the ratio between a group's share of representatives in parliament and its share in

[9] Data was completed with information from Ruedin (2012), OSCE, newspapers, Protsyk & Osoian (2010), Protsyk & Sachariew (2012), and other country specific resources (Chaisty 2013; Crowther and Matonyte 2007; Garaz 2012; McLeay 1980).

the population. Mathematically speaking, the measurement is based on the concept of the advantage ratio of Taagepera and Laakso (1980). Perfect proportionality between the size of an ethnic group and its representation in parliament occurs when $A = \mathrm{x}/y = 1$, where x corresponds to the share of an ethnic group in parliament and y to its share in the population (Taagepera/Grofman 2003: 662).[10]

Controls

Apart from policy responsiveness and descriptive representation there are additional factors that might influence ethnic minorities' political support. In the present analysis, I control for 4 types of factors: political, socio-cultural, performance-based, and demographic factors.

Political support greatly depends on an individual's feeling of belonging to the political winners (Anderson et al. 2005). This is measured as government vote and coded as (1) if an individual states to have voted for one of the parties in government, and (0) otherwise. Further, I control for political interest, which is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values referring to more political interest. Moreover, socio-cultural and performance-based factors are important determinants of political support. I therefore control for an individual's level of education, generalized trust and religiosity, as well as for household income. Likewise, demographic factors such as gender and age have been shown to determine political support, and are therefore included into the analysis. More information about the coding and the questions used for the control variables is provided in table A3 in the supplementary material. All control variables were recoded by assigning the lowest category the value of (0) to ease the interpretation of the regression results.

[10] The data on the size of the population is taken from MAR, EPR-ETH and the CIA world factbooks.

Empirical analysis

The main goal of the empirical analysis is to study the effect of a potential lack of policy responsiveness towards minorities on their support for the political system. For this purpose, minorities' satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country is analysed. In order to establish the influence of policy responsiveness, its effect needs to be distinguished from other explanations for minorities' level of political support. There are at least four reasons why minorities might exhibit low levels of political support (i.e. dissatisfaction with the way democracy works). 1) Low political support of minorities might be due to a generally unresponsive political system – i.e. there is no difference between policy responsiveness towards minorities and majorities. 2) The low political support of minorities may be a sign of overall low political support in a country – i.e. everybody in a political system is equally dissatisfied with the way it works. 3) Minorities might be dissatisfied with the political system because they are not, or not sufficiently, descriptively represented in the parliament. 4) Minorities exhibit low levels of political support, because the government is less responsive towards them than towards the majority population. The last point is the main argument of the present paper and constitutes the heart of the empirical analysis. In order to test the fourth proposition, however, the three alternative explanations for the (low) political support of ethnic minorities need to be ruled out. In order to do this, I proceed as follows.

First, I show that minorities find government policies less responsive than majorities. This is tested by analysing the policy preferences of minority and majority groups and their evaluation of policy performance descriptively (figure 1). I further present evidence that the preferences of majorities are more likely to influence policy outcomes than the preferences of minority groups (figure 2).

Second, I show that the low political support is not an artefact of a generally politically dissatisfied population (table 3). I test this with hierarchical models by regressing political support on minority group membership. The results suggest that minorities are indeed less supportive of the political system than the majority population.

Table 2: Summary of analytical model

Causes of low political support among the minority population	**Analytical steps**	**Empirical indications**
1) Political systems are particularly unresponsive towards minorities	Compare policy preferences and policy responsiveness among the minority and majority population.	Difference regarding policy preferences of and policy responsiveness towards minorities and majorities
2) Minorities are particularly dissatisfied with the political system	Compare political support among the minority and majority population	Difference regarding the political support of minorities and majorities
3) Low support is due to the lack of descriptive representation (H2)	Analyse effect of ethnic minorities' descriptive representation on their level of political support	Consistent and significant effect of descriptive representation
4) Low support is explained by lack of policy responsiveness (H1)	Analyse effect of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities on their political support	Consistent and significant effect of policy responsiveness towards minorities

To test the *third and fourth explanation* I focus exclusively on the minority population and compare the effect of descriptive and substantive representation in the same models (table 4). Hence, in this – main – part of the analysis I investigate with hierarchical linear regressions whether what the system does (policy responsiveness) or what it looks like (descriptive representation) is more important. While this part of the analysis is solely performed on the minority population, the majority population is included for robustness checks.[11] In order to control for

[11] Theoretically, I am interested in the effect of lacking policy responsiveness towards minority groups. There is no theoretical reason, why the effect of policy responsiveness (difference between expectations and perceived performance) should differ between majority and minority groups. The point of interest is whether the generally low level of support among minority groups is associated with lower levels of policy responsiveness and could, consequently, be increased by higher levels of policy responsiveness.

varying levels of democratic experience and quality, as well as other country specific factors that may potentially influence an individual's/group's level of political support, all models include country-fixed effects. Table 2 above summarizes the four explanations for ethnic minorities' (low) level of political support, the analytical steps necessary to test them, and the respective empirical indications in support of the explanations.

Analysing the policy responsiveness towards minorities and majorities

First, to investigate how (a lack of) policy responsiveness relates to the political support of minorities, it is analysed whether policy preferences and policy responsiveness actually differ between members of minority and majority groups or if a political system is equally (un)responsive to the entire population (first explanation for low political support). For this test I only present results for the variables measuring expectations and evaluations of minority rights, because differences between members of minority and majority groups are expected to be most pronounced in the area of minority rights. Figure 1 depicts the policy preferences, the perceived government performance, and the level of policy responsiveness for members of minority and majority groups separately. The clearly separable 'notches' around the median can be understood as strong evidence that the median for members from majority and minority groups differs. The support for minority rights is higher among the minority than the majority population, indicating that members of minority groups, on average, value minority rights more than members of the majority population (left). By contrast, in comparison to the majority population, members of the minority groups are less satisfied with the level of minority rights in their country (middle). Median responsiveness (i.e. congruence between expectations and perceived performance) is correspondingly lower for members of the minority population than for members of the majority population (right).

Second, in order to test to what extent the preferences for minority rights influence the (perceived) government performance regarding this issue, I regress government performance

on policy preferences (see figure 2). For this analysis a multilevel analysis with random intercepts and country fixed effects is conducted. Again, the ESS6 indicators for the evaluation and perception of minority rights are used (see table 1).[12] The perceived guarantee of minority rights protection is explained by an interaction between the minority status and expectations concerning minority rights. In other words, the empirics analyse how well individual policy preferences for minority rights predict the (perceived) government performance among members of minority and majority groups. The findings reveal a clear difference between minorities and majorities. While increased preferences for minority rights are associated with an increased (perceived) guarantee of minority rights among the majority population, there seems to be no effect among the minority population. This implies that governments are (perceived to be) more responsive towards the preferences of the majority population (or that members of the majority population evaluate the guarantee of minority rights less critically than members of the minority population). If policy responsiveness is as important for democracy as many claim (Dahl 1971; Pitkin 1967; Roberts 2010), a lack of responsiveness towards the minority population is likely to hurt the support among members of minority groups. Whether minorities are indeed less supportive of the political system than majorities is analysed in the following section.

[12] The questions used for preferences and perceived guarantee are identical with those used for the construction of the variable "Minority rights responsiveness" – i.e. E7 and E23.

Figure 1: policy responsiveness towards minorities and majorities compared



Notes: The figure presents the distribution of policy responsiveness, perceived performance and expectations with regard to the protection of minority rates among the majority and minority population, pooled over all countries. Non-overlapping notches are strong evidence that the median between the majority and majority differs significantly.

Figure 2: Effect of Expectation on Performance, protection of minority rights



Notes: Effect of expectations concerning minority rights on perceived performance (of the same issue) among minority and majority groups. Graph is based on a multilevel model with individuals clustered in ethnic groups. Perceived guarantee of minority rights protection is explained by an interaction between minority status and expectations about minority rights. Country fixed effects are included.

Analysing the political support of minorities and majorities

In this section the second alternative explanation for the low political support among the minority population is tested by analysing if minorities and majorities indeed differ with regard to their satisfaction with the political system. Low political support is most problematic if it is specific to the minority population – i.e. if it is not mirrored by the support of the majority population.

In table 3 the political support for the regime – satisfaction with democracy – is analysed as a function of the minority status and control variables with linear hierarchical models with random intercepts. Individuals are clustered in ethnic groups and potential country effects are controlled for with country dummies (i.e. country fixed effects). The empty model and model 1 evaluate if political support differs among individuals and countries (empty model) and between majorities and minorities (model 1). As expected, individuals who belong to an ethnic minority group are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than their compatriots from the majority population. While the control variables are mostly in line with the expectations and previous research, they do not erase the effect of the minority status (model 2). Hence in sum, the second alternative explanation for the low political support of ethnic minorities is rejected. The analysis below clearly indicates that members of the minority population are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than members of the majority population, and that the low level of political support among the minority population cannot be explained by a generally politically dissatisfied population. In the next section I therefore restrict the analysis to the political support of minorities to investigate why they are less supportive of the political system than the majority.

Table 3: Explaining satisfaction with democracy among minorities and majorities

	Empty Model	Model 1	Model 2
Minority		-0.41**	-0.24+
		(0.14)	(0.14)
Winner			0.66***
			(0.04)
Gender			-0.02
			(0.04)
Age			-0.00*
			(0.00)
Education			-0.02+
			(0.01)
Political Interest			0.11***
			(0.02)
Interpersonal Trust			0.19***
			(0.01)
Income			0.07***
			(0.01)
Religiosity			0.05***
			(0.01)
Constant	4.18***	4.10***	2.88***
	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Variance (Ethnic groups)	0.39***	0.10**	0.32***
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Variance (Residuals)	2.25***	5.08	2.17***
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)
N (individuals, groups)	14855, 42	14855, 42	14855, 42
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
BIC	66589.51	66522.04	65481.11
Log Likelihood	-33217.91	-33179.37	-32620.48

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The effect of descriptive representation and policy responsiveness on the political support of minorities

In this section I analyse the third and fourth explanation for the low political support among the minority population (see table 2 above) and turn to the evaluation of the main hypotheses. Again, linear hierarchical models with random intercepts, individuals clustered in ethnic groups, and country-fixed effects are used (see table 4). To analyse if policy responsiveness indeed affects minorities' satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country (H1) two strategies are applied. First, I investigate whether individuals who perceive the government to be more responsive exhibit higher levels of support for regime performance (using individual

level data). Then, more 'objective' factors of policy responsiveness are included, which measure the level of policy responsiveness on the group level via the level of economic discrimination and language rights. Furthermore, all models include a measure of descriptive representation to examine if policy responsiveness is indeed the key to political support, or if it is sufficient if a system looks representative – i.e. if descriptive representation is high (H2).

Turning to hypothesis 1, which states that higher levels of policy responsiveness are associated with higher levels of political support, I find strong evidence in favour of the postulated relationship. Even after including country fixed effects in order to control for unobserved country level effects[13], policy responsiveness has a positive effect on minorities' satisfaction with democracy. The first two models present the effect of the subjective measures of policy responsiveness. Both, responsiveness in terms of minority rights and in terms of general policy responsiveness seem to be equally important: the higher an individual perceives policy responsiveness, the more satisfied (s)he is with the way democracy works in the country.[14] The confidence in this result might suffer from fears that evaluations of perceived policy responsiveness and evaluations of democracy are empirically too closely related to be clearly separated. Therefore, I also assess the effect of policy responsiveness with more 'objective' factors which are not based on individual perceptions. As models 3 and 4 in table 4 underline, the results are robust to the inclusion of the group-level measurements of policy responsiveness. Individuals who belong to groups that are economically discriminated are less supportive of the political regime, whereas individuals who belong to groups that receive higher levels of language rights are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. These results match the first hypothesis which postulates that policy responsiveness may work as a remedy against the low

[13] Potential country level effects that might be important, but cannot be tested due to the low number of countries include: the level of democracy, the support for democracy among the majority population, and a recent history of ethnic conflict or economic development. These factors are controlled for by country fixed effects.
[14] The effects also hold when policy responsiveness is measured in a simpler way by only looking at the effect of performance (variables E37 and E7). Results are included into the appendix in table A4.

political support of minorities.[15] This finding is also politically relevant as it suggests that the low political support of minorities is not unalterable. To the contrary, the findings imply that minorities might support the political system to a similar extent as the majority population if their preferences were better represented.

However, is it really policy responsiveness that matters or is political support already ensured through political institutions that look representative? Building on assumptions about group representation we might assume that descriptive representation is sufficient to guarantee the political support of minorities (Gay 2002). Descriptive representation gives members of identity-based groups a feeling of inclusion and influence in politics and might, therefore, suffice to guarantee the political support of minorities (H2) (Madrid 2008). The results in table 2 below clearly reveal that descriptive representation alone is not sufficient to guarantee the political support of minorities. The effect is only significant in one of the models and weaker than the effect of policy responsiveness:[16] An increase from no descriptive representation to perfectly proportional descriptive representation results in barely one scale point higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. In comparison, policy responsiveness has a much more substantial effect: an increase from the minimum to the maximum increases the level of satisfaction with democracy by almost two scale points for the group-level measures, and by more than one scale point for the individual level measures of responsiveness. This implies that what governments do is more important than what they look like, thereby again underlying the importance that governments are responsive to as many citizens as possible and not only to those who are electorally relevant (Dahl 1971).

[15] The results also hold when the individual level variables are included together with group level factors (see table A6 in the supplementary material).
[16] Descriptive representation does not reach significance when included without any measures of policy responsiveness.

Table 4: The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic minorities' satisfaction with democracy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Policy Responsiveness				
General Responsiveness	0.12***			
	(0.01)			
Minority Rights Responsiveness		0.13***		
		(0.01)		
Economic Discrimination			-0.55***	
			(0.16)	
Language Rights				0.41*
				(0.18)
Other Variables				
Descriptive Representation	0.28	0.08	0.96*	-0.07
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.38)
Winner	0.38***	0.40***	0.42***	0.40***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Gender	-0.08	-0.05	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01*	-0.00+	-0.00+	-0.00+
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Interest	0.09+	0.11*	0.09+	0.09+
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interpersonal Trust	0.22***	0.22***	0.23***	0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religiosity	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	0.03+	0.03+	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	5.68***	6.13***	7.75***	5.24***
	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.22)	(1.34)
Variance (Ethnic Groups)	1.05e-16	1.12e-15	1.09e-15	4.48e-18
	(8.86e-16)	(9.01e-15)	(8.84e-15)	(3.97e-17)
Variance (Residuals)	3.79***	3.80***	3.91***	3.92***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
N (individuals, groups)	2466, 25	2466, 25	2466, 25	2466, 25
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
BIC	10484.89	10495.90	10562.83	10570.03
Log Likelihood	-5140.91	-5146.41	-5179.88	-5183.48

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Testing the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the majority population

In order to test the results' robustness, the changes the effects of policy responsiveness undergo when the majority population is included are analysed. I concentrate on attitudes regarding the importance and guarantee of minority rights for the robustness checks as there is no

theoretical reason why the effect of general responsiveness should vary between minority and majority groups.[17] The inclusion of the majority population allows me to ascertain if policy responsiveness is indeed responsible for the different levels of political support among the minority and majority population, and if increasing levels of minority rights affect the support of minorities and majorities differently. The robustness checks presented below (table 5) lend confidence to the results presented so far.

As a first check, policy responsiveness is included as an additional predictor into the models that cover the entire population (table 3). If political support indeed depends mainly on the level of policy responsiveness, the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group should disappear once policy responsiveness is included. Indeed, minorities and majorities are no longer distinguishable with regard to their satisfaction with democracy when policy responsiveness is included into the models (table 5, model 1). This suggests that minorities exhibit lower levels of political support, because the government appears less responsive to their demands than to those of the majority. Minorities expect higher levels of minority rights than the majority, and perceive the level granted to be lower (see also figure 1). This leads to a discrepancy between policy expectations and the perceived performance, and thus negatively affects the political support of minorities.

If a lack of policy responsiveness is the driving force behind minorities' lower level of political support (see table 3, model 2), we should expect minorities to react more strongly to increased minority rights than members of the majority population. One can test this by interacting a person's minority status with the perceived guarantee of minority rights. The positive and significant interaction effect lends strong support to our hypothesis: (perceived) increasing levels of minority protection have a stronger effect on the satisfaction with democracy among

[17] While members of ethnic minorities are expected to react stronger to policy responsiveness in the area of minority rights than the majority population, there is no reason, why members of minorities and majorities should react differently to policy responsiveness when it is assessed with questions on the general level of responsiveness.

members of minority than majority groups. In other words, if the protection of minority rights improves, the gap between minority and majority groups regarding their political support decreases (table 5, model 2).[18]

In sum, the results presented here lend strong support to the assumption that lower levels of political support among the minority population are associated with a lack of policy responsiveness towards their preferences. Members of minority groups are more satisfied with the way democracy works if their expectations are met and if the government takes measures to increase its policy responsiveness toward them (e.g. reduces economic discrimination, increases the level of language rights). The fact that a (perceived) increase in minority rights is more influential among minorities suggests that we are dealing with a minority specific effect. Not all individuals react to increased levels of minority rights. It is members of minorities who demand higher levels of minority rights, and who are more satisfied with their political system if they receive them. While it is worrying that some governments are still less responsive towards minorities than majorities, the findings also suggest that governments which try to square the circle and to represent the preferences of minorities and majorities at the same time will be rewarded by greater levels of support among the minority population. This finding might have important implications for the long-term stability of democracies, particularly in ethnically heterogeneous societies.

[18] Ideally, a similar test would be conducted for the group-level factors (economic discrimination and language rights). Since the group-level factors are exclusively measured for minorities this is not easily done. In Table A6 in the supplementary material I present an approximation, where the political support of the majority population is regressed on the average level of minority rights in a country – i.e. the (missing) level of language rights and economic discrimination for the majority population is replaced with the average value on these variables for a country's minority groups. The results of this robustness check support the claims made above. Economic discrimination does not affect the political support among the majority population, whereas the level of language rights has a barely significant and weak positive effect on the support of the majority population (probably partly due to omitted country-level variables). The effect of language rights is clearly weaker than that for the minority population. In sum, we may, therefore, conclude that the low level of support among the minority population is related to the failure of governments to respond adequately to minority preferences.

Table 5: The effect of policy responsiveness on satisfaction with democracy (full sample)

	Model 1	Model 2
Minority	-0.06	-0.23^{+}
	(0.10)	(0.14)
Minority Rights Responsiveness	0.13***	
	(0.01)	
General Responsiveness	0.12***	
	(0.01)	
Guarantee of minority rights (perception)		0.17***
		(0.01)
Minority * Guarantee of minority rights		0.05*
		(0.02)
Government responsiveness (perception)		0.21***
		(0.01)
Winner	0.56***	0.45***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Gender	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.00***	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Political Interest	0.12***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interpersonal Trust	0.17***	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.06***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religiosity	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	1.40***	1.43***
	(0.22)	(0.20)
Variance (Ethnic Groups)	0.04*	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Variance (Residuals)	4.29***	4.12***
	(0.05)	(0.06)
N (individuals, groups)	14855, 42	11197, 42
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes
BIC	64426.00	47906.22
Log Likelihood	-32083.32	-23822.58

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Conclusion

Most governments are aware of the necessity to be responsive towards the median voter in order to have a chance of re-election (Downs 1957). Consequently, responsiveness towards the median voter is generally fairly well achieved (Cohen, Jeffrey, 1997; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2007; Kang & Powell, 2010; Roberts, 2010). However, more recently some studies revealed important group differences in terms of policy responsiveness between minority and majority groups (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012; Rosset et al., 2013). Considering the heterogeneity of most countries and potential preference differences resulting from this heterogeneity, this paper criticizes the primacy of the median voter from a normative and empirical perspective. If responsiveness is a key characteristic of democracies, responsiveness towards the median voter is problematic, especially if important subgroups in the population are not represented by the median's position. Good democracies do not only require electoral participation and majority vote, but also the protection of group and individual rights. Some suggest introducing special rules that weigh the decision-making power according to the stakes at hand to ensure that a majority with little stakes cannot overrule a minority with high stakes (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). Others advocate political systems which reward compromises between different groups. Politicians might be encouraged to decide against the preferences of the majority in certain issue areas which are of particular importance for minorities if they are aware that their (re-)election depends not only on members of the majority, but also on members of the minority – e.g. through electoral systems which reward cross-group voting and/or coalition building (c.f. Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1969; Reilly 2001).

Apart from the normative problem of neglecting the preferences of minorities, a lack of responsiveness towards minorities also has empirical implications, as individuals who feel that their demands are not met might withdraw their support from the political system and engage in anti-system behaviour. The empirical analysis examined the policy responsiveness towards minorities and its empirical consequences for the political support of minorities. The results

indicate that the preferences of minorities indeed differ quite considerably from the preferences of the majority in many countries, and that governments seem to be more responsive towards the preferences of the majority. This is not only normatively problematic, but has real empirical consequences as a lack of responsiveness towards minorities seems to translate into lower levels of support among the minority population. Contrasting the effect of descriptive representation and policy responsiveness, the findings suggest that policy responsiveness is more important for the political support of ethnic minorities than descriptive representation. Members of minorities seem not only to evaluate how representative institutions look, but also what office-holders do. While the hypotheses where empirically tested for ethnic minority groups, the findings have implications for other subgroups in the population. They might also apply to other minority groups which receive lower levels of policy responsiveness than the majority – e.g. to socio-economically poorer groups (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2013; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, chap. 8). Considering the findings of this paper the lack of policy responsiveness towards poorer citizens should raise concerns. In light of growing socio-economic inequalities (Cingano 2014) low policy responsiveness towards less affluent citizens might have important (and potentially damaging) implications for democratic legitimacy.

The generalisability of these findings is, however, limited by the cross-sectional structure of the ESS dataset. The ESS6 presents a unique source to study policy responsiveness across a variety of issues with individual level data, but is restricted to one time point. Potential changes over time can, therefore, not be analysed. In order to fully understand the link between policy responsiveness and political support, we would ideally rely on panel data to analyse how the effect changes over time, and how within-country variation in policy responsiveness affect the political support of minorities. Future research and new data may reveal further insights into the link between policy responsiveness and political support by analysing how such within-country and time effects affect the presented findings.

Nevertheless, this paper contributes to the normative and empirical literature on policy responsiveness and representation. From a theoretical point of view this paper critically reassessed the primacy of the median voter in the literature on policy responsiveness. While responsiveness towards the median voter might be sufficient in homogenous societies, it carries the risk of a "tyranny of the majority" in heterogeneous societies. The paper argues that the focus on the median voter is not only normatively problematic, but also politically risky, as a lack of responsiveness lowers the political support among minority members. For heterogeneous societies this might prove very dangerous, as a lack of political support is likely to endanger the legitimacy and stability of a political system. The findings imply that minority groups are not simply less supportive of the political system because they are often members of the political losers, but because governments are less responsive towards their preferences.

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Supplementary Material

Figure A1: Correlation between aggregate and survey measures of ethnicity



Notes: correlation between the size of the minority population based on survey and aggregate measures. Data for aggregate measures is taken from the EPR-ETH dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).

Table A1: Ethnic minority groups

Country	Ethnic Minority Groups	Groupsize (Survey)
Albania	Greek speakers	0.42
Belgium	French speakers	41.77
Belgium	German speakers	1.26
Bulgaria	Turkish speakers	8.97
Bulgaria	Romany speakers	4.17
Estonia	Russian speakers	28.54
Finland	Swedish speakers	5.89
Hungary	Romany speakers	0.25
Israel	Islamic	12.64
Kosovo	Serbian Speakers	26.26
Lithuania	Russian speakers	7.73
Lithuania	Polish speakers	4.55
Russia	Tatar speakers	1.41
Russia	Ossetian speakers	0.48
Russia	Avaric speakers	0.4
Russia	Bashkir speakers	0.4
Slovakia	Hungarian speakers	7.25
Slovakia	Romany speakers	0.65
Spain	Catalan speakers	8.9
Spain	Galician speakers	2.89
Spain	Basque speakers	0.61
Switzerland	French speakers	22.07
Switzerland	Italian speakers	3.82
Ukraine	Russian speakers	44.6
Ukraine	Crimean Tatars	0.28

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Satisfaction with Democracy	52602	5.16	2.57	0	10
Minority	27008	0.18	0.38	0	1
General Responsiveness	54673	7.36	3.17	0	10
Minority Rights Responsiveness	54673	7.72	2.69	0	10
Winner	45464	0.20	0.40	0	1
Gender	54656	0.54	0.50	0	1
Age	54540	48.31	18.59	15	103
Education	54309	3.87	1.85	1	7
Political Interest	54411	1.34	0.92	0	3
Interpersonal Trust	54453	4.92	2.49	0	10
Religiosity	54109	4.77	3.08	0	10
Income	43981	4.06	2.81	0	9
Language Rights	4748	4.94	1.44	1	6
Descriptive Representation	4748	0.93	0.51	0	2.04
Economic Discrimination	4748	1.12	1.52	0	4

Table A3: Operationalization of Variables

Variable and Indicator	**Question in ESS6**	**Scale**
Political Support		
Satisfaction with Democracy	And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?	0-10
Policy Responsiveness		
General Policy Responsiveness	[…] please tell me how often you think the government in [country] today changes its planned policies in response to what most people think?	0-10
	How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the government changes policies in response to what most people think?	0-10
Minority Rights	[…] please tell me to what extent you think each of these statements applies in [country]. The rights of minority groups in [country] are protected.	0-10
	How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the rights of minority groups are protected?	0-10
Control variables		
Gender	Gender	0=Male
Age	Age of respondent	
Education	Generated variable: Highest level of education (based on country-specific information)	0-7
Satisfaction with economic performance of government	On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?	0-10
Interpersonal Trust	[…] would you say most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful?	0-10
Religiosity	Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?	0-3
Winner	Which party did you vote for in that [the last] election? Coded as 1 if respondent referred to one of the parties in government.	0-1
Political Interest	How interested would you say you are in politics?	0-3

Table A4: The effect of policy responsiveness on satisfaction with democracy (responsiveness measured with performance indicators)

	Model 1	Model 2
Policy Responsiveness		
General Responsiveness	0.23***	
	(0.02)	
Minority Rights Responsiveness		0.24***
		(0.02)
Other Variables		
Descriptive Representation	0.23	0.09
	(0.37)	(0.33)
Winner	0.35**	0.41***
	(0.11)	(0.10)
Gender	-0.12	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age	-0.01+	-0.00+
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Interest	0.08	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interpersonal Trust	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religiosity	0.05**	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	3.42+	5.85***
	(1.93)	(1.13)
Variance (Ethnic Groups)	4.89e-22	6.45e-16
	(3.90e-21)	(4.78e-13)
Variance (Residuals)	3.60***	3.57***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
N (individuals, groups)	2466, 25	2466, 25
Country Fixed Effects	yes	Yes
BIC	8343.47	9533.42
Log Likelihood	-4073.06	-4666.25

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Substantive representation was measured with the questions E37 and E7: Namely, "[…] please tell me how often you think the government in [country] today changes its planned policies in response to what most people think?" and […] please tell me to what extent you think each of these statements applies in [country]. The rights of minority groups in [country] are protected.

Table A5: The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic minorities' satisfaction with democracy, individual level variables included into all models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Policy Responsiveness			
General Responsiveness	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Minority Rights Responsiveness	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economic Discrimination		-0.44**	
		(0.15)	
Language Rights			0.32+
			(0.18)
Other Variables			
Descriptive Representation	0.11	0.65+	-0.17
	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.37)
Winner	0.39***	0.40***	0.39***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Gender	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Interest	0.10*	0.10*	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interpersonal Trust	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religiosity	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.03+	0.03+	0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	5.36***	6.26***	4.28**
	(1.15)	(1.19)	(1.31)
Variance (Ethnic Groups)	$5.46e^{-19***}$	$1.42e^{-19***}$	$7.79e^{-20}$
	$(4.91e^{-18})$	$(1.19e-^{18})$	(6.44^{-19})
Variance (Residuals)	3.70^{***}	3.69^{***}	3.70^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
N (individuals, groups)	2466, 25	2466, 25	2466, 25
Country Fixed Effects	yes	Yes	yes
BIC	10435.82	10435.39	10440.53
Log Likelihood	-5112.47	-5108.35	-5110.92

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6: The effect of minority rights on the majority's satisfaction with democracy, group-level factors

	Model 1	Model 2
Economic Discrimination	-0.06	
	(0.19)	
Language Rights		0.32^{+}
		(0.18)
Winner	0.70***	0.70***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.00^{+}	-0.00^{+}
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.03*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Political Interest	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interpersonal Trust	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religiosity	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	3.26***	1.70^{+}
	(0.39)	(0.88)
Variance (Ethnic Groups)	1.00**	0.82**
	(0.38)	(0.31)
Variance (Residuals)	4.84***	4.84***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
N (individuals, groups)	12386, 14	12386, 14
BIC	54871.42	54868.72
Log Likelihood	-27379.16	-27377.81

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

3 Chapter

Hänni, Miriam. 2017. “Presence, Representation and Impact: How Minority MPs Affect Policy Outcomes.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42(1): 97–130.

Presence, representation and impact: how minority MPs affect policy outcomes

Abstract

Many ethnic minorities demand (adequate) descriptive representation in parliament – i.e. representation through representatives of their own ethnic group. They expect improved descriptive representation to affect the responsiveness of governments towards their demands. However, the mechanism of how minority MPs affect policy outcomes remains unclear, because minority MPs can easily be outvoted and marginalised. I argue that descriptive representation mainly has an effect if MPs possess additional leverage to influence policy outcomes. The argument is tested with hierarchical models and time-series data from 97 groups in 50 multi-ethnic democracies. While the analysis shows that descriptive representatives are most successful in influencing policy outcomes if they are included in the government, the legislature is powerful, and a group is comparatively large, it also reveals important differences between policy issues.

Keywords: descriptive representation, substantive representation, ethnic minorities, language rights, economic discrimination, comparative study

Introduction

During the last few decades many countries have introduced special measures to ensure the representation of ethnic minority groups (c.f. Bird, 2014; Krook & O'Brien, 2010). Apart from ideological and normative reasons, the driving force behind these measures is the understanding that groups which are excluded from political power and whose preferences are not recognized might become a threat to democratic stability and legitimacy. Increasing the level of descriptive representation in parliament is popular among minority groups, because it is believed to be associated with increased substantive representation (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1994, 1995; Young, 2000) – i.e. increased responsiveness of governments to the preferences of minorities (Pitkin 1967, 209)[1]. Hence, apart from normative claims for the inclusion of all societal groups, which are based on the principle of political equality and the right of all groups to be present in parliament (Ruedin 2009, 335), many see a link between the representation of groups in parliament and the representation of their interests (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1994, 1995; Preuhs, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Wängnerud, 2009; Young, 2000).

However, as already Pitkin underlines, the actual effect of minority representation in parliament on policy outcomes is all but clear (Pitkin 1967, 142). Indeed, research from the United States has shown that increased descriptive representation may go together with decreased policy responsiveness towards minority interests. While gerrymandering in the United States successfully increased Afro-Americans' descriptive representation, it often decreased overall Democratic representation (the party usually more open to Afro-American's interests), thus leading to decreased policy responsiveness towards Afro-Americans in Congress (Cameron, Epstein, and Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999). Furthermore, even if a group is proportionally represented in parliament, it usually constitutes only a small faction. As a result, minority MPs can easily be outvoted and politically marginalised (Bieber 2008, 114). We may even think of descriptive representatives who consciously decide not to target their group specifically, but

[1] Henceforth, the terms substantive representation and policy responsiveness are used interchangeably.

instead to represent all minorities in a country or voters from a mainstream party (Zuber 2015, 5). Conversely, even where descriptive representation is absent, a government might include ministers belonging to an ethnic minority group, or enact minority-friendly legislation, in order to enhance democratic legitimacy and stability (Preuhs 2007, 279; Zuber 2015, 5). Consequently, while many expect a link between descriptive and substantive representation, the mechanism of *how* minority MPs affect policy outcomes remains unclear. Building on the literature of ethnic minorities' substantive representation, this paper tests under which conditions descriptive representation affects policy responsiveness towards minority issues. I argue that it is not principally the level of descriptive representation that matters, but rather its combination with three moderating factors. I expect descriptive representatives to be more successful in influencing policy outcomes if they are included in government coalitions (Preuhs 2006, 2007), if the legislature is powerful (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007), and if their group constitutes a significant share of the population (Ghanem 2012).

The main innovation of this paper is the extension of the study of ethnic minorities' substantive representation to a comparative framework which covers all electoral democracies in (Western and Eastern) Europe, (North and South) America, Australia and New Zealand, and the integration of the three moderating factors into one framework to analyse the *conditions* under which descriptive representation matters. For this purpose, I develop the new dataset "Ethnic minorities in democracies" that provides new measures of descriptive representation of ethnic minorities over time, and allows substantive representation to be measured over a large number of groups. In order to measure the substantive representation of minorities I rely on a de-jure and a de-facto measurement of policy outcomes. The de-facto measurement relies on an extended and recoded measure of MAR's (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) data on economic discrimination, while the newly developed de-jure measure covers the extent of language rights for language minorities.

In exploring the effect of ethnic minorities' descriptive representation on policy outcomes, I first present an overview of the literature on the substantive representation of minori-

ty groups. Then the theoretical framework is discussed which introduces three conditions - government inclusion, legislative power, and group size - which are expected to increase the influence of descriptive representatives on policy responsiveness. Next, I turn to the operationalization and introduce the newly developed dataset on "Ethnic minorities in democracies". Finally, I empirically test the hypotheses and discuss the findings.

Literature review

The literature on the substantive representation of specific social groups proposes a direct link between descriptive and substantive representation. It argues that descriptive representatives work as spokespeople for their group, advocate group-specific policies, or change public policy priorities in areas of importance for members of their own group. The idea is that representatives who belong to the same social or ethnic group as their voters are more likely to share their group's perspectives and to stand for their interests (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011; Bloemraad 2013; Owens 2005; Phillips 1995; Young 2000).

Previous research on the substantive representation of specific social groups (mostly women and ethnic minorities) has applied two strategies. Earlier attempts to conceptualize policy responsiveness have focused mainly on gender or racial differences in political attitudes and parliamentary behaviour. Keeping very close to the initial definition of substantive representation by Pitkin (1967), these studies have analysed how minority parliamentarians vote, how they engage in parliamentary debates, and whether they see themselves as representatives of their identity group. Hence, it was examined whether descriptive representatives are *acting for* (Pitkin 1967, chap. 6) their social group in parliament. These studies have robustly shown that descriptive representatives differ with regard to their political attitudes (Childs 2002; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Norris 1996) and their political behaviour (Baker and Cook 2005; Bird 2011; Bratton 2005, 2006; Broockman 2013; Dolan 1998; Grose 2005; Hogan 2008; Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Lublin 1999; Minta 2009; Preuhs and Hero 2009; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Saalfeld 2011; Swers 1998; Tremblay 1998; Whitby and

Krause 2001), and that many minority (and female) representatives feel a responsibility to represent their own group (Broockman 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Childs 2002).

However, substantive representation is most meaningful if the presence of minority MPs does not only affect political behaviour, attitudes and values in parliament, but also policy outcomes. While it is well documented that minority representatives aim to act for their constituencies or hold different values and base their decisions on different cues than majority MPs (Preuhs and Hero 2009), it is less clear how their behaviour affects policy outcomes. Thus the crucial question to be answered is whether descriptive representation has actual policy consequences. There are some studies on women's substantive representation which analyse the effect of descriptive representation on the existence of women-friendly policies and policies which are considered particularly important for women. These studies analyse the length and extent of maternity and childcare leave (Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), the percentage of children with a child-care space (Bratton and Ray 2002), the extent of welfare benefits (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Reingold and Smith 2012) or policies against domestic violence (Caiazza 2004; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009). Regarding the substantive representation of ethnic minorities, few studies have explicitly focused on *policy outcomes*. The main exceptions are Preuhs (2006, 2007) and Owens (2005), who both study the effect of descriptive representation on policies important to minority groups. Specifically, they focus on the relationship between Afro-Americans' and Latinos' descriptive representation and the extent of welfare benefits in the United States. Reingold and Smith (2012) link the research on women and ethnic minorities and show that the share of female minority representatives has the strongest influence on US states' welfare policy. Beyond the United States, there is almost no comparative research on the policy responsiveness towards minority issues, probably also due to the lack of comparative datasets. To the best of my knowledge, the only exception is the recent book by Andrew Reynolds (2011), who briefly addresses the question from a comparative perspective and finds no conclusive results (Reynolds 2011, 99–100). In the present paper, I build on these contributions and define sub-

stantive representation as minority-friendly policy *outcomes*, rather than as the behaviour and attitudes of descriptive representatives in parliaments.

How Descriptive Representatives influence Policy Outcomes

Studying the effect of ethnic minorities' descriptive representation on policy responsiveness towards their demands rests on the assumption that minorities hold policy preferences that are substantially different from the majority and other minority groups in society – i.e. that group specific interests exist (Hänni 2015b; Lieberman and McClendon 2012). Group specific preferences have been most extensively studied by the literature on social psychology and identity which argues that group identity does not only determine how we view ourselves and others, but also which preferences we hold (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Conover 1984; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Hogg 2003; Lieberman and McClendon 2012).

Hence, while the literature is clear about why descriptive representation should influence substantive representation, it is less clear about how the mechanism works. To understand if and when the presence of minority MPs increases the substantive representation of ethnic minorities, the crucial question is under what *conditions* minority politicians are able to influence political outcomes. In democracies, agenda setting and decision-making is the principal domain of the legislative majority. Since members of an ethnic minority group normally do not hold the legislative majority - at least not in democracies - minority representatives do not usually wield decision-making power (Bieber 2008; Protsyk 2010). Therefore, descriptive representatives can only affect policy outcomes indirectly. In order to influence the policy agenda, minority MPs might follow a number of strategies. In most parliaments MPs have the opportunity to give statements on issues which they see as important. Such motions in parliament are an effective mean of grabbing the attention of other parliamentarians (Tremblay 1998). Furthermore, minority MPs can lobby for their interests in committee meetings, ask questions in parliament and generally raise the awareness among the political majority for minority concerns. In the same way as women might be in a better position than men to pro-

mote women's concerns in parliamentary debates (Tremblay 1998), ethnic minority MPs might be in a better position to promote minority issues.

The particular strategies available to minority MPs depend on how they are elected. Minority representatives are mostly elected through ethnic minority parties or as MPs from mainstream parties.[2] For MPs who are elected through ethnic minority parties there is good reason to believe that they attempt to contribute to the representation of minority issues. These representatives deliberately chose to run for a specific minority group, and can, therefore, be expected to identify strongly with this group (c.f. Zuber 2015, 8). For minority MPs of non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties the picture is more complicated. On the one hand, while minority MPs in multi-ethnic parties might be in favour of minority interests, they might feel responsible for all ethnic (minority) groups rather than explicitly for their own ethnic group (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Zuber 2015, 8). The influence on policy responsiveness towards a *particular* ethnic group might, therefore, be weaker if MPs come from multi-ethnic parties. On the other hand, the 'loyalty' of minority MPs in mainstream parties is unclear. Not all minority MPs who are elected through mainstream parties might see themselves as representatives of their ethnic group, but rather as members of particular political parties - e.g. the Social Democrats or the Conservatives[3]. Furthermore, many party systems are characterized by strong party discipline which makes effective minority representation more difficult in non-ethnic parties. However, although parties are the main parliamentary actors and party discipline is often strong, the common party position is usually the result of intense internal debates. In pre-parliamentary party meetings, individual MPs have the opportunity to convince their fellow party members of their policy views - e.g. on minority issues - and to present themselves as policy specialists. This can give individual MPs considerable influence over the policy position of their party (Thomassen and Andeweg 2004). Hence, even minority MPs in

[2] For a more detailed discussion of how minority MPs are represented in political parties, and how the way of representation influences their political behaviour see Zuber (2015).

[3] However, as outlined above, many minority MPs consider it important to represent their group (Broockman 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Celis and Wauters 2010; Childs 2002; Thomassen and Andeweg 2004).

mainstream (non-ethnic) parties can be expected to influence policy outcomes in favour of their ethnic group – but possibly to a lower extent than MPs from minority parties.

In sum, the ability of minority MPs to influence the legislative agenda is determined by the relationship between minority MPs and the legislative majority. If minority representatives are elected through mainstream parties, their policy influence depends on intra-party coalition building which can be achieved through committee meetings, pre-parliamentary meetings or policy specialization. If minority representatives are part of an ethnic minority party, gaining legislative support for minority issues depends on inter-party coalition building (Protsyk 2010). Hence, regardless of how minority MPs are elected, a positive effect of descriptive representation is expected. However, the effect might be stronger for minority MPs who were elected through ethnic minority parties, because the pattern of representation is more straightforward. From this discussion follow two hypotheses:

H1a: Descriptive representation of ethnic minorities increases the policy responsiveness towards minority preferences.

H1b: The hypothesised effect is stronger for MPs of an ethnic minority party than for MPs of non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties.

While there is good reason to expect a direct effect of descriptive representation on policy outcomes, it might be rather weak, as minority MPs can easily be marginalized in parliament (Bieber 2008). I argue that descriptive representation is particularly important if MPs have additional leverage to influence policy outcomes, and therefore, discuss three ways that are expected to strengthen the effect of descriptive representation. It is claimed that the ability of minority MPs to influence the decision-making process is much higher if the minority groups are part of strong political coalitions (Browning 1984; Preuhs 2007), if the legislature is powerful (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007), or if they make up a bigger share of the population (Ghanem 2012).

The most straightforward way to ensure a position of power, which allows for additional policy influence, is through presence in government. Minority representatives who are part of the executive are in a privileged position for ensuring the incorporation of minority-friendly policies into legislation (Preuhs 2006, 2007; Protsyk 2010). It is, therefore, more likely that a government is responsive to a minority group's demands if it has members of that group within its fold (Cho 2010, 1656). Accordingly, the influence of descriptive representation should be stronger if a minority group is also represented in government. At first glance, one might find it unlikely that members of an ethnic minority group or small minority parties should be included into the government. However, comparatively small minority parties might be attractive coalition partners as they can demand smaller shares of government positions than larger mainstream parties (Bieber 2008). Furthermore, including minorities into government might also serve a governments purpose to increase its legitimacy among the minority population (Gay 2002). [4] From this follows the second hypothesis.

H2: Descriptive representatives have a stronger influence on policy responsiveness if they are part of strong coalitions - i.e. if they are included in the government.

Even where government ministers belonging to an ethnic minority group are lacking, the probability that descriptive representation matters is higher when opposition parties are important for policy making (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007). In a political system where the executive is strong, minority representation might be less important than in a system where opposition parties in the legislature have a more prominent position. For instance, minority representation in parliament is likely to be more effective when minority MPs have a chance to force the government to bargain. The ability of opposition parties to influence the political agenda is highly dependent on the agenda-setting prerogatives of the government during the parliamentary passage of bills. Therefore, the influence of minority representation in parlia-

[4] Indeed, there are a number of countries where minority MPs are regularly represented in government (Bieber 2008). Examples include the Hungarian minority in Romania and Slovakia, or the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.

ment is higher when the executive influence over legislative matters is low (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007). This argumentation leads to a hypothesis postulating an interactive effect of descriptive representation and the strength of the legislature.

H3: Descriptive representatives have more influence on policy responsiveness if they live in a country with a powerful legislature.

Finally, given that a small number of minority MPs can easily be outvoted and marginalized (Bieber 2008), it is expected that descriptive representatives are more successful in influencing policy outcome for larger minorities. Not only are the policy demands of larger groups more likely to be heard, but they are also more likely to be considered (Ghanem 2012, 367; Liu 2011, 131), as large minority groups can credibly threaten the stability of the state if they are excluded from the political system (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 96; Hänni 2014). Furthermore, with the share of minority MPs remaining the same, those representing larger minority groups naturally win more seats, meaning that the influence of MPs of larger minority groups will be greater. In other words, simple arithmetic implies that it is more difficult to exclude a sizeable minority (e.g. 40%) from power, than a minority of negligible size (e.g. 5%). In sum, larger groups are more likely to exert influence on policy outcomes because they can put more pressure on decision-makers, and are more likely to play a pivotal role in the decision-making process (Ghanem 2012, 367). From this emerges the fourth hypothesis.

H4: Descriptive representatives of large minority groups have a greater effect on policy responsiveness than descriptive representatives of small minority groups.

Case selection and Measurement

Case selection

This project covers pluri-ethnic democracies (Freedom House (2011) ≤ 4 and Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2011) ≥ 6)[5] with at least two ethnic groups and more than 500'000 inhabitants since 1945 from Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America and Oceania, where ethnic minority groups are politically relevant and exceed one per cent of the population. African and Asian democracies (17 countries) are excluded for mainly two reasons: 1) In many African countries ethnic parties are banned or representation based on ethnicity is prohibited. This makes it very difficult to gather valid information about their representation in parliament and government, and to study the effect of descriptive representation on policy responsiveness (in particular hypothesis 2 which relies on representation in ethnic minority parties). 2) Ethnic identity is more volatile in Asian and African countries and there are more cross-cutting cleavages of identity (e.g. India, Zambia). This makes it more problematic to identify the relevant ethnic cleavage for the study of policy responsiveness without deep case knowledge.

On the basis of these criteria I developed the dataset "Ethnic minorities in democracies" which includes novel measures on descriptive representation in parliament and government as well as on the substantive representation of ethnic minorities. In the present study, ethnic minorities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-nationalist minorities based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). Datasets on ethnic minorities often suffer from selection bias, because one needs to decide which of the at least 5000 existing ethnic groups to include (Birnir et al. 2014; Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce problems of selection bias I chose politically relevant (salient) ethnic minority groups on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority

[5] In cases where the two ratings differed, the country was only included if it is rated at most one scale-point below the democracy threshold (on the measure where it was not rated as democratic).

at Risk dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The combination of both datasets reduces the selection bias associated with datasets on ethnicity (especially with MAR) (Hug 2013). In cases where MAR data is used, missing groups are coded through other sources and a review of the group-specific literature (see the respective variables for more details).[6] In total 97 ethnic groups from 50 countries are included into the analysis (see also table A1 in the supplementary material, Part A). For some (mainly small) groups information on the descriptive representation in parliament was not available. These groups were, therefore, excluded from the main analysis; for some robustness checks they were considered and coded with their share of descriptive representation in ethnic minority parties.

The Dependent Variables: Ethnic Minorities' Substantive Representation

The argument that the presence of minority representatives in parliament affects the substantive representation of minorities rests to some extent on the assumption that members of the same minority group share a similar identity which distinguishes them from members of other groups and influences their policy preferences (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Phillips 1995). Descriptive evidence supports this assumption. Minorities often seem to have distinct policy preferences, both in cultural and non-cultural areas, which differentiates them from the majority population in their country. They are more likely to be in favour of minority rights and differ with regard to how important they perceive economic issues (Hänni 2015a). This is illustrated by figure 1 below which depicts the difference between ethnic minorities and majorities on the question, how important government assistance for the guarantee of cultural autonomy is perceived (based on data from the ISSP Research Group 2012). In most countries individuals who belong to an ethnic minority group seem to be more likely to support increased government assistance for cultural autonomy than individuals who belong to a country's majority group.

[6] A more detailed description of the dataset is provided in the data appendix at the end of this dissertation.

Figure 1: Difference in preferences for cultural autonomy between minorities and majorities



Notes: Estimates are based on the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2003 on National Identity (II) (ISSP Research Group 2012). Specifically, the following question was used in order to analyse differences between minorities and majorities: „Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions" (Q8b). Models were calculated by predicting preferences for cultural autonomy by an interaction between country and minority status with an OLS regression.

Given these preference-differences we need to define on which issues the substantive representation of minorities shall be measured. As discussed previously, substantive representation is here understood as policy outcomes, rather than as the political behaviour of MPs. Following studies on women's substantive representation, ethnic minorities' substantive representation may be defined as issues particularly salient to ethnic minorities, or as issues where policy consequences are likely to have a stronger impact on members of an ethnic minority group than on members of the majority group (Carroll 1994; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Kittilson 2008). This definition already reveals the ultimate problem of measuring ethnic minorities' substantive representation: the assumed homogeneity of minority interests. It is clear that minority interests might and will differ among members of the same ethnic group (see also the error bars in figure 1) and this heterogeneity of ethnic groups is acknowledged. Nevertheless, in light of the growing political importance of minority representation, a reasonable and pragmatic approach to studying its effect on policy outcomes is necessary, which

looks at issues that are likely to be important to most members of minority group (even if not for everybody).

Previous attempts to measure substantive representation as policy outcomes have mainly focused on studies in the United States. Scholars have mostly measured policy responsiveness by considering the extent of social welfare benefits (Owens 2005; Preuhs 2006, 2007). While this solution might be convincing for measuring responsiveness to Latino or Afro-American interests in the United States, it poses unresolved challenges to an application to cross-country comparisons. The present study therefore considers policies which are likely to be important for ethnic minorities across Europe, America, and Oceania, and focuses on areas where minorities tend to have different priorities than the majority population - i.e. on areas where responsiveness to minority interests matters. This approach is in line with studies on policy responsiveness towards women, which also focus on broad women-friendly policies to measure policy responsiveness. I rely on academic research and international treaties to identify two policy areas which directly affect members of ethnic minority groups. The first focus is on minority language rights as a legislative area which is of particular importance for many ethnic minority groups (Deets and Stroschein 2005). Language is often seen as an important group characteristic which bonds group members together (Liu 2011, 125), and is the most important marker for many ethnic groups (Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3). Internationally, minority language rights find wide support among organizations within and beyond Europe (e.g. United Nations, 1966, para. 27; Council of Europe, 1992; CSCE, 1990, para. 35). The newly developed index of minority language rights consists of three variables and ranges from 0 to 6, where each element can be guaranteed (2), partly guaranteed (1), or not guaranteed (0). The three variables are 1) the possibility of using the minority language when interacting with authorities and the courts; 2) the possibility of education of the minority language (as a subject); 3) the possibility of education in the minority language (as the language of instruction for all subjects). Data is collected on the group level and is based on Leclerc's database on

language policies around the world (Leclerc 2015).[7] For the part of the analysis which includes this variable, the sample is restricted to language minorities (approximately 80% of the minorities in the sample are language minorities).[8]

A second focus is economic discrimination. This is included as a measure for de-facto policy responsiveness towards minority groups. Certainly, economic discrimination is one of the most obvious obstacles which ethnic minority groups face in many countries, and accordingly is an issue of substantive importance for most members of an ethnic community. The importance of fighting economic discrimination of minorities is also a primary goal of international organisations such as the OSCE (OSCE 2012). Economic discrimination is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 with MAR data, where (0) refers to no discrimination and (4) refers to the presence of exclusionary and repressive policies which severely restrict the economic opportunities of an ethnic group (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Groups excluded by MAR were recoded with case study information based on reports of the Minority Rights Group International, Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Wheatley (2004).

The focus on two very different policy areas – cultural and economic policies –allows studying if the effect of the explanatory variable is consistent across different policy areas. One might expect different policy issues to have different causes. Cultural policies are the issues most often demanded by members of minorities (Kymlicka 1995), but also relatively easy to implement as they are usually treated as single pieces of legislature. By contrast, economic policies aimed at the reduction of economic discrimination might be more difficult to arrange, because they might include (higher) monetary transfers across groups than the implementation of cultural policies, and their implementation is likely to be more complicated, because they might be included into broader economic or budgetary policy packages. Distinguishing between two types of policies that are relevant for minorities allows us to analyse if they are explained by the same mechanisms.

[7] Data was completed with Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Liu (2011).
[8] The results for economic discrimination are robust to the exclusion of non-language minorities.

Independent Variables: Descriptive Representation and the Moderating Factors

The main independent variable is *descriptive representation*, which is measured by counting all the MPs of an ethnic group in parliament. This measure extends previous time-series measures of descriptive representation considerably as it not only codes MPs from ethnic minority parties, but also minority MPs who were elected through non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties.[9] Data on descriptive representation in parliament is mainly coded with information from the annual Human Rights Reports of the United States Department of State (U.S. Departement of State) and parliamentary websites, and complemented with country specific information[10]. Descriptive representation is calculated as the ratio between the group's share of representatives in parliament and the group's share in the population. Mathematically speaking, the measurement is based on the concept of the advantage ratio of Taagepera and Laakso (1980). Perfect proportionality between the size of an ethnic group and its representation in parliament is given when $A=x_i/y_i=1$, where x_i corresponds to the share of an ethnic group in parliament and y_i to its share in the population (Taagepera/Grofman 2003: 662). To analyse whether the effect of descriptive representation is stronger if it is achieved through minority parties (H1b), it is accounted for the share of minority MPs which is elected trough ethnic minority parties. For this purpose, a party is considered as ethnic when its representatives are primarily elected by members of the ethnic group and their main political appeal is based on ethnicity (Ishiyama 2009). Data on ethnic minority parties and their share in parliament is based on Bochsler (2010), Ishiyama (2009), Pan & Pfeil (2006), Reed (2002), Van Cott (2005), and official election results.

As outlined above, a conditional effect of descriptive representation in parliament is expected (H2-H4). Methodologically speaking, an interaction term between descriptive representation in parliament and the respective moderating variable is calculated and included in

[9] Didier Ruedin (2009, 2013) and Andrew Reynolds (2011) both collected very detailed cross-sectional data for minority representation beyond ethnic parties.

[10] Data was completed with information from OSCE country reports, newspapers, Ruedin (2012), Reynolds (2011) Protsyk & Osoian (2010), Protsyk & Sachariew (2012), Lublin (1997), Van Cott (2000), Crowther and Matonyte (2007), and McLeay (1980).

the models. First, the question of whether government inclusion strengthens the effect of descriptive representation on policy responsiveness is analysed (H2). This is measured with a dummy variable, where (0) indicates that no minority representative is included in the executive, and (1) refers to governments where at least one minister belongs to the respective ethnic minority group.[11]

Second, it is expected that minority MPs are more likely to influence policy making, when the legislature is powerful (H3) (Alonso/Ruiz-Rufino 2007). The policy influence of the legislature is measured with an assessment of its relative leverage in the political process (Banks and Wilson 2013). The variable ranges from (0) to (3), where (0) refers to a country where no legislature exists, (1) refers to an ineffective legislature where the implementation of legislation is impossible, (2) characterizes a partially effective legislature, i.e. the executive does not completely dominate, but still outweighs the legislature, and (3) refers to an effective legislature with substantial legislative authority (Banks and Wilson 2013).

Third, the probability that the preferences of minority groups are heard, and more crucially, considered in the policy making process depends on the *relative size of the minority group* (Ghanem 2012, 367; Liu 2011, 131). I therefore expect an interactive effect between group size and descriptive representation. Data on group size is taken from MAR and EPR-ETH (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Minorities at Risk Project 2009).[12]

Control Variables

Additionally, it is controlled for other factors which might confound the relation between descriptive and substantive representation. First, territorial autonomy rules for minority groups are considered as an explanation for the level of policy responsiveness. Forms of decentralization are an important means of collective representation as they distribute power

[11] Sources include electoral databases [(Beck et al. 2001), (Nordsiek 2012), the European Election Database (2012), and the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2012)], the country reports from the U.S. Departement of State, and Birnir (2007) as well as Birnir and Satana (2013).

[12] If the information regarding the ethnic composition of the population differed between MAR and EPR-ETH, the data was validated with information from the CIA World Factbooks. The relative size of a minority group is calculated as its share of the entire population.

from the centre to the constituent political entities (Erk and Anderson 2009). *Territorial autonomy rules* are measured with a dummy variable based on EPR-ETH (Bormann et al. 2015), and completed with information provided in Pan and Pfeil (2006), laws on autonomy, MAR (Minorities at Risk Project 2009), and constitutions[13]. Second, territorial concentration may contribute to substantive representation, as groups which are territorially concentrated might develop a stronger group-feeling which might strengthen their political demands. *Territorial concentration* is measured with MAR-data, and completed with information based on Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Wucherpfennig et al. (2012). The variable consists of four categories, where (0) refers to widely dispersed groups and (3) to groups which are concentrated in one region. Third, many countries in *Central and Eastern Europe* have improved their minority legislation – at least on paper – since minority recognition and protection is one of the prerequisites for admission to the European Union (Liu and Baird 2012; Rechel 2008; Schwellnus, Balázs, and Mikalayeva 2009). Therefore, a dummy variable for Central and Eastern Europe is included.

Table A2 in the supplementary material shows descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis. The level of analysis is an ethnic minority group in a country in a given year (country-group-years). The full sample of 97 groups and 50 countries is restricted due to missing information regarding the representation in parliament for some small minority groups. In total, the sample includes 77 ethnic minority groups from 44 democracies for economic discrimination, and 71 groups from 40 democracies for language rights. Due to slightly different observation periods for the two dependent variables this allows for the inclusion of 79 minority groups in 44 democracies. See the supplementary material (Part A) for more details on included ethnic minority groups and countries.

[13] The results are substantially identical when updated and extended MAR data is used.

Data Analysis and Findings

This study tests whether increases in ethnic minorities' descriptive representation are associated with increases in policy responsiveness towards minority issues (substantive representation). To answer this question a method which provides within-group estimates over time is needed. For this purpose multilevel analysis is applied. Multilevel models with three levels (time, group, country) allow analysing if the proposed relationship holds within ethnic groups and not just between them (Hox 2010; Shor et al. 2007) - i.e. if increases in descriptive representation within one particular group over time improve policy responsiveness towards this particular group.[14] The models include a random intercept for countries and ethnic groups to take different baseline levels of substantive representation across groups and countries into account. The fixed effects of the independent variables then refer to the average effect on substantive representation when the independent variables change within ethnic groups. Formally, the model takes the following form:

$$Y_{ijk}=\beta_{0k}+ \beta X_{ijk} + \alpha W_{jk} + \gamma Z_k + [T\ X_{ijk}X_{ijk} \mid T\ X_{ijk}W_{jk} \mid T\ X_{ijk}Z_k] + \mu_{0k} + \lambda_{jk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

Substantive representation in country k and group j at point i is explained by an overall mean (β_{0k}), time dependent group-level variables (the X variables and the respective β), time independent group and country variables (the W and Z variables and their respective α and γ), interactions between time-variant group variables, time-variant or invariant group or country variables (the XX, XW, and XZ variables and their respective T), country variation (μ_{0k}), group variation (λ_{jk}), and time variation (ε_{ijk}).

The findings of the hierarchical linear regressions are presented in table 1 below. For each dependent variable (economic discrimination and language rights) four models are presented. Models 1 and 6 include the main independent variable of interest (descriptive representation in parliament) and all the control variables, while the subsequent models include one

[14] The application of a multilevel model to time-series data is straightforward (Hox 2010). In contrast to the usual multilevel models, time is set as the lowest level. The effect of descriptive representation on policy responsiveness is analysed with a linear multilevel model (see table 1).

interaction effect at a time to test hypotheses 1b-4 for both dependent variables separately. The baseline (empty) models not presented here show that around 30% of the variance is attributed to country-level differences, approximately 50% of the variance is explained by group-level differences, and 20% are attributed to the lowest level (country-group-year) - thus justifying the choice of a hierarchical model.

The findings presented in table 1 support the first hypothesis which states that descriptive representation is positively related with policy responsiveness for both dependent variables (model 1 and 6). More specifically, the higher a group's level of descriptive representation in parliament the lower is the economic discrimination towards that group, and the higher is its level of language rights. In terms of substantial effects, however, the influence of descriptive representation is rather small. When a group's descriptive representation increases from none to perfectly proportional representation, the level of economic discrimination decreases by approximately 0.68.[15] The effect is somewhat smaller with regard to language rights where an increase from none to perfectly proportional representation refers to an increase of approximately half a scale point. If the effect of descriptive representation is linear, this suggests that it mainly matters if a minority group is considerably over-represented - i.e. if it has a representation score above 1. This would be in line with the famous argument that a critical mass of MPs is needed to have enough leverage to actually influence policy outcomes (e.g. Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Bratton, 2005) (see also hypothesis 4 below).

As suggested above, such leverage is more likely if the MPs are backed by an ethnic minority party than if they belong to a mainstream party since the link to their ethnic group is more direct. Hypothesis 1b, therefore examines if the effect is stronger if most minority MPs are part of ethnic minority parties. This assumption is tested with an interaction effect between descriptive representation and the share of those minority MPs who is elected through ethnic minority parties (models 2 and 7). For the interpretation of the interaction effect, I refer

[15] The models are robust to an ordered logit specification of hierarchical models (see supplementary material Part B, table A8 and figure A3).

to figure 2 below (first row), which graphically illustrates how the effect of descriptive representation in parliament varies with the share of minority MPs elected trough ethnic minority parties. As the first row of figure 2 illustrates, descriptive representation has indeed a much stronger effect on the level of economic discrimination when the share of MPs elected through minority parties is high. While the interaction effect is not significant with regard to the level of language rights, the direction of the effect is in line with the expectations – i.e. minority MPs seem to have more influence if they were mostly elected through ethnic minority parties. Hence, although the present analysis cannot yet conclusively solve the puzzle of whether descriptive representation in ethnic minority parties is really more effective for the substantive representation of minorities, the available evidence speaks rather in support of the hypothesis.

The small effect of descriptive representation on policy responsiveness should come as no surprise, because minority MPs might easily be outvoted or marginalized in parliament. This paper, therefore, discusses three additional mechanisms which are expected to increase the leverage of minority MPs. First, descriptive representatives are expected to be more likely to influence policy outcomes if they are in a special position of power which makes their support pivotal. The present analysis tests this hypothesis by interacting descriptive representation in the parliament with government inclusion of minorities (H2). The findings are presented in model 3 and 8 of table 1 and in the second row of figure 2, which shows the effect of descriptive representation for groups that are included in the government (1) and groups that are not included in the government (0).[16] The hypothesis is only supported for the level of language rights. The graphical presentation of the interaction effect illustrates that the effect of descriptive representation in parliament is more than doubled if minority groups are included in the government. By contrast, the effect of descriptive representation on economic discrimination is negatively affected by government inclusion: against the expectations de-

[16] The results are robust if government inclusion is measured as inclusion of an ethnic minority party into government.

scriptive representation has a stronger effect on the level of economic discrimination, if a group is not included into the government. Hence, government inclusion seems only to strengthen the effect of descriptive representation on the introduction of cultural policies.

The importance of government inclusion for improvements of cultural rights is well illustrated by the example of Romania. In Romania, minority language rights were hotly debated during the first years after communism, but there was no political will to implement more language rights among the majority. Even though the Hungarian minority demanded more language rights for years it was only when they entered the government in 1996 and moderated their demands (Jenne 2007) that things started to change. Victor Ciorbea's new government, which the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) joined, promised to change the education law in return for DAHR support. The law which was finally passed in 1999 was a compromise. While it did not revise the rule of teaching history and geography in Romanian (even in minority schools), it included other elements demanded by the Hungarian minority such as improved provisions for education for Hungarians in universities. Further improvements regarding minority education were achieved under the subsequent (minority) government in 2001 which was supported (without government participation) by DAHR. Similarly, it is mainly thanks to DAHR, who repeatedly threatened to leave the government coalition that a law was passed in 1999 which allowed minorities to use their own language in interactions with Romanian authorities in districts where they comprise more than 20% of the population (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013; Chiribuca and Magyari 2003; Kelley 2004). These examples show that being in a position of political power - through government participation or support of a minority government - can contribute considerably to the introduction of minority-friendly policies. DAHR achieved much more through their participation in a weak government than in the six years in opposition, even though it was highly criticized by internal challengers for its accommodative behaviour and confronted with newly funded minority parties who pursued a more radical agenda (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013). By contrast, gov-

ernment inclusion and exclusion of DAHR had no (additional) effect on the economic discrimination in Romania, which has always been low.

Figure 2: Marginal effect of descriptive representation in parliament on substantive representation as the moderating variables change, 95% confidence intervals



Notes: Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals, marginal effects plots are based on Models 2-5 and 7-10. The Y-axis refers to the size of the marginal effect of descriptive representation in parliament on economic discrimination or language rights, respectively.

Apart from government inclusion two additional factors which might increase the leverage of minority MPs were discussed. The third hypothesis postulates that descriptive representation has a stronger effect if the legislature is powerful and if the legislative prerogatives of the government are low. The findings are again presented in table 1 (models 4 and 9) and figure 2 (third row). The graphical illustration of the interaction effect shows the effect of descriptive representation in the parliament at different levels of legislative effectiveness and illustrates that the power of the legislature only increases the effect of descriptive representation on economic discrimination. Put differently, minority MPs have a higher influence on policies affecting economic discrimination in countries where the legislature is more powerful. There is no significant interaction effect with regard to the level of language rights, but the direction of the effect is again consistent with the expectations.

Finally, by definition, the same share of descriptive representatives results in more parliamentary influence if a group is larger in comparison to the majority group. The fourth hypothesis postulates that descriptive representation has a stronger effect for larger groups – either because larger groups have a higher threat potential, or because the same level of descriptive representation results in more MPs for larger groups. Models 5 and 10 in table 1 below show that descriptive representation in parliament has a much stronger effect for large minorities than for small minorities, supporting the view that minority representatives can only influence policy outcomes if they have enough leverage in public and in parliament. The graphical representation of the interaction effect (see row 4 in figure 2 above) further illustrates the importance of group size. Descriptive representatives are clearly more successful in increasing the level of minority language rights and reducing the level of economic discrimination if their group makes up a significant share of a country's population. However, is it the size of an ethnic group or simply the number of MPs it has in parliament that matters? In other words, can the influence of small minorities be increased by raising their number of MPs and over-representing them in parliament? In order to answer these questions size was substituted with the share of minority MPs in parliament in the interaction effect (see figure A1 and

table A3 in the supplementary material, Part B). The results are less significant and less clear, however. While the effect is similar regarding the level of language rights, it is partly insignificant for economic discrimination and goes in the opposite direction – however, this effect is entirely driven by the outlier of Guyana in 1991 and disappears (becomes insignificant) if the outlier is excluded. This implies that the size of an ethnic group has an effect on its own and not only due to the number of minority MPs in parliament. If this is true, small groups do not gain additional leverage by over-representation, because governments seem to consider the real size of the group (for example their threat potential) when taking decisions.

To summarize, as expected descriptive representation increases the substantive representation of ethnic minorities in terms of policy outcomes (H1a), and there is some support for the argument that the effect is stronger if MPs are elected through ethnic minority parties (H1b). Unsurprisingly, however, the direct effect of descriptive representation is rather small. Therefore, we tested if the effect of descriptive representation was moderated by government inclusion (H2), legislative effectiveness (H3) and group size (H4). While group size has a strong and consistent effect on both dependent variables, the findings regarding the other two mediating factors reveal an interesting pattern which requires further elaboration. Why does government inclusion increase the effect of descriptive representation in parliament on language rights, but not on economic discrimination? Conversely, why does the power of the legislature increase the effect of descriptive representation on economic discrimination, but not on language rights? To better understand this puzzle we need to take a closer look at the actual predicted effect of economic discrimination and language rights at different levels of descriptive representation (see figure 3).

Figure 3 suggests a different causal explanation for language rights and economic discrimination. According to figure 3, an improvement of language rights requires both, government inclusion *and* descriptive representation – i.e. both factors are necessary conditions for an improvement of language rights. By contrast, government inclusion seems to be sufficient on its own, but not necessary, for the reduction of economic discrimination. As figure 3

clearly indicates, even groups that are not well represented in parliament benefit from relatively low levels of economic discrimination, as long as they are represented in government. This difference persists when descriptive representation rises, but groups which are excluded from government seem to be able to reduce the gap if they are well represented in parliament – in particular if the legislature is powerful (see figure A2 in the supplementary material). This suggests that minority MPs are able work together with non-minority MPs – i.e. to build parliamentary alliances – in order to change economic policies. However, this does not seem to work for language policies. How can we explain this difference?

I argue that economic policies are better suited for alliance building than cultural policies. In particular, policies to tackle economic discrimination tend to be part of larger policy packages, such as the general economic policy or budgetary decisions. When parliaments decide on policy bundles – such as economic policies – opportunities for negotiations between different factions in parliament arise. Minority MPs might promise to support certain aspects of a policy bundle in exchange for measures against economic discrimination. Likewise, minority parties might only ensure their support for the budget, as long as it includes aspects to improve the economic situation of their group. Such alliances are more likely to form in multidimensional policy fields (e.g. economic policy) than for single issues (e.g. language policies). While language rights are among the rights which are most often claimed by language minorities (Deets and Stroschein 2005), they are less important for the majority and rarely included in broader policy bundles. Accordingly, it is more difficult to negotiate a policy deal in the area of language policies. Only government inclusion seems to give minority MPs the power to get the necessary support for changes in language policies. This also explains why a powerful legislature is less important for the introduction of language rights: when government inclusion is the key to the introduction of cultural policies, a powerful legislature is less important. This explanation is supported by the example of Romania discussed above. In Romania the nationalistic discourse prevailed, and the majority was not willing to make concessions, until DAHR entered the government and put the question of language rights to the fore-

front of the coalition negotiations. Only government inclusion – and the threat to leave the coalition – gave the minority the power to successfully demand more language rights. From a more general point of view, the question of whether some policies are more likely to be supported by alliances across parties than others might require further research. To my knowledge this question has not received systematic attention so far.

Figure 3: Predicted Level of Substantive representation depending on descriptive representation and government inclusion



Notes: Linear predictions of level of substantive representation (language rights and economic discrimination), based on models 3 & 8 in table 1.

Table 1: Explaining Policy Responsiveness towards Minority Issues

	Economic Discrimination					Language Rights				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	-0.68***	-0.60***	-0.77***	0.63*	-0.40***	0.47***	0.45***	0.36***	0.27	0.29**
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.27)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.09)
Share of MPs in ethnic party	-0.55***	-0.27+	-0.58***	-0.57***	-0.51***	0.14	0.08	0.12	0.14	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Government inclusion	-0.48***	-0.47***	-0.75***	-0.43***	-0.45***	0.35***	0.35***	-0.13	0.34***	0.33***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	-0.08	-0.08	-0.10+	0.19*	-0.07	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Size	2.93***	2.61**	3.10***	2.84***	4.41***	0.52	0.63	0.99	0.51	-0.33
	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.83)	(0.82)	(0.88)	(0.93)	(0.95)	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.96)
Concentration	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.29***	-0.26***	-0.27***	0.27**	0.27**	0.29***	0.27**	0.24**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Territorial Autonomy	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.27***	1.40***	1.40***	1.39***	1.40***	1.38***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Central and Eastern Europe	-0.46	-0.47	-0.46	-0.51+	-0.49	1.23**	1.23**	1.25**	1.24**	1.25**
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		-0.53**					0.12			
		(0.20)					(0.20)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.43**					0.70***		
			(0.14)					(0.14)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				-0.52***					0.08	
				(0.10)					(0.10)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					-4.00***					2.77**
					(0.82)					(0.87)
Constant	3.21***	3.25***	3.29***	2.55***	3.07***	1.21**	1.19**	1.21**	1.31**	1.31***
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.40)

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Level 3: Variance	0.40^{+}	0.42^{+}	0.39	0.33	0.36	0.38	0.38	0.22	0.38	0.39
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.66)	(0.62)
Level 2: Variance	0.91**	0.90**	0.93**	0.92**	0.92**	2.01**	2.00**	2.10**	2.00**	1.91**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.62)
Level 1: Variance	0.39***	0.39***	0.39***	0.39***	0.39***	0.41***	0.41***	0.40***	0.41***	0.41***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1737	1737	1737	1737	1737	1828	1828	1828	1828	1828
N (countries, ethnic groups)	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70
Log Likelihood	-1802.08	-1798.50	-1797.09	-1789.24	-1790.35	-1941.54	-1941.36	-1928.67	-1941.23	-1936.54
BIC	3693.69	3693.98	3691.16	3675.46	3677.67	3973.22	3980.36	3954.97	3980.10	3970.73

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0$. The multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command.

Robustness checks

To ensure the validity of the results, the models were confronted with several robustness tests and are robust to all alternative model specifications, which were tested. First, one might question the direction of the relationship as policy responsiveness might also affect political empowerment and, thereby, the political representation of ethnic minorities. In order to control for this caveat, I have calculated the same models with lagged independent variables. As Table A4 in the supplementary material reveals, the effects are almost identical to those presented above. The fact that the past level of descriptive representation explains the present level of substantive representation makes it is less likely that the direction of causation is reversed and supports the robustness of the results.

Second, the time-series are rather short for most countries due to missing information on the descriptive representation of minority groups in parliament before the 1990s (in particular in Latin American countries). To test the robustness of the findings for longer time-series, the oldest available values of descriptive representation were therefore used as a proxy for descriptive representation in earlier years. This approach mainly affects Latin American countries, where descriptive representation has only increased during recent years. Copying backwards values of a period with no or very few descriptive representatives to a previous period, where minority groups were also severely underrepresented (c.f. Van Cott 2005; Maybury-Lewis 2002) is, therefore, unlikely to bias the results. As Table A5 in the supplementary material shows, the results are also stable after the missing data on descriptive representation is replaced by the closest available value as the coefficients are essentially identical to those presented in Table 1 above.

Third, along the same lines, I controlled for the robustness of the results to the inclusion of those groups which had to be excluded from the main analysis, because information on their descriptive representation in parliament was completely missing. I approximated descriptive representation in parliament for these groups by replacing missing values with descriptive representation through ethnic minority parties (if existing) or zero for all other cas-

es.[17] The results are robust to the inclusion of these groups as shown in Table A6 in the supplementary material.[18]

Fourth, as hierarchical models are still rarely used for time-series the robustness of the models was tested against the more common cross-sectional time-series panel design (PCSTS) with country-group fixed effects (see table A8 in the supplementary material). As it includes country-group fixed effects the PCSTS model *only* considers changes within ethnic groups over time – i.e. it can also be understood as an additional test for the causality of the effect. Again, the findings are virtually identical to those of the multi-level model presented above. This does not only support the general robustness of the results, but also underlines the usefulness of hierarchical models for time-series data. While the results seem to be similar between both approaches, the higher flexibility of hierarchical models (e.g. to the inclusion of time invariant explanatory variables) suggests that they should be considered more often.

Finally, the robustness of the effects was checked with an ordered logit specification. As economic discrimination is an ordinal variable with only few categories an ordered logit model would be more appropriate than a linear regression. As Table A9 in the supplementary material indicates the results are robust to an ordered logit specification. The direction of the coefficients and the interaction effects are identical to the results presented above. Therefore, linear models were presented for the main models instead of ordered logit models for the benefit of the more straightforward interpretation.

Conclusion

Many members from ethnic minority groups are convinced that only MPs from their own ethnic group can represent them properly. While the presence of minority MPs is certainly important for symbolic and normative reasons, it remains purely symbolic unless it affects

[17] Based on the assumption that groups without representation through ethnic parties in parliament, and without any information about their representation in parliament are entirely excluded from parliament. This applies to four groups: Byelorussians in Estonia, Roma in France, Macedonians in Greece, and Friulians in Italy.

[18] A combination of the tests in table A5 and A6 proofed also robust – i.e. results for the complete sample (50 countries, 97 groups) was approximated by replacing missing groups with their representation through ethnic minority parties, and by prolonging the time-series through the replacement of missing values with the closest available value. Results are presented in table A7, and are virtually identical to the other results presented here.

policy outcomes. This paper attempted to shed light on the link between descriptive and substantive representation from a comparative perspective by investigating under which conditions minority MPs are most successful in influencing policy outcomes. Going beyond most studies of substantive representation, I built on a small number of recent studies from the United States and argued that substantive representation should be studied by analysing policy outcomes rather than the political behaviour and attitudes of ethnic minorities. Analysing data from all 50 multi-ethnic democracies (except for Africa and Asia) and 97 minority groups, it was shown that higher levels of descriptive representation are indeed associated with higher levels of policy responsiveness towards minority issues, thus supporting hypothesis 1a. While the direct effect of descriptive representation in the parliament on ethnic minorities' substantive representation is rather weak, it is considerably strengthened by four factors. First, as suggested in hypothesis 1b, descriptive representation seems to have a stronger effect when it is achieved through the presence of ethnic minority parties - at least with regard to the level of economic discrimination. This suggests that minority parties are in a slightly better position to lobby for economic redistribution than individuals from mainstream parties who might have different priorities or may be bound by the official party line. The importance of parties and parliaments for economic policies is also mirrored in findings regarding the other hypotheses.

The second hypothesis postulated that descriptive representatives are more influential if their ethnic group is represented in government. The results suggest that this is particularly true with regard to cultural policies (language rights). The level of language rights appears much higher when groups are represented in government *and* parliament. By contrast, economic policies in favour of minority groups are not only implemented when they are included into the government, but also when they are well represented in parliament – parliamentary representation seems to work as a remedy against a lack of government representation. This is especially true in countries where the legislature is powerful (H3). This suggests that the mechanisms affecting economic and cultural policies might be different: Improvements of cultural policies seem to depend on presence in parliament *and* government, whereas econom-

ic policies seem to be affected by inclusion into the government, or high descriptive representation – in particular when parliaments are strong and most MPs are elected through minority parties. However, future research is needed to clarify this relationship, and to study how it is related to non-minority related policies. Finally, hypothesis 4 tested the argument that representatives from larger minority groups are more successful in influencing policy outcomes than representatives from smaller minority groups. The findings suggest that descriptive representation is particularly effective if a group is relatively large in comparison to the majority population – apart from the number of MPs, a group's 'threat potential' seems to affect their substantive representation.

By extending the analysis of ethnic minorities' substantive representation beyond single case studies, this study contributed to the understanding of the influence of descriptive representatives on policy outcomes. Previous research has robustly shown that descriptive representatives often act for their constituency by, for instance, disproportionally supporting minority-friendly legislation or engaging in policy areas which are important to minorities. It has further been demonstrated that minority MPs indeed feel a certain responsibility to represent their group. Previous research was less clear, however, about the actual impact of minority MPs on policy outcomes. This paper contributes to this discussion by introducing two measures of policy responsiveness which can be used in a comparative perspective across time and space. The fact that we could observe an impact of descriptive representation on actual policy outcomes renders minority inclusion even more important. In this regard, the findings strengthen claims for adequate representation of ethnic groups not only for symbolic or normative reasons, but also due to its policy consequences. Furthermore, in contrast to most previous comparative studies of minority representation, this paper goes beyond descriptive representation in minority parties. Minority parties do not exist in every country where ethnicity is salient, or they might only be supported by a minority of the respective ethnic group. Hence, extending the concept of descriptive representation beyond representation in ethnic minority parties contributes to our understanding of the role of descriptive representa-

tion and allows the effect to be studied for societies where MPs are not (primarily) elected through ethnic minority parties.

Future research might further develop the focus on policy outcomes rather than parliamentary behaviour when studying the substantive representation of ethnic minorities, as this is the only way to understand the actual policy consequences of descriptive representation. In this regard, it is necessary to focus on additional aspects of minority issues and to develop new measures to analyse if the proposed relationship holds beyond the two proxies used in the present study. Furthermore, due to data restrictions a possibly important explanation of ethnic minorities' substantive representation could not be tested in the present paper: the attitudes of the majority population. It is likely that parliaments and mainstream parties are more open to minority issues if the majority population shows some tolerance toward ethnic minorities and their political demands. Tolerant or neutral attitudes of the majority population might, therefore, moderate the influence of descriptive representation on policy responsiveness towards minority issues.[19]

[19] Table A10 in the supplementary material presents a very rough approximation of this claim. For a small subsample where data was available I included the attitudes of the majority (measured through World Values Survey data) as a control variable. I used the question whom individuals would not like as their neighbours (people of a different race, ethnic group, Roma) to approximate the attitudes of the majority towards minorities. The results remain robust to the inclusion of this variable.

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Supplementary material

Part A: Description of variables and data

Table A1: Ethnic minority groups

Country	Minority Group	Size	Included since[a]
Albania	Greeks	0.03	2011
Argentina	Indigenous peoples	0.02	1983
Australia	Aborigines	0.03	1945
Austria	*Slovenes*	*0.01*	*1955*
Belgium	Flemings	0.59	1945
Bolivia	Quechua Aymara	0.25	1982
Bolivia	Guarani	0.03	1982
Bosnia-Herzegovina	*Croats*	*0.14*	2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Roma	0.01	2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina	*Serbs*	*0.37*	2002
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	0.45	1985
Bulgaria	Roma	0.05	1990
Bulgaria	Turks	0.10	1990
Canada	French Canadians	0.04	1945
Canada	Indigenous People	0.03	1945
Canada	Québecois	0.20	1945
Chile	Indigenous People	0.04	1989
Colombia	Afro-columbians	0.23	1957
Colombia	Indigenous People	0.03	1957
Costa Rica	Afro-Costa Ricans	0.03	1945
Costa Rica	Indigenous People	0.01	1945
Croatia	Serbs	0.05	2000
Czech Republic	Roma	0.01	1993
Ecuador	*Highland Indigenous People*	*0.29*	*1979*
Ecuador	Lowland indigenous	0.01	1979
El Salvador	Indigenous People	0.10	1984
Estonia	*Byelorussians*	*0.01*	*1991*
Estonia	Russians	0.26	1991
Estonia	Ukrainians	0.02	1991
Finland	Swedes	0.06	1945
France	*Basques*	*0.01*	*1969*
Georgia	Abkhazians	0.04	1996
Georgia	Adzhars	0.06	1996
Georgia	Armenians	0.06	1996
Georgia	South Ossetians	0.02	1996
Greece	*Macedonians*	*0.01*	*1974*
Greece	Muslims	0.01	1974
Greece	*Roma*	*0.01*	*1974*
Guatemala	Indigenous People	0.43	1996
Guyana	Afro-Guyanese	0.30	1991
Guyana	Indigenous People	0.09	1991

(continued)

Table A1: (continued)

Country	Minority Group	Size	Included since[a]
Honduras	Garifuna	0.02	1980
Honduras	Indigenous People	0.07	1980
Hungary	Roma	0.05	1989
Israel	Arabs	0.11	1948
Italy	*Friulians*	*0.01*	*1948*
Italy	*Sardinians*	*0.02*	*1948*
Latvia	*Byelorussians*	*0.29*	*1991*
Latvia	Russians	0.03	1991
Latvia	Ukrainians	0.04	1991
Lithuania	Poles	0.07	1991
Lithuania	Russians	0.06	1991
Macedonia	Albanians	0.25	1992
Macedonia	Roma	0.03	1992
Macedonia	Serbs	0.02	1992
Macedonia	Turks	0.04	1992
Mexico	Indigenous People	0.14	1997
Moldova	Gagauz	0.04	1994
Moldova	Slavs	0.21	1994
Montenegro	Albanians	0.05	2006
Montenegro	Bosniak	0.12	2006
Montenegro	Croats	0.01	2006
New Zealand	Maori	0.13	1945
Nicaragua	Indigenous People	0.05	1995
Panama	Afro-Panamians	0.14	1990
Panama	Indigenous People	0.60	1990
Paraguay	Indigenous People	0.02	1992
Peru	Afro-Peruvians	0.05	2000
Peru	Aymara	0.02	2000
Peru	Indigenous lowland people	0.01	2000
Peru	Quechua	0.34	2000
Romania	Magyars	0.07	1992
Romania	Roma	0.03	1992
Serbia	Hungarians	0.04	2006
Serbia	Roma	0.01	2006
Serbia	Sandzak Muslims	0.02	2006
Slovakia	Hungarians	0.11	1993
Serbia-Montenegro	*Croats*	*0.01*	*2000*
Serbia-Montenegro	*Hungarian*	*0.03*	*2000*
Serbia-Montenegro	*Albanian*	*0.17*	*2000*
Serbia-Montenegro	*Roma*	*0.01*	*2000*
Serbia-Montenegro	*Sandzak Muslims*	*0.03*	*2000*
Slovakia	Roma	0.04	1993
Spain	Basques	0.06	1977
Spain	Catalans	0.02	1977
Spain	Galicians	0.05	1977

(continued)

Table A1: (continued)

Country	Minority Group	Size	Included since[a]
United Kingdom	Welsh	0.02	1945
Spain	Roma	0.17	1977
Switzerland	Swiss French	0.16	1945
Switzerland	Swiss Italian	0.08	1945
Turkey	*Kurds*	*0.18*	*2002*
Ukraine	Russians	0.22	1991
United Kingdom	Catholics in N.I.	0.01	1945
United Kingdom	Scots	0.10	1945
United States	African-Americans	0.13	1945
United States	Latinos	0.15	1945
Uruguay	Afro-Uruguayans	0.06	1985

Notes: italics: groups with missing values for minority members of parliament. They are, therefore, excluded from the analysis, although they fulfil the case selection criteria. They are considered for the robustness checks presented in table A6.
a: first year of inclusion refers to year a country became democratic, the year of independence or 1945.

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Language Rights	2453	2.83	2.23	0	6
Economic Discrimination	2488	1.80	1.50	0	4
Descriptive Representation in Parliament	2121	0.62	0.67	0	3.26
Share of MPs in ethnic minority parties	2121	0.20	0.35	0	1
Government Inclusion	2909	0.26	0.44	0	1
Legislative Effectiveness	2926	2.68	0.56	0	3
Group Size	2926	0.10	0.12	0.01	0.59
Group Concentration	2926	2.16	1.15	0	3
Territorial Autonomy	2926	0.26	0.44	0	1
Central-Eastern Europe	2926	0.22	0.42	0	1

Part B: Specifications and Robustness Checks

Figure A1: Marginal effect of descriptive representation over the share of minority MPs, 95% confidence intervals



Notes: Models based on an interaction effect between descriptive representation and the share of minority MPs in parliament (see table A3 below).

Table A3: The effect of descriptive representation in dependence of the share of minority MPs

	Economic Discrimi-nation	Language Rights
Descriptive Representation	-0.45***	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Share minority MPs	-7.34***	-2.51+
	(1.15)	(1.35)
Descr. Rep*Share minority MPs	2.31***	6.12***
	(0.56)	(1.20)
Share MPs in minority parties	-0.52***	0.08
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Government Inclusion	-0.42***	0.35***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	-0.09	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Size	5.10***	0.52
	(0.90)	(0.97)
Concentration	-0.24**	0.29***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Autonomy	-0.25**	1.43***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Central and Eastern Europe	-0.45	1.36***
	(0.31)	(0.40)
Constant	3.05***	1.25**
	(0.33)	(0.39)
Level 3: Variance	0.38	1.00
	(0.26)	(0.59)
Level 2: Variance	0.91	1.49**
	(0.25)	(0.45)
Level 1: Variance	0.40***	0.42***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	1737	1828
N (country, ethnic groups)	44,77	41, 70
Log-Likelihood	-1781.91	-1923.63
BIC	3668.26	3952.42

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
The multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command.

Figure A2: Prediction of economic discrimination for groups that are not part of the government, depending on the level of descriptive representation and legislative effectiveness



Notes: Linear predictions of level of substantive representation (language rights and economic discrimination), based on models 3 & 8 in table 1.

Table A4: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, incl. lagged IVs

	DV: Language Rights					DV: Economic Discrimination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	0.49***	0.46***	0.38***	0.31	0.30**	-0.71***	-0.65***	-0.82***	0.40	-0.44***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.28)	(0.11)
Share of MPs in ethnic parties	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.12	0.09	-0.58***	-0.39*	-0.62***	-0.60***	-0.55***
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Government inclusion	0.32***	0.31***	-0.18	0.31***	0.30***	-0.50***	-0.49***	-0.87***	-0.46***	-0.47***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.07	-0.08	-0.11+	0.15+	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Size	0.82	1.02	1.29	0.81	-0.10	3.01***	2.80***	3.22***	2.92***	4.34***
	(0.92)	(0.94)	(0.92)	(0.92)	(0.94)	(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.83)	(0.90)
Concentration	0.33***	0.34***	0.35***	0.33***	0.30***	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.30***	-0.27***	-0.27***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Territorial Autonomy	1.36***	1.36***	1.34***	1.36***	1.34***	-0.31***	-0.30***	-0.32***	-0.31***	-0.30***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
CEE	1.31**	1.31**	1.32***	1.31**	1.32**	-0.60+	-0.60+	-0.60+	-0.64*	-0.62+
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		0.21					-0.36+			
		(0.20)					(0.21)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.71***					0.59***		
			(0.14)					(0.14)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				0.07					-0.43***	
				(0.10)					(0.11)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					3.02***					-3.64***
					(0.87)					(0.86)
Constant	1.03*	1.00*	1.05**	1.12**	1.15**	3.20***	3.22***	3.33***	2.64***	3.08***
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.33)

Table A4: (continued)

Level 3: Variance	1.01	0.95	1.01	1.04	1.04	0.41	0.41	0.35	0.34	0.37
	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Level 2: Variance	1.49**	1.49**	1.49**	1.38**	1.38**	0.89**	0.89**	0.95**	0.91**	0.93**
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Level 1: Variance	0.41***	0.41***	0.41***	0.41***	0.40***	0.41***	0.41***	0.40***	0.41***	0.40***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	1759	1759	1759	1759	1759	1663	1663	1663	1663	1663
N (country, ethnicgroups)	41, 69	41, 69	41, 69	41, 69	41, 69	42, 72	42, 72	42, 72	42, 72	42, 72
Log Likelihood	-1837.98	-1837.45	-1824.95	-1837.71	-1832.03	-1729.84	-1728.36	-1721.37	-1721.51	-1720.98
BIC	3765.62	3772.04	3747.04	3772.56	3761.21	3548.67	3553.13	3539.16	3539.43	3538.38

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command.
All models include lagged IVs for descriptive representation, share of MPs in ethnic minority parties, government inclusion, and legislative effectiveness

Table A5: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, missing values of descriptive representation replaced with closest available value

	DV: Language Rights					DV: Economic Discrimination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	0.39***	0.38***	0.30***	0.38	0.19+	-0.65***	-0.55***	-0.71***	0.41	-0.38***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.28)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.10)
Share of MPs in ethnic parties	0.32**	0.28*	0.32**	0.32**	0.30**	-0.36***	-0.08	-0.36***	-0.38***	-0.32**
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Government inclusion	0.35***	0.34***	-0.07	0.35***	0.33***	-0.46***	-0.45***	-0.66***	-0.42***	-0.43***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	0.20***	0.20***	0.18**	0.19**	0.19***	-0.07	-0.08+	-0.08+	0.11+	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Size	1.31	1.39	1.69+	1.31	0.36	2.55**	2.24**	2.65***	2.49**	0.00
	(0.98)	(1.00)	(0.98)	(0.98)	(1.02)	(0.80)	(0.81)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(.)
Concentration	0.44***	0.44***	0.46***	0.44***	0.41***	-0.34***	-0.35***	-0.35***	-0.33***	-0.34***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Territorial Autonomy	1.66***	1.66***	1.66***	1.66***	1.64***	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.30***	-0.28***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CEE	1.44***	1.44***	1.45***	1.44***	1.46***	-0.51+	-0.50+	-0.52+	-0.55*	-0.54+
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		0.09					-0.63**			
		(0.22)					(0.19)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.61***					0.33*		
			(0.15)					(0.14)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				0.00					-0.41***	
				(0.11)					(0.09)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					3.05**					-3.91***
					(0.97)					(0.83)
Constant	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.32	3.34***	3.40***	3.38***	2.89***	3.22***
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.28)

(continued)

Table A5: (continued)

Level 3: Variance	1.04	1.04	0.99	1.03	1.02	0.32	0.35	0.30	0.28	0.27
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Level 2: Variance	1.51**	1.51**	1.55**	1.53**	1.43**	0.77***	0.77***	0.79***	0.79***	0.82***
	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Level 1: Variance	0.61***	0.61***	0.60***	0.61***	0.60***	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	2090	2090	2090	2090	2090	2078	2078	2078	2078	2078
N (country, ethnic groups)	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	45, 81	45, 81	45, 81	45, 81	45, 81
Log-Likelihood	-2457.55	-2457.47	-2449.66	-2457.55	-2452.66	-2193.17	-2187.97	-2190.37	-2183.58	-2182.23
BIC	5006.85	5014.33	4998.70	5014.49	5004.70	4478.01	4475.25	4480.06	4466.47	4463.76

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Missing values for descriptive representation were replaced by the closest value available to test for the robustness of the results to longer time-series. This mainly affects Latin American countries.

Table A6: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, approximated values for missing groups

	DV: Language Rights					DV: Economic Discrimination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	0.47***	0.44***	0.36***	0.23	0.31***	-0.65***	-0.55***	-0.72***	0.50*	-0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.09)
Share of MPs in ethnic parties	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.05	-0.17*	0.04	-0.18*	-0.18*	-0.16*
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Government inclusion	0.35***	0.35***	-0.15	0.34***	0.34***	-0.50***	-0.49***	-0.72***	-0.46***	-0.47***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.07	-0.08	-0.09	-0.10+	0.13+	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Size	1.21	1.38	1.68+	1.20	0.48	2.84***	2.52**	2.97***	2.77***	4.50***
	(0.88)	(0.90)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.91)	(0.77)	(0.78)	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.83)
Concentration	0.42***	0.42***	0.44***	0.41***	0.39***	-0.27***	-0.27***	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.26***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Territorial Autonomy	1.34***	1.33***	1.32***	1.34***	1.32***	-0.34***	-0.32***	-0.35***	-0.34***	-0.33***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CEE	1.58***	1.57***	1.59***	1.57***	1.59***	-0.52+	-0.48+	-0.53+	-0.52+	-0.53*
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		0.18					-0.61***			
		(0.18)					(0.17)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.73***					0.35**		
			(0.13)					(0.13)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				0.10					-0.45***	
				(0.10)					(0.09)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					2.46**					-4.34***
					(0.84)					(0.78)
Constant	0.56	0.54	0.56	0.68+	0.65+	3.09***	3.11***	3.15***	2.53***	2.94***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.29)

(continued)

Table A6: (continued)

Level 3: Variance	0.44	0.43	0.25	0.44	0.45	0.24	0.26	0.19	0.22	0.19
	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.65)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Level 2: Variance	1.92**	1.92**	2.05**	1.91**	1.85**	0.92***	0.91***	0.97***	0.89***	0.97***
	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.70)	(0.63)	(0.61)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Level 1: Variance	0.41***	0.41***	0.40***	0.41***	0.40***	0.40***	0.40***	0.40***	0.40***	0.40***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	2155	2155	2155	2155	2155	2128	2128	2128	2128	2128
N (country, ethnic groups)	46, 80	46, 80	46, 80	46, 80	46, 80	49, 92	49, 92	49, 92	49, 92	49, 92
Log-Likelihood	-2229.80	-2229.30	-2214.69	-2229.27	-2225.58	-2112.81	-2106.34	-2109.13	-2101.06	-2097.48
BIC	4551.71	4558.39	4529.16	4558.32	4550.95	4317.57	4312.31	4317.89	4301.73	4294.58

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Missing values for descriptive representation in parliament were replaced by descriptive representation in parliament through ethnic minority parties (if available) or zero (under the assumption that no information is available, because the parliament did not include any MP of this particular group.

Table A7: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, complete sample, combination of approaches from Table A5 and A6

	DV: Language Rights					DV: Economic Discrimination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	0.41***	0.38***	0.31***	0.29	0.23*	-0.60***	-0.49***	-0.64***	0.31	-0.30**
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.27)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.09)
Share of MPs in ethnic parties	0.24**	0.18	0.24**	0.24**	0.22*	-0.13+	0.07	-0.14+	-0.15*	-0.12+
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Government inclusion	0.35***	0.35***	-0.08	0.35***	0.34***	-0.47***	-0.45***	-0.63***	-0.44***	-0.43***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	0.18***	0.19***	0.17**	0.16*	0.18***	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.11*	0.05	-0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Size	1.67+	1.81+	2.06*	1.67+	0.86	2.43**	2.16**	2.51***	2.38**	4.07***
	(0.93)	(0.95)	(0.94)	(0.93)	(0.97)	(0.74)	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.81)
Concentration	0.52***	0.52***	0.53***	0.52***	0.50***	-0.32***	-0.32***	-0.33***	-0.32***	-0.31***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Territorial Autonomy	1.62***	1.61***	1.61***	1.62***	1.60***	-0.36***	-0.34***	-0.36***	-0.36***	-0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CEE	1.75***	1.74***	1.76***	1.75***	1.77***	-0.52+	-0.47+	-0.52+	-0.52*	-0.53*
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		0.16					-0.63***			
		(0.20)					(0.17)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.64***					0.26*		
			(0.15)					(0.13)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				0.05					-0.35***	
				(0.10)					(0.09)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					2.74**					-4.22***
					(0.93)					(0.79)
Constant	-0.19	-0.21	-0.20	-0.14	-0.10	3.28***	3.30***	3.31***	2.90***	3.14***
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.26)

(continued)

Table A7: (continued)

Level 3: Variance	0.91	0.88	0.78	0.90	0.88	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.24
	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.63)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Level 2: Variance	1.70**	1.72**	1.78**	1.70**	1.65**	0.80***	0.82***	0.80***	0.77***	0.89***
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Level 1: Variance	0.49***	0.49***	0.49***	0.49***	0.49***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Observations	2438	2438	2438	2438	2438	2485	2485	2485	2485	2485
N (country, ethnic groups)	46, 81	46, 81	46, 81	46, 81	46, 81	50, 97	50, 97	50, 97	50, 97	50, 97
Log-Likelihood	-2782.84	-2782.51	-2773.62	-2782.74	-2778.56	-2521.46	-2514.57	-2519.49	-2513.45	-2507.40
BIC	5659.28	5666.41	5648.63	5666.86	5658.50	5136.74	5130.78	5140.61	5128.53	5116.43

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Missing values for descriptive representation in parliament were replaced by descriptive representation in parliament through ethnic minority parties (if available) or zero (under the assumption that no information is available, because the parliament did not include any MP of this particular group. Values were copied back to earlier years in order to prolong time-series to the entire democratic period (see table A5)

Table A8: Explaining Policy Responsiveness towards Minority Issues, PCSTS-Models with fixed effects

	Language Rights					Economic Discrimination				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	0.47***	0.47***	0.37***	0.32	0.32**	-0.68***	-0.61***	-0.77***	0.58*	-0.38***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.11)
Share of MPs in ethnic party	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.12	-0.66***	-0.40*	-0.68***	-0.67***	-0.63***
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Government inclusion	0.34***	0.34***	-0.12	0.34***	0.33***	-0.50***	-0.49***	-0.79***	-0.45***	-0.47***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Legislative Effectiveness	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	0.20*	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Size	-0.72	-0.67	0.04	-0.74	-1.28	6.17***	5.14***	6.53***	6.11***	7.16***
	(1.24)	(1.28)	(1.24)	(1.24)	(1.25)	(1.48)	(1.54)	(1.48)	(1.47)	(1.48)
Concentration	0.21*	0.21*	0.25*	0.21*	0.19+	-0.27*	-0.29**	-0.28**	-0.26*	-0.25*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Territorial Autonomy	1.40***	1.40***	1.39***	1.40***	1.39***	-0.25**	-0.24**	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.24**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		0.03					-0.52*			
		(0.21)					(0.21)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.68***					0.46***		
			(0.14)					(0.14)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				0.06					-0.50***	
				(0.10)					(0.10)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					2.45**					-4.20***
					(0.91)					(0.89)
Constant	1.84***	1.83***	1.74***	1.92***	1.89***	2.46***	2.63***	2.54***	1.83***	2.39***
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.38)
Observations	1828	1828	1828	1828	1828	1737	1737	1737	1737	1737
N (countries, ethnic groups)	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	41, 70	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77
Log Likelihood	-1740.54	-1740.52	-1728.17	-1740.34	-1736.73	-1608.74	-1605.66	-1602.93	-1596.58	-1597.14
BIC	3541.16	3548.64	3523.93	3548.28	3541.06	3277.15	3278.46	3273.00	3260.30	3261.42

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0$. The multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12.

Table A9: Explaining the Level of Economic Discrimination, ordered logit model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	-2.53***	-1.94***	-2.68***	5.25***	-1.83***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(1.20)	(0.44)
Share of MPs in ethnic party	-1.14*	0.30	-1.15*	-1.20**	-1.03*
	(0.46)	(0.58)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.47)
Government inclusion	-2.26***	-2.26***	-2.51***	-1.77***	-2.20***
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.41)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Legislative Effectiveness	-0.29	-0.33	-0.31	1.18***	-0.30
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.22)
Size	10.79***	9.10**	10.80***	10.45***	13.04***
	(3.12)	(3.19)	(3.12)	(3.09)	(3.26)
Concentration	-0.86**	-0.91***	-0.87***	-0.83**	-0.84**
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)
Territorial Autonomy	-1.85***	-2.03***	-1.82***	-1.84***	-1.81***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Central and Eastern Europe	-1.48	-1.47	-1.50	-1.81	-1.56
	(1.21)	(1.27)	(1.21)	(1.13)	(1.19)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		-3.56***			
		(0.88)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			0.45		
			(0.54)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				-3.20***	
				(0.49)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					-7.66*
					(3.24)
Cut 1	-6.13***	-6.55***	-6.24***	-2.72*	-5.96***
	(1.22)	(1.26)	(1.23)	(1.36)	(1.21)
Cut 2	-3.92**	-4.24***	-4.03***	-0.46	-3.72**
	(1.22)	(1.25)	(1.22)	(1.36)	(1.21)
Cut 3	-2.52*	-2.84*	-2.63*	0.97	-2.32+
	(1.21)	(1.25)	(1.22)	(1.36)	(1.21)
Cut 4	0.98	0.66	0.87	4.57***	1.18
	(1.21)	(1.24)	(1.21)	(1.37)	(1.20)
Level 3: Variance	6.04	6.70	5.75	4.51	5.66
	(4.02)	(4.09)	(4.10)	(3.91)	(3.78)
Level 2: Variance	11.95*	12.61**	12.09*	12.20*	11.81**
	(4.67)	(4.74)	(4.82)	(4.93)	(4.41)
N	1737	1737	1737	1737	1737
N (country, ethnic groups)	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77	44, 77
Log-Likelihood	-1291.20	-1282.72	-1290.86	-1267.15	-1288.22
BIC	2686.84	2677.34	2693.62	2646.19	2688.34

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Ordered logit models calculated with Stata 14th meologit command.

Table A10: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, incl. attitudes of towards minorities

	DV: Economic Discrimination					DV: Language Rights				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl.	-1.54***	-1.50***	-1.93***	-0.42	-1.17***	0.69***	0.69***	0.21	-0.11	0.19
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.59)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.50)	(0.19)
Share of MPs in ethnic parties	-1.19***	-1.02***	-1.37***	-1.17***	-1.23***	0.16	0.15	-0.02	0.14	0.19
	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Government inclusion	-0.60***	-0.60***	-1.16***	-0.58***	-0.55***	0.33***	0.33***	-0.50***	0.31***	0.30***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Legislative Effectiveness	-0.04	-0.04	-0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11	-0.05
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Size	3.55**	3.32**	3.94**	3.59**	4.53***	2.55*	2.57*	3.56**	2.50*	1.06
	(1.18)	(1.20)	(1.21)	(1.17)	(1.26)	(1.17)	(1.22)	(1.14)	(1.17)	(1.21)
Concentration	-0.29**	-0.29**	-0.35***	-0.29**	-0.27*	0.71***	0.71***	0.76***	0.70***	0.61***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Territorial Autonomy	-0.47***	-0.47***	-0.38**	-0.47***	-0.50***	0.90***	0.90***	1.00***	0.90***	0.93***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
CEE	-0.87*	-0.87*	-0.76+	-0.94*	-0.88*	0.68	0.68	0.78	0.72	0.69
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.53)
Attitudes towards minorities	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Descr. Rep. * Share parties		-0.26					0.01			
		(0.34)					(0.28)			
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.			1.02***					1.30***		
			(0.20)					(0.19)		
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.				-0.40+					0.29+	
				(0.21)					(0.18)	
Descr. Rep. * Size					-4.79*					5.77***
					(2.11)					(1.56)
Constant	3.45***	3.48***	3.72***	3.13***	3.29***	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.51	0.63
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.56)

Table A10: (continued)

Level 3: Variance	0.31^{+}	0.31^{*}	0.31^{+}	0.30^{+}	0.32^{*}	$1.06e^{-22}$	$1.44e^{-17}$	$7.74e^{-18}$	$2.16e^{-22}$	$9.20e^{-14}$
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	($1.26e^{-21}$)	($2.43e^{-16}$)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Level 2: Variance	0.02	$2.05e^{-23}$	0.03	0.02	$4.31e^{-14}$	1.77^{**}	1.66^{**}	1.77^{**}	1.78^{**}	1.71^{**}
	(0.14)	($3.74e^{-22}$)	(0.15)	(0.14)	($3.74e^{-13}$)	(0.64)	(0.80)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.48)
Level 1: Variance	0.34^{***}	0.33^{***}	0.34^{***}	0.34^{***}	0.34^{***}	0.21^{**}	0.21^{**}	0.20^{**}	0.20^{**}	0.21^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Observations	996	996	996	996	996	994.00	994.00	994.00	994.00	994.00
N (country, ethnic groups)	22, 37	22, 37	22, 37	22, 37	22, 37	22, 34	22, 34	22, 34	22, 34	22, 34
Log-Likelihood	-1120.80	-1120.52	-1108.41	-1118.89	-1118.25	-1028.86	-1028.86	-1005.90	-1027.51	-1022.17
BIC	2331.35	2337.69	2313.48	2334.44	2333.16	2147.44	2154.34	2101.52	2151.64	2140.96

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Attitudes of the majority population are measured with the World Values Survey question on whom individuals would not like as their neighbours: people of a different race, ethnic group, or Roma.

4 Chapter

(A revised version of this chapter is forthcoming with Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1307098)

Inclusion and responsiveness:

Disentangling political representation and its effect on ethnic protests in electoral democracies

Abstract

Political representation is a central pillar of democracy. Political representation contributes to political stability through symbolic inclusion (descriptive representation) and policy consequences. Empirically, most papers do not distinguish between different types of representation. This paper disentangles the effect of representation by studying descriptive and substantive representation separately. With a cross-sectional time-series design, analysing over 90 ethnic minority groups in more than 40 electoral democracies worldwide, it is shown that symbolic and instrumental aspects of representation matter, but that the effect of government inclusion is overestimated when policy responsiveness is not considered. The findings further suggest that different types of policies affect protest differently.

Keywords: Policy responsiveness, grievances, ethnic minorities, ethnic protest, descriptive representation

Introduction

Political representation is a crucial aspect of democracies (Dahl 1971). While political representation of the majority is generally well achieved in new and old democracies (e.g. Roberts 2010; Powell 2004), representation of ethnic minorities is more contested. Many democracies have recognized the challenges associated with underrepresentation of ethnic minorities and increasingly provide special rules for minority representation (Bird 2014; Krook and O'Brien 2010). Nevertheless minorities remain numerically and substantively underrepresented in many democracies (e.g. Ruedin 2013; Reynolds 2011). This is problematic as the absence of minority representation and of responsiveness towards minority groups is likely to lead to anger and resentment (grievances) which might – under certain circumstances - translate into violent and non-violent protests against the state (Theuerkauf 2010).

Previous research has shown that political representation – in particular descriptive representation in the government – reduces the risk of ethnic confrontations (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Nevertheless, we know only little about the mechanism that links representation to protest. On the one hand, political representation might be important due to its symbolic role of fostering feelings of inclusion and belonging among the minority population (Mansbridge 1999). On the other hand, political representation is expected to have instrumental benefits, such as increased policy responsiveness (e.g. Phillips 1995; Preuhs 2007), a better access to resources and policy benefits, or an increased perception of security among minority groups (Theuerkauf 2010). In this regard, I argue that the main benefit of representation is instrumental, but symbolic aspects might also play a role.

Hence, representation is expected to influence policy responsiveness towards minority demands – i.e. the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of ethnic minorities (e.g.

Mansbridge, 1999; Preuhs, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005) which should reduce grievances and, therefore, the likelihood of ethnic confrontations (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). While most previous studies see the importance of representation in its instrumental effect, they approximate the effect of policy responsiveness with government inclusion. Thereby, previous research equalises descriptive representation in the government with policy influence or at least assumes a direct link between the two forms of representation (e.g. Birnir 2007; Cederman et al. 2010). However, although responsiveness might be more likely when a group is numerically present, it is all but guaranteed. Minority representatives might easily be marginalised or outvoted (Bieber 2008) or they might represent other interests than those of their ethnic group (Zuber 2015). This happened for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Croat member of the state presidency (2006-2014), Željko Komšić, was considered an illegitimate representative of Croat interests by Bosnian Croats, as he was allegedly mainly elected thanks to Bosniak voters (Bochsler 2012, 70).

Accordingly, this paper argues that the effect of political representation can only be understood by theoretically and empirically disentangling the symbolic and instrumental effects of representation. It, therefore, distinguishes between descriptive representation and its assumed effect – i.e. policy responsiveness – and thereby contributes to the on-going discussion about policy responsiveness and its role for democratic stability and ethnic confrontations.

The forms of ethnic confrontations in democracies vary greatly and range from low-scale non-violent protests to violent protests (i.e. rebellions). In democracies, non-violent forms of protest prevail, but violent confrontations also occur (Gurr 2000, 29–30) – for instance in the United States (1960s and 70s), in Spain (1970s-2000s), or in Bolivia (early 2000s). In most cases violent protests are preceded or accompanied by non-violent protests (Regan and Norton 2005, 325; Gurr 2000, 50) and caused by similar factors (Saideman et al. 2002; Wimmer 1997).

This paper, therefore, focuses on the effect of representation for the entire range of ethnic protests in democracies – from non-violent to violent protest.[1]

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After briefly discussing the literature on grievances and ethnic conflict and protest the theoretical part explains why political inclusion matters and how policy responsiveness influences the likelihood of ethnic confrontations. The empirical analysis relies on the new dataset "Ethnic Minorities in Democracies" that combines EPR and MAR measures with newly developed indicators on policy responsiveness and descriptive representation. It also includes a case study of Bolivia to illustrate the effects found in the quantitative part. The final section discusses the findings and concludes by highlighting steps for future research.

Representation, Policy Responsiveness and Grievance

The argument that a lack of representation increases the risk of democratic instability and ethnic confrontations is linked to grievance-based explanations of conflict, which attribute protest to discontent about unfulfilled expectations and the resulting grievances thereof (Theuerkauf 2010). In short, grievances develop when people perceive a discrepancy between the rights and resources to which they feel entitled and those that they (perceive to) be granted (Gurr 1970). Grievance-based explanations of ethnic confrontations see ethnic confrontations as attempts to eliminate grievances (Sambanis 2002, 223) and have a long history in political science (e.g. Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Birnir 2007; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gubler and Selway 2012; Gurr and Moore 1997; Gurr 1970, 1993; Regan and Norton 2005; Theuerkauf 2010).

To explain the effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic confrontations theories about the role of ethnic minorities' political grievances are of particular importance. Political grievances

[1] Henceforth, I refer to violent and non-violent protests, as protests or ethnic confrontations.

develop when ethnic groups are excluded from political power, and feel that they have no influence in a countries' political life. Excluded groups are more likely to search for ways outside the established political arena to make their demands heard (Theuerkauf 2010). Even though recent studies have clearly established a link between (descriptive) representation (especially in the government) and the likelihood of ethnic confrontations, we know still little about the mechanism that links representation to protest. On the one hand, representation may be important, because it fosters feelings of belonging to the political community and participating in the decision-making process among the minority group (Gay 2002; Mansbridge 1999, 641). In this sense representation can be understood as being intrinsically valuable, as almost all minority groups find representation important (Theuerkauf 2010). Most research on the effect of representation on conflict claims, however, that representation of minorities matters because it makes politics more responsive and less discriminative towards the demands of minority groups (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Theuerkauf 2010). In this regard, the role of political representation of minorities lies in its instrumental effect: being present in the political institutions is expected to increase the likelihood that policy outcomes are in line with minority preferences (Theuerkauf 2010, 126–128), which should reduce grievances and consequently the likelihood of conflict. Although most scholars of ethnic conflict agree that representation is important due to its effect on policy outcomes, most research only looks at descriptive representation (in the government), and is, therefore, unable to disentangle the symbolic and instrumental effect of representation.

Contributing on this literature I argue that the effect of descriptive representation and policy responsiveness on anti-government protest should be distinguished. While policy responsiveness is a clear sign of actual policy impact descriptive representation is not necessarily related to political power. Minority MPs or ministers may be purely symbolic figureheads without actual policy influence. They can easily be marginalised or outvoted (Bieber 2008, 114), and might be unable to increase the policy responsiveness towards minorities. While the influence

of government ministers might be bigger than that of parliamentary representatives, even they might be side-lined. Consequently, I argue in this paper that what actually matters for the accommodation of minorities is policy impact and not symbolic representation. For the accommodation of ethnic groups it is not only important who achieves representation, but also which policies are introduced. Therefore, this paper proposes to explicitly study the effect of policy responsiveness rather than relying on descriptive representation in government as a proxy and to disentangle the symbolic effect of inclusion from its substantial effect on policy outcomes. The focus on actual policies in addition to political inclusion contributes to understanding how political representation is linked to ethnic confrontations and to determine when symbolic inclusion is sufficient and when it matters only due to its effect on policy responsiveness.

While it is intuitively apparent that groups which are satisfied with the policy outcome are unlikely to engage in protest against the state, it is less clear under which conditions groups which are dissatisfied protest against the government (Jenne 2007). The literature on the opportunity structure of protest (Eisinger 1973; Opp 2009) suggests, for instance, that protest is unlikely when chances for success are small. This suggests that the effect of policy responsiveness on protest might be non-linear. Namely, one might expect groups that are neither entirely marginalized, nor entirely satisfied with the way politics works in their country to be most likely to protest against the state. The potential lack of protest among marginalised groups (groups with low levels of policy responsiveness) may be caused by at least two contrasting explanations, which are discussed in more detail below: low feelings of efficacy and a lack of economic means.

On the one hand, protests require sufficient motivation to mobilise against the state. Motivation for protest is influenced by grievances (caused by a lack of policy responsiveness) and feelings of efficacy. While a lack of policy responsiveness is generally expected to increase grievances and, therefore, the likelihood of protests, a lack of efficacy might moderate the effect. Ethnic groups and individuals who have never experienced any responsiveness towards

their demands might feel unable to influence policy outcomes (i.e. have low efficacy) and, therefore, abstain from any engagement in politics (Eisinger 1973; Opp 2009).

On the other hand, protest requires a certain amount of resources to mobilize and organize group members in order to orient their grievances against the political actors (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). A complete lack of policy responsiveness may reduce a group's access to resources and, therefore, protest.

Figure 1: The effect of policy responsiveness on the likelihood of ethnic protest against the state



Notes: simulation of inverted u-shape relationship between policy responsiveness and the level of ethnic confrontation (non-violent and violent forms of protest).

In sum, groups that are completely denied responsiveness to their demands might feel that they have no influence (low efficacy) or lack the necessary resources (means) to engage in protest against the state and refrain from any interaction (even confrontational) with the state. If the non-linear effect is due to a lack of efficacy it should equally apply to responsiveness in all policy areas. If it is due to a lack of (economic) means to start and sustain a protest, however,

it is more likely to be visible when governments are particularly unresponsive in the economic area. When neither of the two explanations is correct, the effect of policy responsiveness should be linear – i.e. increasing levels of policy responsiveness linearly reduce the level of protest against the state. This is illustrated in figure 1 above. Based on these theoretical considerations the following hypotheses are postulated, whereas hypothesis 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the level of descriptive representation the lower the level of ethnic protest against the state.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the level of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities, the lower the level of protest against the state.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic protest has the form of an inverted u-shape, in particular with regard to economic issues.

Case selection and Operationalisation

Case selection

The analysis is based on a worldwide sample of ethnically heterogeneous democracies (Freedom House (2011) value ≤ 4, and Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2011) value≥6) [2], but 17 Asian and African democracies were excluded for the following reasons: 1) the basis for the identification of ethnicity is much more diffuse in African and Asian countries; there are more cross-cutting identity cleavages than in other regions and the saliency of these cleavages is more volatile (e.g. Posner 2007). 2) In many African countries ethnic parties are banned and representation based on ethnicity is prohibited. Information on minority representation is, therefore, often scarce. This makes a study which focuses on different aspects of representation problematic (e.g. Bogaards, Basedau, and Hartmann 2010 and further contributions in Democratization

[2] In cases where the two ratings differed, the country was only included if the difference to the threshold was not more than one scale-point. If countries were democratic for different periods with authoritarian interruptions, only the most recent democratic period was considered. If a country's democracy broke down recently (e.g. Venezuela) it was excluded.

17(4)). Accordingly, the paper covers all electoral democracies in Western and Eastern Europe, the Americas and Oceania. Apart from being democratic countries have to fulfil the following criteria. They need to contain at least 500'000 inhabitants[3] and be pluri-ethnic - i.e. a country must feature at least two politically relevant ethnic groups[4] of at least one per cent of the country's population.

Based on these criteria the new dataset "Ethnic minorities in democracies" was developed that covers all pluri-ethnic democracies in Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America, and Oceania since 1950. Datasets on ethnic groups notoriously suffer from selection bias, as researchers always need to determine which of the at least 5000 ethnic groups to include into the analyses (Birnir et al. 2014; Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce the problem of selection bias the two most commonly used datasets on ethnic groups were combined. Groups were selected on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority at Risk Project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).[5] In total, 93 groups from 48 countries fulfil the selection criteria outlined above (see table A1 in the supplementary material). 20 of these groups are not coded by MAR. To avoid the selection effect associated with MAR data (Hug 2013), information for these groups has been added to the dataset based on extensive reviews of the group-specific literature. For one of the dependent variables, manual coding was only possible for a subset of cases. Therefore, these results will be subject to robustness checks (see below).[6]

[3] In order to exclude micro-states, for which information is scarce.
[4] Ethnic minorities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-nationalist minorities based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18).
[5] EPR-ETH defines a group as politically relevant if "at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Hunziker 2013). A group is defined as relevant (or politically significant) by MAR if "the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and [if] the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests" (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).
[6] A more detailed description of the dataset is provided in the data appendix at the end of this dissertation.

Dependent Variable[7]

The dependent variable measures ethnic minorities' confrontation with the state by analysing violent and non-violent protest. Violent ethnic protest has become very rare in electoral democracies during the last few decades, while non-violent protest has continued. As non-violent protest is often understood as preceding and paralleling violent protest (Gurr 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Saideman et al. 2002; Wimmer 1997), the entire range of ethnic confrontations is considered by analysing violent and non-violent forms of protest. *Violent protest* is measured using the MAR dataset's rebellion variable (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Since only very few groups in the sample used violent protest as a means to advance their demands the variable is recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) refers to the presence of violent protest against the state. Because the MAR dataset does not cover all ethnic minority groups in the sample, the variables were completed with additional information based on an extensive review of the group-specific literature. As no indication was found that any of the 18 groups missing in MAR has been engaged in violent protest since 1950,[8] missing values were coded as (0). *Non-violent protest* is measured with an ordinal variable from the minorities at risk dataset (MAR) with ranges from (0) (no protest) to 4 (medium and large demonstrations[9]) (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Because the group-specific literature is less explicit about non-violent protests, recoding of excluded groups was only possible for a small subsample (four groups). Therefore, the results regarding non-violent protest will be subjected to two types of robustness checks. First, the analysis will be conducted with a higher threshold for inclusion (1.5%)[10], because the sample is more complete when only groups above 1.5% of the population are taken into account. Second, the models will be run with the full sample, where missing values on the

[7] Descriptive Statistics for all variables are available from Table A2 in the supplementary material
[8] This is in line with Birnir et al. (2011; 2012) who analysed violent rebellion for all the groups MAR misses and found that only 8 of over 900 excluded groups had engaged in violent rebellion since 1945.
[9] Categories 4 and 5 of the MAR dataset are merged into one category.
[10] MAR selects groups that make up at least 1% of a country's population.

protest variable will be coded as zero, because it is more likely that MAR excludes groups that do not engage in protest (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).

Independent Variables

The main independent variable is *policy responsiveness* towards minority preferences. Measuring policy responsiveness towards ethnic groups rests on the assumption that group preferences exist, and that they are distinguishable from the preferences of the majority. Indeed, survey research on preferences of ethnic minorities and majorities shows that ethnic minorities often have different policy preferences than the majority, in particular with regard to 'minority issues', but also on more general policy issues (Hänni 2015; Lieberman and McClendon 2012). Even if not all members of a minority group support group rights to the same extent, ethnic minorities are significantly more likely to do so than members of the majority (Evans and Need 2002; Rovny 2014). Hence, while the potential heterogeneity of minority preferences is acknowledged, measuring policy responsiveness of minorities on the group level appears justified.

Previous attempts to measure policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities have mainly concentrated on the United States. Scholars have measured policy responsiveness by considering the extent of social welfare benefits (Preuhs 2006, 2007), by looking at the voting behaviour of minority MPs (Hero and Tolbert 1995), or by measuring the liberal attitudes of members of congress (Lublin 1999). While these solutions are useful for measuring responsiveness to Latino or Afro-American interests in the United States, they are not applicable in a cross-country comparison. Instead, a cross-national study of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities might focus on at least two aspects: 1) policies which directly target ethnic minorities; 2) issues that are most important to voters belonging to ethnic minority groups. Similar to studies on policy responsiveness towards women (e.g. Caiazza, 2004; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009;

Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005), the present study focuses on policies which directly target minorities.

In order to distinguish between the efficacy and means argument for the potential u-shaped effect of policy responsiveness (see H3), the existence of policies which directly target ethnic minorities is measured with two separate variables, one considering a cultural, the other an economic policy area. First, policy responsiveness is approached with an index of minority language rights. Language is often seen as an important group characteristic which bonds group members together (Liu 2011, 125), and is the most important marker for many ethnic groups (Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3). Accordingly, recognition and support for minority language and education are the rights most often claimed by ethnic minorities (Deets and Stroschein 2005). The index of minority language rights consists of an additive index of three variables and ranges from 0 to 6, where each element can be guaranteed (2), partly guaranteed (1), or not guaranteed (0). The three variables are i) the possibility to use the minority language with authorities and the courts; ii) the possibility of education of the minority language; iii) the possibility of education in the minority language. Data is collected on the group-level based on Leclerc's (2015) databases on language policies around the world[11]. For the part of the analysis which includes this variable, the sample is restricted to language minorities (around 80% of all minorities in the sample). As a second factor for policy responsiveness towards minority groups economic discrimination is analysed. Economic discrimination is one of the most obvious obstacles which ethnic minority groups face, and is accordingly an issue of substantive importance for most members of an ethnic community. Economic discrimination is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 with MAR data, where (0) refers to no discrimination and (4) refers to the presence of exclusionary and repressive policies which severely restrict the economic opportunities of an ethnic group (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).[12] This measure of economic discrimination combines

[11] Completed with Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Liu (2011)

[12] (1) refers to significant economic discrimination due to historical marginalisation, but where the state attempts to improve the situation of the group through public policies, (2) refers to significant economic discrimination due

information about the extent of discrimination *and* the policies which are introduced in order to tackle discrimination. It is, therefore, a good indicator to measure the actual implementation of minority-friendly policies. Missing values (due to MAR's selection criteria) were recoded with secondary sources, based on reports by the Minority Rights Group International (2014), Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Wheatley (2004).

Descriptive representation is measured as incorporation into the government, because minority representation is most effective if minorities have a say in government (Hänni 2014). *Government inclusion* is measured with a binary variable, where (1) refers to governments where at least one minister belongs to the respective ethnic minority group. It is coded with information from electoral databases,[13] the country reports from the U.S. Department of State, Birnir (2007) and Birnir and Satana (2013).

The independent variables are lagged by one year in order to take the potential endogeneity of representation and protest into account. One might argue that responsiveness and descriptive representation improve, when minorities protest, because governments attempt to accommodate them to prevent further escalation. By regressing protest on the lagged explanatory variable the risk that protest causes an improvement of representation is lower.

Control Variables

We control for other factors which are known to explain the level of ethnic protest. 1) Factors influencing the mobilization capacity of an ethnic group such as group size and territorial concentration are controlled for. Information on *territorial concentration* is based on Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) and MAR data (Minorities

to historical marginalisation, while no or very few policies are implemented to improve the situation of the group, and (3) refers to significant economic discrimination due to present marginalisation with no, or insufficient measures to improve the group's status.

[13] The database of political institutions (Beck et al. 2001), the Parties and Election Database (Nordsiek 2012), the European Election Database (2012), and information provided by the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2012)

at Risk Project 2009).[14] The *size of an ethnic minority group* is measured with data on the ethnic group's share of the population according to MAR and EPR-ETH (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Minorities at Risk Project 2009).[15]

2) It is controlled for institutional factors such as territorial autonomy and the electoral system. Coding of t*erritorial autonomy* is based on EPR-ETH-data (Bormann et al. 2015; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), and information provided in Pan and Pfeil (2006), laws on autonomy, and constitutions. The electoral system is measured as a set of dummy variables (proportional system, mixed system, plurality/majority systems) (Bormann and Golder 2013), where plurality and majority systems are used as the reference category.

3) The level of a country's economic development is considered, because richer countries are expected to be better equipped to accommodate ethnic groups through redistribution (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Saideman et al. 2002).[16] *Economic development* is measured with data on the GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 US $). The data is based on the Penn World Tables (Center for International Comparision of Production Income and Prices 2006).[17]

Finally, it is controlled for factors related to the opportunity structure of protest. First, it is expected that ethnic minority groups are more likely to engage in protest against the government if protest is seen as a legitimate means to advance a group's policy demands in a country. Therefore, it is controlled for a country's general *culture of protest*, measured through additively combining information on peaceful anti-government demonstrations[18] and strikes[19]

[14] The variable consists of four categories, where (0) refers to widely dispersed groups, (1) covers groups which are primarily urban or form the minority in one region, (2) indicates that a part of the group is a majority in one region, while other group members are dispersed, and (3) refers to groups which are concentrated in one region.
[15] If the information regarding the ethnic composition of the population differed between MAR and EPR-ETH, the data was validated with information from the CIA World Factbooks.
[16] Others argue that economic development increases protest, because modernization leads to more discrimination and thus to more grievances (Fearon 2003; Gellner 1983).
[17] Due to missing data in the Penn World Tables, data for Serbia-Montenegro (2000-2005) is based on World Bank data (2012).
[18] Number of peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature (Banks and Wilson 2013).
[19] Number of strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involve more than one employer and that are aimed at national government policies or authority (Banks and Wilson 2013).

(Banks and Wilson 2013). Second, the opportunity for protest is lower if governments are known to suppress unconventional political actions easily. A country's level of repression is measured through the political terror scale data (Gibney et al. 2015).[20] The scale ranges from 1-5 with higher values indicating more repression. Missing years on this variable were replaced by the closest available value.

Data Analysis and Findings

This part examines the effect of representation on ethnic confrontations with the state by disentangling the effect of symbolic inclusion in the government (descriptive representation) and policy responsiveness (as a potential consequence of government inclusion). I apply multilevel analysis in order to deal with cross-sectional time-series data instead of the more common panel (PTSCS) data analysis. The multilevel design provides accurate estimates of time-series effects while simultaneously controlling for dependencies in the data (i.e. dependencies between ethnic groups over time and between ethnic groups in the same country) (e.g. Shor et al. 2007). This allows us to analyse if the proposed relationship holds within ethnic groups and not just between them – e.g. if increases in policy responsiveness towards one particular group over time reduce the risk (level) of ethnic confrontations for this particular group. The main independent variables are lagged by one year in order to account for the potential endogeneity of representation and protest. The analysis first examines the consequences of policy responsiveness for non-violent protest (table 1) before turning to the discussion of policy responsiveness and violent protest (table 2).

Table 1 below estimates the effect of representation on non-violent protest with linear multilevel models, with random intercepts and slopes. The empty model not reported here supports the choice of a hierarchical model: most of the variance in protest behaviour occurs at the group-

[20] The political terror scale assesses government repression based on Amnesty International and U.S Department of State reports. When the two ratings differed, the higher value is chosen.

year-level (60%), 38% of the variance is explained by group-level factors and only 1% by country-level characteristics. This implies that country characteristics are least important in explaining non-violent protest. We first analyse the effect of government inclusion on the level of ethnic minorities' non-violent protest (H1). As postulated, inclusion into the government reduces the level of minority protest – i.e. groups which are represented by one of their own in government protest less than groups who lack descriptive representatives in the government. We then turn to the second and third hypotheses which refer to the effect of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities on non-violent protest. We distinguished between cultural and economic aspects of policy responsiveness. The analysis reveals varying effects between the two variables. As hypothesis 2 anticipates, higher levels of minority language rights are linearly associated with decreases in the level of non-violent protest against the state. By contrast, economic discrimination has a non-linear effect on the level of non-violent protest. Groups with a midrange level of economic discrimination protest most, whereas groups that are not discriminated and groups that are highly discriminated protest less. For a more intuitive interpretation of the non-linear effect it is referred to the predicted values in figure 2 below, which depicts the inverted U-shape relationship between economic discrimination and non-violent protest.[21] To facilitate the interpretation and comparison with other measures of representation, the scale for economic discrimination was reversed and all variables scaled from 0 to 1. Figure 2 further underlines that the guarantee of all forms of representation (responsiveness and government inclusion) has a very similar effect on the level of non-violent protest: for all measures of representation the level of non-violent protest is comparable, when representation is high. Hence, at least regarding non-violent protest, the symbolic and instrumental aspects of representation seem to be equally important.

[21] The U-Shaped effect is presented with confidence intervals in figure A1 in the appendix. As figure A1 reveals the U-shaped effect is significant across the entire level of economic discrimination.

Table 1: Explaining non-violent Protest Behaviour of Ethnic Minorities

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Language Rights (lag)	-0.12*	-0.12		
	(0.05)	(0.11)		
Language Rights^2 (lag)		0.00		
		(0.02)		
Economic Discrimination (lag)			0.05	0.51***
			(0.05)	(0.13)
Economic Discrimination^2 (lag)				-0.11***
				(0.03)
Government Inclusion (lag)	-0.56***	-0.56***	-0.56***	-0.52***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Territorial Autonomy	0.22	0.22	0.14	0.18
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Concentration	0.11+	0.11+	0.06	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Group Size	3.14***	3.14***	4.41***	4.15***
	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.91)	(0.88)
GDP p.c in 1000 US$	0.06***	0.06***	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Proportional System [a]	0.13	0.13	-0.24	-0.29+
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Mixed System [a]	0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Anti-government Actions	-0.00	-0.00	0.01+	0.01+
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
State Repression	-0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.98***	0.98***	0.81**	0.59*
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Country level variance	0.41**	0.41**	2.01e-13	3.18e-17
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(1.24e-12)	(7.90e-14)
Slope Variance (country level)	0.09*	0.09*	0.06*	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group level variance	0.13+	0.13+	0.59***	0.54***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Year level variance	0.94***	0.93***	0.93***	0.93***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1391	1391	1751	1751
N(country, groups)	38, 63	38, 63	44,79	44,79
Log Likelihood	-2022.97	-2022.97	-2541.88	-2534.41
BIC	4154.51	4161.75	5195.79	5188.31

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command. [a] Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system.

Figure 2: Predicted level of non-violent protest at varying levels policy responsiveness and government representation



Notes: predicted margins of policy responsiveness (economic discrimination and language rights) and government representation on the level of violent protest. Other variables are held constant at their mean. The scale of economic discrimination was inverted – i.e. high values refer to high policy responsiveness or low economic discrimination, respectively.

Regarding the control variables, the mobilization capacity of minority groups seems to be important: bigger groups (and to some extent more concentrated groups) are more intensely engaged in non-violent confrontations with the state than smaller groups. Against the expectations, higher economic development seems to foster non-violent protest. This might support the argument that increased development increases discrimination and, therefore, grievances among ethnic minority groups (Fearon 2003; Gellner 1983). By contrast, institutional factors seem to be less important for non-violent protest: the effect of the electoral system and territorial autonomy are mostly insignificant. Regarding the opportunity structure of protest only the existence of other anti-government actions in a state has (partly) an influence on protest, while state repression seems to have no effect.

As discussed above, the measure of non-violent protest might potentially suffer from selection bias, as MAR does not cover all minority groups that fulfil the selection criteria of the present study. Therefore, two types of robustness checks regarding the validity of the protest variable were conducted (see Table A3 in the supplementary material). First, the threshold regarding the size of minority groups was slightly increased to 1.5% of the total population. This led to the exclusion of two countries and 8 very small minority groups, but allows the hypotheses to be tested with an almost complete sample, thus reducing the MAR related potential selection bias. As the findings presented in Models 1-4 in table A3 in the supplementary material indicate, we find virtually identical effects in the smaller sample. Second, the number of groups included into the analysis was extended to the full sample by assigning missing groups the value of (0) on the protest variable, because groups excluded by MAR are likely to show low levels of protest.[22] The results are presented in Table A3 in models 5-8. Confirming the findings presented above, the results are robust to this alternative operationalization of protest. We still find the u-shaped effect of economic discrimination, a linear effect of language rights, and a negative effect of government inclusion which is comparable to that presented in table 1 above.

Do these findings translate into more violent forms of protest or have violent and non-violent protests different causes? Table 2 below presents the effect of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation in the government on violent protest. The empty models not presented here indicate that 19% of the variance in violent protest is explained by the lowest level (group-year-level), 67% by group-level characteristics and 14% by country level factors. We start our analysis again by evaluating the effect of descriptive representation in the government (H1). In line with the findings on non-violent protest and earlier research (e.g. Birnir 2007; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), descriptive representation in the government reduces the

[22] One of MAR's selection criteria requires that groups are mobilised and are "the basis for collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests" (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). As this is certainly the case as soon as groups engage in protests, it is likely that excluded groups do not protest.

likelihood of violent protest – i.e. the symbolic aspect of representation seems also to play a role for violent protest.

Turning to the effect of policy responsiveness, the analysis in table 2 reveals again contrasting effects for cultural and economic policies. While language rights seem to be linearly associated with the likelihood of violent protest, economic discrimination seems again to have a small non-linear effect. In terms of substantial effects, a one-point increase in the level of language rights reduces the likelihood of violent protest by about 40%. The effect does not change, however, for high levels of language rights, thereby aligning with hypothesis 2, which postulates a linear effect of policy responsiveness. By contrast, the effect of economic discrimination seems to be non-linear - thus supporting H3. While lower levels of economic discrimination reduce the risk of violent protest, very discriminated groups appear to have a slightly lower risk of violently engaging against the state than groups with a mid-range level of economic discrimination (see figure 3). However, the uncertainty associated with this effect is considerable.[23] The non-linear effect should, therefore, be interpreted cautiously and only be understood as a possible indication for the presence of a non-linear effect. Apart from illustrating the small (and potentially insignificant) non-linear effect of economic discrimination, figure 3 compares the effect of policy responsiveness and government inclusion. To ease the interpretation of figure 3, the scale of economic discrimination has again been reversed and all variables have been scaled from 0 to 1. The fact that descriptive representation in the government remains significant after controlling for policy responsiveness suggests that symbolic and instrumental aspects of representation are important for the likelihood of violent ethnic protest.

[23] Figure A2 in the supplementary material provides the confidence intervals for the U-shaped effect. The uncertainty associated with the u-shaped effect is considerable. The effect can, therefore, not be interpreted with great confidence. However, I still take it as a sign for the presence of a small non-linear effect as the large uncertainty is probably at least partly caused by the general very low probability of violent protest in democracies.

Table 2: Explaining violent protest of ethnic minorities

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Language Rights	-0.40*	-0.55		
	(0.18)	(0.48)		
Language Rights^2		0.03		
		(0.09)		
Economic Discrimination			0.71***	3.70***
			(0.15)	(0.67)
Economic Discrimination^2				-0.63***
				(0.13)
Government Inclusion	-1.17*	-1.18*	-1.51***	-1.44**
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.46)
Concentration	0.88*	0.87+	0.84**	1.11**
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.36)
Group Size	1.81	1.60	1.97	1.06
	(4.72)	(4.75)	(3.51)	(4.42)
GDP p.c in 1000 US$	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Proportional System	-0.73	-0.77	-0.93	-0.75
	(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.75)	(0.85)
Mixed System	0.76	0.75	-0.82	-0.41
	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.80)	(0.90)
Anti-government Actions	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Territorial autonomy	2.11***	2.13***	1.09**	1.28**
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.39)	(0.42)
State Repression	0.30	0.31	0.41**	0.23
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Constant	-5.82***	-5.72***	-8.27***	-11.29***
	(1.52)	(1.55)	(1.33)	(1.79)
Country level variance	6.45	6.69	1.97	5.20
	(5.03)	(5.13)	(2.56)	(4.19)
Slope Variance (country)	0.39	0.39	-	-
	(0.23)	(0.22)	-	-
Group level variance	9.74*	9.53*	8.51**	11.59**
	(4.52)	(4.50)	(2.88)	(4.28)
Observations	1935	1935	2299	2299
N(country, group)	44, 76	44, 76	48, 93	48, 93
Log Likelihood	-412.92	-412.86	-491.72	-474.94
BIC	931.79	939.24	1084.07	1058.25

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmelogit command. In logistic models the variance of the lowest level is fixed at 3.29. [a] Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system.

Figure 3: Predicted probability of violent protest over varying levels of policy responsiveness and government representation



Notes: predicted margins of policy responsiveness (economic discrimination and language rights) and government representation on the level of violent protest. Other variables are held constant at their mean. The scale of economic discrimination was inverted – i.e. high values refer to high policy responsiveness or low economic discrimination, respectively.

Regarding the control variables, all else equal, concentrated groups and groups which enjoy territorial autonomy are more likely to use violent protest as a means to advance their demands. These findings are in line with the research on federalism and territorial autonomy stating that subnational autonomy arrangements which closely follow ethnic group lines foster rather than accommodate tensions between ethnic groups (Christin and Hug 2012; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Roeder 2009), and that concentrated groups have a better opportunity structure to mobilize (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). While economic development was positively associated with non-violent protest it seems to reduce violent protest against the state. This confirms the mixed findings and arguments for economic development presented in the literature.

The results are robust to different model specifications. On the one hand, instead of a hierarchical model with time as the lowest level, a cross-sectional time-series panel analysis was

conducted (see table A4). The findings are comparable, thus, underlying the robustness of the results.[24] On the other hand, the models for non-violent protest were estimated with an ordered logit model to take the non-continuous nature of protest into account.[25] The significance and direction of the estimates presented in table A5 are similar to those presented above, thus confirming the robustness of the findings.

Taken together, these findings help disentangling the effect of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation. Comparing the effect of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation in the government it appears that both forms of representation are important. The fact that symbolic inclusion (descriptive representation) stays significant after including measures for policy responsiveness implies that government inclusion is an insufficient proxy for substantive representation and has a value of its own. Furthermore, by disentangling symbolic and instrumental forms of representation it could be shown that different issues affect protest differently. Economic discrimination seems to be non-linearly associated with protest (H3) – in particular with non-violent protest, while language rights seem to have a linear effect (H2). The different effect of language rights and economic discrimination invites further clarification. As discussed above cultural and economic rights might be differently linked to the likelihood of ethnic confrontations. Whereas economic rights are directly related to a group's economic wellbeing, the deprivation of cultural rights does not necessarily translate into economic marginalisation, but might affect its prospect for group survival. Hence, while groups which are economically marginalized might lack the necessary resources to successfully mobilize, groups who feel culturally threatened might have the necessary economic means and engage in confrontation against the state to address their cultural grievances. Accordingly, the findings yield more support to the means than efficacy argument for the u-shaped relationship.

[24] The effect of language rights is no longer significant, but the direction and size of the effect remains comparable. Generally, the results regarding language rights appear slightly less stable, probably also due to little variance over time.

[25] Strictly speaking protest is measured on an ordinal scale and requires the use of ordinal multi-level models. Since the results are very similar, the results of the linear models are presented in the paper.

If the decreasing effect of policy responsiveness at high level of discrimination was related to efficacy, it would equally apply to language rights. The fact that language rights are linearly related to protest, however, suggests that it is a lack of resources (means) rather than efficacy which makes protest less likely at low levels of responsiveness. The previous concentration of the literature on descriptive representation in the government overlooks that such differences between policy areas exist.

The case of Bolivia: non-violent and violent protest of the indigenous population

This section provides illustrative case evidence for the quantitative models presented above. For this purpose, we need a case that is well explained by the models and for which the dependent variable varies over time (Lieberman 2005; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Bolivia fulfils these criteria, as it has small residuals, and has experienced various violent and non-violent protests in the period under observation (since 1982).

At the time of democratisation the situation of Bolivia's indigenous population had already slightly improved. To understand whether the u-shaped effect of the quantitative models can also be observed qualitatively one needs, accordingly, to look at the pre-democratic period. The indigenous population was always economically worse off than the rest of the population. On the one hand, the overlap of economic development and identity was seen as partly accidental and associated with cultural autonomy in specific indigenous areas that excluded indigenous from 'modernization'. On the other hand, the state also actively discriminated and exploited the indigenous and marginalised them politically. Nevertheless, the indigenous rarely actively protested against their situation (Evia, Laserna, and Skaperdas 2008; Gurr and Burke 2000, 179; Rice 2012, 76). This changed after the Nationalist Revolution of the 1950s when the agrarian and educational reforms transformed the economic structure dramatically and most indigenous received the right to vote. As parts of the indigenous population became wealthier and more aware of politics they realized that their discrimination was not only based on economic, but

also on cultural grounds (Evia, Laserna, and Skaperdas 2008), and started to mobilise politically against it. Whereas the indigenous organised initially mainly as miners and peasants they began to integrate explicit indigenous demands into the agenda of the peasant and labour protests in the late 1960s. In particular, the ongoing failure of the revolutionary government to integrate the indigenous despite changes in the economic and educational structure led to a shift of the protest discourse and a 'reindigenousisation' of the population (Flesken 2013, 337–339).[26] The increase in protest at a time when the system became slightly more open towards indigenous demands is in line with the u-shaped effect of economic discrimination discussed above: as long as minority groups were entirely socially and politically marginalised they protested less, because they lacked the economic means (and in the case of Bolivia the necessary efficacy) to protest against government policies.

In order to further illustrate the causal link between policy responsiveness and protest in Bolivia I know turn to the discussion of specific indigenous protests during the democratic period. I focus on selected, large-scale protests (see table A6 in the supplementary material) rather than on explaining the overall protest pattern since the early 1980s. This has the advantage that more fine-grained data can be used to illustrate the mechanism that was found in the quantitative analysis.

One of the first major protests after transition to democracy started in the late 1980s when the indigenous lowland people protested against the state (Rice 2012, chap. 5; Van Cott 2005, chap. 3).[27] At this time policy responsiveness towards indigenous people in Bolivia was still

[26] While the discourse of the protests transformed during the 1970s and raised indigenous demands more explicitly they were not a new phenomenon of the democratization period and cannot be attributed to increased identification with indigenous identity. To the contrary, the protests led to a sharpening of collective indigenous identity and increased the willingness of people to identify as indigenous rather than mestizo – i.e. people with mixed heritage (Flesken 2013b; Flesken 2013a). However, the Quechua and Aymara speaking population was already active and relevant before democratization (according to EPR-ETH),

[27] Protests of the Aymara and Quechua population were mostly oriented against attempts of the government to eradicate coca production. While coca production is partly seen as an indigenous tradition it is also related to international drug trafficking (Rice 2012, 5). I will, therefore, leave this aspect of the protests out and concentrate on those that have clearly an economic or cultural agenda.

rather low, but they were no longer as marginalised as at the beginning of the century. Nevertheless, the indigenous population was still lacking sufficient land rights, cultural discrimination was high and economic discrimination considerable (Van Cott 2000, 2005, chap. 3). As a consequence, indigenous groups mobilised and showed their dissatisfaction with the state by protesting. From 1991 onwards a number of laws were passed to protect the cultural and economic rights of the indigenous population – for instance access to land in the highlands. The turning point for protests and indigenous rights was the constitutional reform of 1994 (Gurr and Burke 2000). In 1994, language rights were increased by granting the lowland indigenous communities more rights to minority language education, and the possibility to use indigenous languages in contact with the authorities. Simultaneously, policies were introduced to lessen economic discrimination against the indigenous population. For instance, in the mid-1990s, for the first time, a large extent of the government's development budget went to rural indigenous communities, and local authorities were granted the authority to implement these projects, thereby contributing to the empowerment and economic development of the indigenous population (Gurr and Burke 2000). As a consequence violent protests ceased entirely and the non-violent protests organised in support of these issues also stopped.[28]

Half a decade later, another wave of indigenous protests erupted. Due to dissatisfaction with government policies, particularly with progress in the INRA[29] land reform, social investment in health and bilingual education, or the question of indigenous control over subsoil resources, the organization of the lowland indigenous people in Bolivia (CIDOB) organized a protest against the government in July 2000. The protests ceased after an agreement was reached that guaranteed an improvement of the INRA law and certain minority rights, as well as the appointment of a Guarani minister into government (Gustafson 2002, 281, 290).

[28] This does not mean that all non-violent protests stopped. Major protests in the second half of the 1990s occurred for instance, when Cocoa growers protested against attempts of the government to eradicate coca production.

[29] The INRA law was a set of rules for land reforms that was passed in 1996. INRA stands for Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National institute for agrarian reform) (Gustafson 2002, 281).

A second indigenous protest in the same year that started in April and continued until September demonstrates how protests are not always harmless and can easily escalate into violence. Initially, the Aymara-dominated Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesionos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) expressed their dissatisfaction with government policies with road blocks that paralyzed the country for 20 days. Similar to CIDOB, they were protesting against the implementation of the INRA land-reform law, but being more radical, demanded the implementation of a revised proposal that regulated indigenous control over land reform, the distribution of titles and territories, as well as control over soil, subsoil and water rights for the Andean indigenous communities. In contrast to the CIDOB-protests, these actions turned violent and resulted in the death of 15 people and more than one hundred injured protestors (Gustafson 2002, 284–289). After reaching an agreement with the state which promised large investments into infrastructure projects and an adaptation of the contested INRA law the protests of the highland indigenous stopped. However, both agreements (with CIDOB and CSUTCB) were not sufficiently implemented by the state, leading to renewed protests in the following months (Gustafson 2002, 290–291).

In sum, the case of Bolivia supports the effect found in the quantitative analysis. According to the examples discussed here, minority groups start to protest against the government if they are dissatisfied with government policies and feel discriminated. When the lack of policy responsiveness coincides with a lack of government inclusion (as in Bolivia until 2005) minority groups have no other means to bring their demands to the attention of the elites than by protesting (Madrid 2008, 174). Indeed, after Evo Morales became Bolivia's first indigenous president in 2006 the protest by the indigenous population ceased. While Morales' first government (2006-2010) also faced various social protests they were mostly caused by those who had benefitted from previous government policies and now felt excluded from the new government (Rice 2012, 74). The fact that the protagonists of the protests changed after Evo Morales' election lends further support to the argument that people protest when they are dissatisfied with

government policies. While non-violent protest is not necessarily dangerous for a democratic regime, and can be understood as the healthy mobilization of dissatisfied citizens, it can easily transform into more violent confrontations with the state as the example of the CSUTCB protests demonstrates. Consideration of and responsiveness to minority demands should, therefore, be a central concern of every democratic government.

Conclusion

Political representation in general and policy responsiveness in particular are crucial aspects of every democracy. They require the continued responsiveness of governments to the policy preferences of their citizens (Dahl 1971). Questions of representation are most heatedly debated in (ethnically) heterogeneous societies, where groups of people might feel excluded from access to power and unrepresented by policy outcomes. This is highly problematic, as feelings of exclusion may contribute to political instability and societal confrontations. Previous studies showed that representation in government reduces ethnic confrontations. We know little, however, about the political mechanism that links descriptive representation to the absence of ethnic confrontations. Government inclusion may be effective due to its symbolic effect on minorities' perceptions of inclusion. Usually it is argued, however, that descriptive representation in the government increases policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities, which in turn reduces grievances, and consequently, ethnic conflict. Empirical evidence for the role of policy responsiveness in reducing ethnic confrontations has not been presented so far. Rather, it has been approximated with data on descriptive representation in the government. This study attempted to extend the research on minority representation by disentangling the effect of descriptive representation and policy responsiveness. Building on the new dataset "Ethnic minorities in democracies" it analysed if and how policy responsiveness affects non-violent and violent forms of ethnic confrontation with the state.

In sum, the findings suggest that higher levels of policy responsiveness reduce ethnic minorities' confrontation with the state. Interestingly, the effect seems to differ for economic and cultural policies. While economic discrimination appears to follow an inverted u-shaped effect, cultural rights have a linear effect on ethnic confrontations. This supports the assumption that groups which are entirely marginalized do not protest, because they lack the necessary resources to sustain a political movement. By contrast, groups which are culturally, but not economically, marginalized may have the necessary economic means to sustain a confrontation with the state and might, therefore, be more likely to express their grievances through protesting. These differences call for further theoretical and empirical study in order to fully understand what distinguishes the effect of cultural from economic policies.

Apart from policy responsiveness descriptive representation in the government also matters. This might suggest that not only instrumental, but also symbolic aspects of inclusion contribute to the reduction of inter-ethnic tensions. In contrast to previous studies, which used descriptive representation (partly) as a proxy for policy responsiveness this paper set out to directly test this mechanism with new data which allowed us to look beyond descriptive representation in government. Thereby, it contributes to the discussion about minority representation and its effect on ethnic confrontations. While not all forms of representation affect protest in the same way, this study suggests that both, symbolic and instrumental aspects of representation explain the level of ethnic protest. This is significant as it contributes to the understanding of the role inclusion and representation play in ethnic confrontations. Only by disentangling descriptive and substantive representation and analysing specific policies one can understand, how representation affects ethnic protest. While government inclusion may work as a proxy for policy responsiveness to some extent, it also appears to matter on its own (after policy responsiveness is considered). Some may interpret this as a sign that symbolic aspects of representation accommodate minorities. Others, however, might argue that the effect of descriptive representation would disappear if more aspects of policy responsiveness were considered. Future

studies might, therefore, extend the findings of this paper in order to analyse whether the symbolic aspect of representation continues to play a role once additional aspects of policy responsiveness are considered.

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Supplementary material

Table A1: Ethnic Minority Groups

Country	Minority Group	Size	Years covered
Albania	Greeks	0.03	2001-2006
Argentina	Indigenous peoples	0.02	1983-2006
Australia	Aborigines	0.03	1950-2006
Austria	Slovenes	0.01	1955-2006
Belgium	Flemings	0.59	1950-2006
Bolivia	Aymara	0.25	1982-2006
Bolivia	Guarani	0.03	1982-2006
Bolivia	Quechua	0.31	1982-2006
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croats	0.14	2002-2006
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Roma	0.01	2002-2006
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbs	0.37	2002-2006
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	0.45	1985-2006
Bulgaria	Roma	0.05	1990-2006
Bulgaria	Turks	0.10	1990-2006
Canada	French Canadians	0.04	1990-2006
Canada	Indigenous People	0.03	1990-2006
Canada	Québecois	0.20	1990-2006
Chile	Indigenous People	0.04	1989-2006
Colombia	Afro-columbians	0.23	1957-2006
Colombia	Indigenous People	0.03	1957-2006
Costa Rica	Afro-Costa Ricans	0.03	1950-2006
Costa Rica	Indigenous People	0.01	1950-2006
Croatia	Serbs	0.05	2000-2006
Czech Republic	Roma	0.01	1993-2006
Ecuador	Highland Indigenous People	0.29	1979-2006
Ecuador	Lowland indigenous	0.01	1979-2006
El Salvador	Indigenous People	0.10	1979-2006
Estonia	Byelorussians	0.01	1991-2006
Estonia	Russians	0.26	1991-2006
Estonia	Ukrainians	0.02	1991-2006
Finland	Swedes	0.06	1950-2006
France	Basques	0.01	1969-2006
Georgia	Abkhazians	0.04	1996-2006
Georgia	Adzhars	0.06	1996-2006
Georgia	Armenians	0.06	1996-2006
Georgia	South Ossetians	0.02	1996-2006
Greece	Macedonians	0.01	1974-2006
Greece	Muslims	0.01	1974-2006
Greece	Roma	0.01	1974-2006
Guatemala	Indigenous People	0.43	1996-2006
Guyana	Afro-Guyanese	0.30	1991-2006
Guyana	Indigenous People	0.09	1991-2006
Honduras	Garifuna	0.02	1980-2006
Honduras	Indigenous People	0.07	1980-2006
Hungary	Roma	0.05	1989-2006
Israel	Arabs	0.11	1950-2006
Italy	Friulians	0.01	1950-2006

(continued)

Table A1 (continued)

Italy	Sardinians	0.02	1950-2006
Latvia	Byelorussians	0.29	1991-2006
Latvia	Russians	0.03	1991-2006
Latvia	Ukrainians	0.04	1991-2006
Lithuania	Poles	0.07	1991-2006
Lithuania	Russians	0.06	1991-2006
Macedonia	Albanians	0.25	1992-2006
Macedonia	Roma	0.03	1992-2006
Macedonia	Serbs	0.02	1992-2006
Macedonia	Turks	0.04	1992-2006
Mexico	Mayans	0.01	1997-2006
Mexico	Other Indigenous People	0.13	1997-2006
Moldova	Gagauz	0.04	1994-2006
Moldova	Slavs	0.21	1994-2006
New Zealand	Maori	0.13	1950-2006
Nicaragua	Indigenous People	0.05	1990-2006
Panama	Afro-Panamians	0.14	1990-2006
Panama	Indigenous People	0.60	1990-2006
Paraguay	Indigenous People	0.02	1992-2006
Peru	Afro-Peruvians	0.05	2000-2006
Peru	Aymara	0.02	2000-2006
Peru	Indigenous lowland people	0.01	2000-2006
Peru	Quechua	0.34	2000-2006
Romania	Magyars	0.07	1992-2006
Romania	Roma	0.03	1992-2006
Serbia-Montenegro	Croats	0.01	2000-2005
Serbia-Montenegro	Hungarian	0.03	2000-2005
Serbia-Montenegro	Albanian	0.17	2000-2005
Serbia-Montenegro	Roma	0.01	2000-2005
Serbia-Montenegro	Sandzak Muslims	0.03	2000-2005
Slovakia	Hungarians	0.11	1993-2006
Slovakia	Roma	0.04	1993-2006
Spain	Basques	0.06	1976-2006
Spain	Catalans	0.02	1976-2006
Spain	Galicians	0.05	1976-2006
Spain	Roma	0.17	1976-2006
Switzerland	Swiss French	0.16	1950-2006
Switzerland	Swiss Italian	0.08	1950-2006
Turkey	Kurds	0.18	2002-2006
Ukraine	Russians	0.22	1991-2006
United Kingdom	Catholics in N.I.	0.01	1950-2006
United Kingdom	Scots	0.10	1950-2006
United Kingdom	Welsh	0.02	1950-2006
United States	African-Americans	0.13	1950-2006
Uruguay	Afro-Uruguayans	0.06	1985-2006

Notes: Serbia 2006 and Montenegro 2006 fulfil the selection criteria, but are dropped from the analysis due to the lagging of the variables (as data for Serbia and Montenegro as separate countries is only available as of 2006 – i.e. the last year under observation).

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Non-violent protest	1832	1.68	1.32	0	4
Violent rebellion	2402	0.14	0.35	0	1
Economic discrimination	2405	1.81	1.48	0	4
Language rights	2023	2.75	2.24	0	6
Government inclusion	2405	0.23	0.42	0	1
Autonomy	2405	0.26	0.44	0	1
Concentration	2405	2.17	1.15	0	3
Size	2405	0.10	0.12	0.01	0.59
GDP p. C in 1000 US$	2403	14.17	9.49	1.47	43.22
Plurality System	2405	0.29	0.45	0	1
Proportional System	2405	0.62	0.49	0	1
Mixed System	2405	0.09	0.29	0	1
Antigovernment Actions	2388	1.23	3.14	0	60
State Repression	2405	1.96	0.97	1	5

Table A3: Explaining non-violent Protest behavior of Ethnic Minorities, robustness check

	Only minorities > 1.5%				Imputed Protest Variable			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Language Rights (lagged)	-0.14**	-0.13			-0.08*	-0.07		
	(0.05)	(0.11)			(0.04)	(0.08)		
Language Rights^2 (lagged)		-0.00				-0.00		
		(0.02)				(0.02)		
Economic Discrimination (lagged)			0.05	0.39**			0.03	0.60***
			(0.06)	(0.13)			(0.06)	(0.12)
Economic Discrimination^2 (lagged)				-0.08**				-0.13***
				(0.03)				(0.03)
Government Inclusion	-0.57***	-0.57***	-0.57***	-0.55***	-0.40***	-0.40***	-0.37***	-0.35***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Concentration	0.11+	0.11+	0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group Size	3.21***	3.22***	4.36***	4.17***	3.89***	3.90***	3.85***	3.59***
	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.90)	(0.89)	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.94)	(0.88)
GDP p.c in 1000 US$	0.06***	0.06***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Proportional System	0.14	0.14	-0.15	-0.20	0.07	0.07	-0.33*	-0.37*
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Mixed System	0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.12	-0.14
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Anti-government Actions	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.01+	0.01+
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Autonomy	0.20	0.20	0.22+	0.25+	0.09	0.08	0.02	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)
State Repression	-0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.96***	0.95***	0.78**	0.62*	1.22***	1.22***	1.09***	0.75**
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)

(continued)

Table A3 (continued)

Country level variance	0.48*	0.48*	3.54e-14	2.29e-10	0.29	0.29	2.01e-08	2.15e-10
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(2.88e-13)	(1.14e-07)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(1.51e-07)	(1.28e-09)
Slope Variance	0.10**	0.10**	0.05**	0.05**	0.04***	0.04***	0.10*	0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group level variance	0.12+	0.12+	0.53***	0.52***	0.49**	0.49**	1.07***	0.89***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Year level variance	0.94***	0.94***	0.91***	0.91***	0.70***	0.70***	0.70***	0.71***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observation	1265	1265	1564	1564	1935	1935	2299	2299
N(country, group)	36,57	36,57	42, 71	42, 71	44, 76	44, 76	48, 93	48, 93
Log Likelihood	-1844.37	-1844.37	-2249.45	-2245.76	-2542.55	-2542.54	-3045.45	-3033.09
BIC	3795.89	3803.03	4609.24	4609.20	5198.62	5206.17	6207.00	6190.02

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Robustness checks for protest variable. Models 1-4 replicate the models in Table 1 with groups > 1.5% of the population. This allows testing the models with an almost complete sample. In Models 5-8, the protest variable was imputed for missing groups with the value of 0, thus assuming that groups not reported in the MAR sample were not experiencing high levels of protest (as they would be 'at risk' otherwise and included into the sample). Multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command.

[a] Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system.

Table A4: Explaining violent and non-violent Protest Behavior of Ethnic Minorities, PTSCS Model

	Non-violent Protest				Violent Protest			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Language Rights (lagged)	-0.07	-0.01			-0.37**	-0.14		
	(0.07)	(0.14)			(0.14)	(0.36)		
Language Rights^2 (lagged)		-0.01				-0.05		
		(0.03)				(0.07)		
Economic Discrimination (lagged)			0.01	0.59*			0.68***	3.49***
			(0.11)	(0.27)			(0.15)	(0.61)
Economic Discrimination^2 (lagged)				-0.13*				-0.60***
				(0.06)				(0.12)
Government Inclusion	-0.67*	-0.67*	-0.68*	-0.67*	-1.07*	-1.03*	-1.52***	-1.44**
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Concentration	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.89*	0.94*	0.84**	1.11***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Group Size	7.47**	7.55**	7.68**	6.29*	2.11	2.29	1.83	0.28
	(2.73)	(2.74)	(2.80)	(2.65)	(3.64)	(3.70)	(3.20)	(3.90)
GDP p.c in 1000 US$	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.04*	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.03	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Proportional System	-0.09	-0.09	-0.11	-0.20	-0.78	-0.71	-1.08	-1.05
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.71)	(0.73)	(0.67)	(0.75)
Mixed System	0.27	0.25	0.17	0.11	-0.50	-0.43	-0.96	-0.74
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.79)	(0.81)	(0.73)	(0.81)
Anti-government Actions	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Autonomy	0.24	0.21	0.06	0.07	1.20**	1.16*	1.08**	1.25**
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.38)	(0.41)
State Repression	-0.08	-0.08	-0.00	-0.00	0.54**	0.52**	0.42**	0.24
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	0.87+	0.84+	0.48	0.28	-5.36***	-5.57***	-7.99***	-10.62***
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(1.21)	(1.25)	(1.20)	(1.48)

(continued)

Table A4 (continued)

Observations	1391	1391	1751	1751	1935	1935	2299	2299
N (country, group)	38, 63	38, 63	44,79	44,79	44, 76	44, 76	48, 93	48, 93
Log Likelihood	-1944.78	-1944.47	-2417.55	-2407.89	-428.98	-428.72	-491.79	-475.53
BIC	3961.93	3968.55	4909.78	4897.93	948.78	955.83	1076.46	1051.69

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

PTSCS models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtreg and xtlogit command. The models on non-violent conflict are calculated with clustered standard errors on the country-level to control for country variance (Option is not available for logistic models).

[a] Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system.

Table A5: The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic minorities' non-violent Protest, ordered logit models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Language Rights (lag)	-0.33**	-0.34		
	(0.12)	(0.23)		
Language Rights^2 (lag)		0.00		
		(0.04)		
Economic Discrimination (lag)			0.09	1.02***
			(0.11)	(0.26)
Economic Discrimination^2 (lag)				-0.22***
				(0.06)
Government Inclusion (lag)	-0.94***	-0.94***	-0.93***	-0.86***
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Territorial Autonomy	0.40	0.41	0.20	0.26
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Territorial Concentration	0.22	0.21	0.18	0.24+
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Group Size	6.67***	6.65***	8.75***	8.31***
	(1.92)	(1.93)	(1.93)	(1.89)
GDP p.c in 1000 US$	0.12***	0.12***	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Proportional System	0.08	0.08	-0.62+	-0.73*
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Mixed System	0.20	0.20	0.01	-0.07
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Anti-government Actions	0.00	0.00	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
State Repression	-0.09	-0.09	0.06	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Cut 1	-0.39	-0.40	0.27	0.73
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.53)	(0.54)
Cut 2	1.02+	1.01+	1.57**	2.04***
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.54)	(0.55)
Cut 3	2.68***	2.67***	3.08***	3.56***
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.54)	(0.55)
Cut 4	4.77***	4.76***	5.17***	5.65***
	(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Level 3 Variance (slope)	0.59*	0.58*	0.27	0.24
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(.)	(.)
Level 3 Variance (intercept)	2.24**	2.24**	3.11e-28	1.63e-28
	(0.99)	(0.99)	(78.53)	(81.91)
Level 2 Variance (intercept)	0.75**	0.74**	2.57***	2.46***
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.60)	(0.58)
Observations	1391	1391	1751	1751
N (country, ethnic groups)	38, 63	38, 63	44,79	44,79
Log-Likelihood	-1883.95	-1883.95	-2279.80	-2272.42
BIC	3890.95	3898.18	4679.10	4671.80

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Hierarchical ordered logit models were calculated with the meologit command in Stata 14.

Figure A6: Overview of selected indigenous protests in Bolivia

Period	Actors	Issues	Protests	Policy Changes	Change in Protest
Late 1980s-1994	CIDOB, CPIB	Collective land titles, cultural rights	Violent and non-violent protests until 1994	1991: legislation to protect rights of indigenous; 1992: improvement of land rights 1993: programmes to introduce bilingualism etc. 1994: new constitution that legally recognizes indigenous	Violent protests stopped entirely, non-violent protests concerned with these questions also stopped.
July 2000	CIDOB	Implementation of INRA law; bilingual education & health; subsoil resources	Non-violent protest in 2000	Negotiations with government. Minor improvements: A Guarani leader was inaugurated as vice minister.	CIDOB Protest ceased.
April – Sept. 2000	CSUTCB	Implementation of INRA Law; indigenous control over land reform, the distribution of titles and territories, as well as soil, subsoil and water rights	Violent and non-violent protests	Accord between government and protest organisers: modification of INRA law, infrastructural projects. But: no agreement regarding coca plantations	Immediate protest stopped Renewed protests in following years
After 2000	CIDOB, CSUTCB			The agreements of 2000 were eventually not fulfilled and built the basis for renewed mobilisation by low- and highland indigenous groups.	New protests due to dissatisfaction with implementation of agreement.

Sources: Evia, Laserna, and Skaperdas 2008; Gurr and Burke 2000; Gustafson 2002; Rice 2012; Van Cott 2005

Figure A1: Predicted probability of non-violent protest over varying levels of economic discrimination



Figure A2: Predicted probability of violent protest over varying levels of economic discrimination



Description of the Dataset „Ethnic minorities in democracies“

The dataset on “Ethnic minorities in democracies” covers countries since 1945 from Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America and Oceania, where ethnic minority groups are politically relevant and exceed one per cent of the population. Ethnic minorities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-nationalist minorities based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). Hence, it includes pluri-ethnic democracies (Freedom House (2011) ≤ 4 and Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2011) ≥ 6) with at least two ethnic groups and more than 500’000 inhabitants. In cases where the two ratings (Freedom House and Polity IV) differed, the country was only included if it is rated at most one scale-point below the democracy threshold (on the measure where it was not rated as democratic). For countries with interrupted democratic periods only the latest democratic period was counted (e.g. Turkey). Countries with a recent breakdown of democracy (e.g. Venezuela) were excluded from the dataset.

Datasets on ethnic minorities often suffer from selection bias, because one needs to decide which of the at least 5000 existing ethnic groups to include (Birnir et al. 2014; Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce problems of selection bias I chose politically relevant (salient) ethnic groups on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority at Risk dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The combination of both datasets reduces the selection bias associated with datasets on ethnicity (especially with MAR) (Hug 2013).

The variables are based on an extension of MAR data and indicators based on newly collected data.

Extension of MAR data

Three indicators are based on MAR data (violent and non-violent protest, economic discrimination). In order to increase the coverage of these indicators and gather data for all groups and countries in the dataset I consulted country specific sources and reports.

Economic Discrimination:

- Minority Rights Group International : http://www.minorityrights.org (main source, used for: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Costa Rica, Finland, Guyana, Macedonia, Spain, UK, Uruguay)
- Pan, C. and Pfeil, B.S., 2006. *Minderheitenrechte in Europa. Handbuch der europäischen Volksgruppen, Band 2*. Wien: Springer Verlag. (Latvia & Estonia)
- Wheatley, J., 2004. Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia. *ECMI Working Paper*, 12(September). (Georgia)

Rebellion:
According to Birnir (2011) only very few of the group that MAR does not cover have engaged in violent protest against the state. Therefore, I did a google search for all groups and countries where data on rebellion was missing and concluded that no violent rebellion had occurred, when the google search did not yield any results.

Protest:

In contrast to violent protest, non-violent protest occurs more often, also for groups that are not covered by MAR (e.g. parts of the French speaking population of Switzerland, Flemish population of Belgium). It was not possible to reliably code those protests for all missing countries with additional information. In particular, it was only possible to code the level of non-violent protest for Ukrainians and Byelorussians in Estonia and Latvia (replaced with values for the Russian minority, since many argue that these groups highly overlap and since they rarely mobilize independently).

Newly compiled indicators

Descriptive Representation in Parliament:

The dataset provides a measure of the overall descriptive representation in parliament (i.e. in minority parties *and* mainstream parties). For this purpose, the share of minority MPs was compared to the share of the minority in the population. Perfectly proportional descriptive representation is given, when the share of minority MPs corresponds to the minority's share in the population. Sources typically contain information on the number of MPs in parliament which was then related to the total number of seats in the lower house in order to calculate the share of minority MPs.

Main sources:

- Human rights reports (main source): http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
- Years before 1999: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=crhrp
- For 2006: Ruedin, D., 2009. Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 15(4), pp.335–354.

Additional sources:

- Albania: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/16856
- Brazil: Johnson, O.A.I., 1998. Racial Representation and Brazilian Politics: Black Members of the National Congress, 1983–1999. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 40(4), pp.97–118.
- Bulgaria: Protsyk, O. and Sachariew, K., 2012. Recruitment and Representation of Ethnic Minorities under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Bulgaria. *East European Politics & Societies*, 26(2), pp.313–339.
- Canada:
    - http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Compilations/Parliament/Aboriginal.aspx?Menu=HOC-Bio&Role=MP
    - http://www.mediaindigena.com/tim-fontaine/issues-and-politics/an-aboriginal-whos-who-of-canadian-politics
    - http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/Lists/Members.aspx?Current=True&ElectionDate=&First=False&Gender=&Name=&New=False&Parliament=1924d334-6bd0-4cb3-8793-cee640025ff6&Parliament=1924d334-6bd0-4cb3-8793-cee640025ff6&Party=&Picture=False&Province=&Riding=&Section=False
- Latin American Countries: Van Cott, D.L., 2000. *The friendly liquidation of the past. The Politis of Diversity in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

- Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova: Crowther, W.E. and Matonyte, I., 2007. Parliamentary elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova compared. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 40(3), pp.281–299.
- Macedonia: http://www.sobranie.mk/home-en.nspx
- Mexico: http://portal.te.gob.mx/sites/default/files/32_representacion.pdf
- Moldova:
    - http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41184&no_cache=1#.VbnjKEZKaDl
    - Protsyk, O. and Osoian, I., 2010. *Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties?: Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova*. ECMI Working Paper.
- New Zealand:
    - McLeay, E.M., 1980. Political argument about representation: the case of the Maori seats. *Political Studies*, XXVlll(1), pp.43–62.
    - Fleras, A., 2009. From Social Control towards Political Self-Determination? Maori Seats and the Politics of Separate Maori Representation in New Zealand. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 18(03), p.551.
- Romania:
    - Chatre, B., Protsyk, O. and Matichescu, M., 2009. Representational consequences of special mechanisms for ethnic minority inclusion : evidence from Romania.
- Switzerland:
    - Staatskalender Schweiz: http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch
- United States:
    - Lublin, D., 1999. *The Paradox of Representation*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_African-American_United_States_Representatives
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Hispanic_and_Latino_Americans_in_the_United_States_Congress

For some countries where ethnic minority groups live very concentrated, the number of MPs who are elected from a certain district was used as a proxy, when no other information was available. This concerns Wales in the UK, and the Basque region in France.

Representation in Ethnic Minority Parties

In addition to descriptive representation in parliament the share of minority MPs which is elected through ethnic minority parties is accounted for in the dataset. For this purpose a party is defined as ethnic when its representatives are primarily elected by members of one ethnic group and their main political appeal is based on ethnicity.

Sources for the identification of minority parties

- Bochsler, D., 2010. Electoral Rules and the Representation of Ethnic Minorties in Post-Communist Democracies. *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, 2007/8(7), pp.153–180.
- Ishiyama, J., 2009. Do Ethnic Parties Promote Minority Ethnic Conflict? *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15(1), pp.56–83.
- Reed, R., 2002. New Rules for the Game: Paraguayan Indigenous Groups and the Transition to Democracy. In: D. Mabury-Lewis, ed., *The Politics of Ethnicity:*

Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.309–328.
- Van Cott, D.L., 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics.* Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Pan, C. and Pfeil, B.S., 2006. *Minderheitenrechte in Europa. Handbuch der europäischen Volksgruppen, Band 2*. Wien: Springer Verlag.

Additional sources for election results

- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P., 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 15(1), pp.165–176.
- Nordsiek, W., 2012. *Parties and Elections. The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe*. [online] Available at: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/.
- European Election Database, 2012. *Data on various elections*. [online] Available at: <http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/>.
- Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2012. *PARLINE Database on national parliaments*. [online] Available at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp.

Representation in Government:

Main Source:

- Human rights reports (main source): http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
- Years before 1999: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=crhrp

Additional Sources:

- Birnir, J.K. and Satana, N.S., 2013. Religion and Coalition Politics. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(1), pp.3–30.
- Birnir, J.K., 2007. *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics*. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P., 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 15(1), pp.165–176.
- Nordsiek, W., 2012. *Parties and Elections. The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe*. [online] Available at: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/.
- European Election Database, 2012. *Data on various elections*. [online] Available at: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/.
- Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2012. *PARLINE Database on national parliaments*. [online] Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>.

Language Rights:

Main source:

- Leclerc, J., 2015. *L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde*. [online] Available at: http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/ [Accessed 8 Jul. 2015].

Additional sources:

- Liu, A.H., 2011. Linguistic Effects of Political Institutions. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(01), pp.125–139.
- Pan, C. and Pfeil, B.S., 2006. *Minderheitenrechte in Europa. Handbuch der europäischen Volksgruppen, Band 2*. Wien: Springer Verlag.

This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities in democracies worldwide. It analyses under which conditions descriptive representation in parliament influences policy responsiveness towards minorities. It then focuses on the consequences of these two types of representation for ethnic conflict and political support among ethnic minorities.

It draws on data from more than 40 countries and 90 minority groups in electoral democracies in Europe, North and South America, and Oceania and presents new data to test the hypotheses.

In sum, the dissertation shows that policy responsiveness differs significantly between minority and majority groups and that governments are often less responsive to members of minority than majority groups. Descriptive representation indeed incraeses policy responsiveness, especially when minority MPs have sufficient leverage. The fact that governments are less responsive towards minorities in many democracies is normatively problematic because one of the main pillars of democracy is only partially fulfilled. But it also has important empirical consequences: a lack of policy responsiveness negatively affects political support, and increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict.